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Preface
The models of this study have been presented in various seminars, workshops and conferences,
and I would like to thank the participants for their helpful comments. During the time following
these presentations, the papers were reviewed and modied several times. Consequently, the
chapters in this dissertation are not identical with the papers presented at these seminars.
Major parts of the paper "Bank Levy and Bank Risk-Taking" and of the paper "Contingent
Public Bailout, Contagion and Bank Risk-Taking" were presented 2012 at the 9th Workshop on
Money, Banking, and Financial Markets in Düsseldorf (Germany), at the Annual Conference of
the Verein für Socialpolitik in Göttingen (Germany) and at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian
Economic Association in Vienna (Austria). The paper "Who Should Rescue Subsidiaries of
Multinational Banks" was also presented at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic
Association and in a Doctoral Seminar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
These papers were also presented in the Doctoral Seminars at the University of Leipzig.
The paper "What Makes Banking Crisis Resolution So Di¢ cult? Lessons From Japan and
the Nordic Countries" is the only paper written in co-authorship with Uwe Vollmer. Although
this paper was developed in close cooperation, some parts of it can be individually allocated.
The following subsections were mainly written by Uwe Vollmer: 6:1 "Introduction", 6:2:4 "Cri-
sis resolution obstacles" and 6:4 "Reassessment of current crisis resolution procedures". The
Subsections 6:2:2 "Liquidity provisions", 6:2:3 "Bank bailouts", 6:3:1 "Japan", 6:3:2 "Nordic
countries" and the "Appendix" were written by the author of the dissertation. Subsections
6:2:1 "Taxonomy", 6:3:3 "Determinants of crisis resolution paths" and 6:5 "Conclusion" are
based on the joint e¤orts of both authors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Purpose and motivation
This thesis consists of ve essays. Although each essay is self-contained, they all share a
common theme: the relation between regulatory intervention and the risk-taking behaviour of
banks. Two major instruments of regulatory intervention are considered: bank levy and bank
bailouts. The objective of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following questions: Do
bank levies increase the risk-taking of banks in a competitive environment? When do bank
bailouts decrease banks risk-taking? Does the international coordination of bank bailouts
a¤ect the relation between bailouts and the risk-taking behaviour of banks? Who should rescue
subsidiaries of multinational banks? How could an e¢ cient coordination of bank bailouts be
designed and implemented?
The extensive public interventions by central banks and the scal authorities as well as the
severe outcome of the recent nancial crisis have brought these topics back to the political
agenda.1 In order to avoid a collapse of the nancial system, liquidity assistance by Central
Banks as well as solvency assistance by governments were necessary. The European Central
Bank (ECB), the US Federal Reserve (FED) and the Bank of England (BoE) decreased their
main renancing rate by more than 400 basis points within a few months.2 In addition, the
ECB, for instance, changed its monetary policy framework and applied a xed-rate tender
procedure with full allotment, which replaced the previous variable rate tender with xed
alloted amount. Apart from direct liquidity support to banks, Central Banks, in particular
the FED, have also purchased short-term papers and long-term securities to strengthen the
interbank market and the long-term securities market. These purchases were intensied when
sovereigns began to get distressed. Then, the CBs expanded their programme to the purchase
of government bonds.
1For a description of the recent crisis and policy reactions, see, for instance, Bordo (2008); Petrovic
& Tutsch (2009) and Acharya & Richardson (2009).
2On this point, and the examples that follow, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20090113a.htm (12 January 2014),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb110301.pdf (12 Janu-
ary 2014), and European Central Bank (2010).
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Apart from liquidity assistance to the nancial markets and institutions, solvency assistance,
for instance, through guarantees on bank liabilities and assets was provided in many developed
countries such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States and in some
developing countries (Laeven & Valencia (2012)). These interventions were accompanied by
direct recapitalization or even nationalization of important nancial institutions in Germany
(e.g. Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate), France (e.g. BNP), the Netherlands (e.g. Fortis,
ING), Switzerland (e.g. UBS), the United Kingdom (e.g. RBS, Northern Rock) and the United
States (e.g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
Despite the long list of crisis experiences in the second half of the 20th century, it could not
be avoided that many countries su¤ered from large scal costs and output losses (Caprio &
Klingebiel (2002); Laeven & Valencia (2008); Reinhart & Rogo¤ (2008)).3 Laeven & Valencia
(2012) determine scal costs of 1.8% of GDP in Germany, 1% of GDP in France, 8.8% of
GDP in United Kingdom, 4.5% of GDP in the United States and 27.3% of GDP in Greece.
Output losses amounted to 11% of GDP in Germany, 23% of GDP in France, 25% of GDP in
the United Kingdom, 31% of GDP in the United States and 43% of GDP in Greece.4
To avoid a recurrence of such a global nancial turmoil, the Group of Twenty (G-20) agreed
on guiding principles for regulatory reforms, such as the enhancement of sound regulation and
the reinforcement of international cooperation.5 To ensure the enhancement of sound regu-
lation, "nancial institutions should have clear internal incentives to promote stability". The
reform of international cooperation entails the collaboration of national supervisors through
the establishment of supervisory colleges for all major cross-border nancial institutions. These
colleges should strengthen the surveillance of the activities of nancial institutions and assess
the risks as well as regulate the cross-border crisis management. Major reforms initiated on
the summit in Washington D.C. have already been transposed in international agreements
and supranational and/or national law. These reforms also stipulate that nancial institutions
should bear the losses in a nancial crisis, as required by the G-20.
In the European Union, the establishment of a Banking Union has been considered as an
adequate way to avoid the recurrence of such a crisis. The Banking Union aims to harmonize
banking regulation in the European Union. Recently, the Members of the European Union
agreed on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), one of the key components of the Banking
Union. The SRM focuses on a bail-in tool, where shareholders and creditors bear the costs
3Caprio & Klingebiel (2002) nd 113 systemic banking crises in 93 countries, and they document 50
borderline and smaller banking crises in 44 countries between the late 1970s and 2002. They consider a
crisis as systemic if much, or all, bank capital is exhausted. Laeven & Valencia (2008) identify even 124
systemic banking crises between 1970 and 2007. They consider a crisis as systemic if "a countrys corporate
and nancial sectors experience a large number of defaults and nancial institutions and corporations
face great di¢ culties repaying contracts on time".
4Laeven & Valencia (2012) measure output losses as the cumulative sum of the di¤erences between
actual and trend real GDP expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP. They dene scal costs as
the component of gross scal outlays related to the restructuring of the nancial sector. Fiscal costs
associated with bank recapitalizations are included, but asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance
from the treasury are excluded.
5On this point and the following remarks, see http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/washington-
dc/declarationofthesummitonnancialmarketsandtheworldeconomy.htm (23 January 2014).
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of a bank failure, as the main resolution tool. Public intervention costs in a crisis have to be
paid by a fund which is nanced by the banks themselves through a bank levy. Cooperation
between resolution authorities shall be established in the crisis prevention period in order to
facilitate public intervention in a crisis scenario.
The following chapters analyse the relation between two key components of the SRM - the
bank levy and the cooperation between resolution authorities -, and a main objective declared
by the G-20: banks incentives to promote stability. Although the bail-in tool (conversion
of debt into equity) is a key component of the SRM, bailouts, or at least the assistance
to struggling banks, should not be excluded. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD)6 does not explicitly exclude such support: "In order to avoid moral hazard, any failing
institution should be able to exit the market, irrespective of its size and interconnectedness,
without causing systemic disruption. A failing institution should in principle be liquidated under
normal insolvency proceedings. However, liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings
might jeopardise nancial stability, interrupt the provision of critical functions, and a¤ect the
protection of depositors. In such a case it is highly likely that there would be a public interest
in placing the institution under resolution and applying resolution tools rather than resorting to
normal insolvency proceedings. The objectives of resolution should therefore be to ensure the
continuity of critical functions, to avoid adverse e¤ects on nancial stability, to protect public
funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public nancial support to failing institutions
and to protect covered depositors, investors, client funds and client assets (BRRD)."
As the ordinary resolution tools, such as the bail-in tool, have not yet been tested in a real
crisis, and due to the fact that it will take time to prepare global institutions for such a tool
in a crisis, it may be useful to have an adequately designed "tool of last resort", such as a
bailout, in order to avoid the disruption of critical functions. Therefore, the essays also deal
with the impacts of bank bailouts on the risk-taking behaviour of banks and ask which bailout
policy could avoid moral hazard and enforce sound behaviour of banks.
1.2 Methodology
Although the essays are self-contained, each chapter shares with other chapters common
methodology aspects. This does not mean that the basic cornerstones presented in the fol-
lowing are the same in all essays. Peculiarities will be presented in each chapter separately.
Chapter 6 di¤ers from the other chapters in as much as it does not provide a model, but it
provides a review of the literature on the relation between regulatory intervention and banks
risk-taking. This chapter studies regulatory interventions in previous episodes of crises by using
a case-study approach.
6Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing
a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment rms and amending
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC,
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU)
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 173, 12 June 2014, p. 190.
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Methodologically, the aim of the thesis is to study how bank regulation a¤ects the risk-
taking behaviour of banks from a theoretical point of view. Therefore, the focus is on one of
the key banking functions: managing risks. The banksrisk management can be analysed in
various ways as there are diverse risks in a bank. A fundamental distinction is between liquidity
risk and solvency risk. Liquidity risk occurs when a bank faces unexpected cash payments,
whereas solvency or credit risk occurs when a borrower is unable to repay a debt or, generally,
when the project of the bank fails. While the rst type of risk concentrates on the liability
side of a balance sheet, the solvency risk concentrates on the asset side of a balance sheet
(Freixas & Rochet (2008)). The focus of the following essays is on solvency risk.7
Solvency risk or credit risk can be modeled in several ways. A prominent way of mod-
eling credit risk decisions in banking is the portfolio approach (Hart & Ja¤ee (1974); Kim
& Santomero (1988)). This approach deals with banks choosing their optimal investment,
depending on the return and risk of the portfolio, as well as on their risk preferences. In gen-
eral, we follow this basic approach, but assume that banks are risk-neutral (Cordella & Yeyati
(2003)). Therefore, the portfolio choice of the banks is based on expected payo¤s of the
portfolios. Due to limited liability of banks, the portfolio with the highest expected payo¤ is
not necessarily the banks optimal choice. The key determining factor of the banks behaviour
throughout the essays is the choice between high payo¤s and safe investments. This trade-o¤
can also be obtained by a setup in which banks monitor their creditors, where this monitoring
is costly (Holmstrom & Tirole (1997)). Both setups will be applied in this thesis, depending
on which approach is more convenient.
We not only analyse the risk-taking of a bank in isolation, but we also consider competition
among banks. Therefore, we use the industrial organization approach and apply it to the
banking sector (Freixas & Rochet (2008)). The focus is on the monopolistic competition
setup à la Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979), where rms (banks) compete on the market
for customers, e.g. depositors. In the Hotelling model, two rms, located on a street line,
compete in the market for customers, whereas Salop models competition among more than
two rms. As long as the number of rms is "irrelevant", we direct our attention on the setup
à la Hotelling.
In this thesis, the impact of bank regulation on the risk-taking behaviour of banks is
always studied in a setup of simple non-cooperative games, where the player set consists of
the banks, shareholders and creditors (depositors) and the regulator. We consider subgame
perfect equilibria and solve the games by backward induction if the games are in extensive
form. In one section, we need the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. If the games are
static, we use the Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. Except in base scenarios, the
information among the players is asymmetric. Hence, the players cannot observe each others
actions. As a consequence, a regulator, for instance, cannot observe a banks risk decisions
and, therefore, cannot condition his bailout policy on the banks risk behaviour. However,
7For further details on the relationship between regulation and liquidity risk, we refer the reader to
Chapter 6.
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even if the regulator was able to observe a banks risk-taking, he may not be able to condition
his bailout policy on the banks behaviour. This is only possible if the regulator and the bank
can sign a contract which forces the regulator to pursue a pre-dened bailout policy. Such a
contract is called "complete".
The literature di¤erentiates between "complete" and "incomplete" contracts. For example,
complete-contract models deal with situations where a contingent contract on states of nature
can be signed, as they are observable and veriable by a third party, e.g. a court (Freixas &
Rochet (2008)). Consider, for instance, a shock that may hit a bank and force it into insolvency.
This shock might be observable and veriable by a court which allows the regulator and the
banks to sign a contract promising a certain bailout probability depending on the state of
nature or the systemic relevance of the bank. This approach is used in Chapters 3 and 4.
Incomplete-contract models deal with situations where a contingent contract, if written, would
have no legal value, since no court would be able to determine the contingent obligations of
either party. Consider, for instance, a shock that may hit a bank and run it into insolvency.
Although both regulators and banks can observe the shock, they cannot sign a contract which
allocates a bailout probability to each type of shock, since it cannot be veried by a third
party. Consequently, an ex ante announcement is not credible (Repullo (2000); Kahn &
Santos (2005)). This approach is used in Chapter 5. In Chapter 2, bailouts are not taken into
consideration and, therefore, the di¤erentiation between complete and incomplete contracts
is not necessary. It may be worthwile to mention that the distinction between complete
and incomplete contracts could or has to be made in the case of each contract between
any parties. However, contracts between depositors and banks are considered as complete
contracts throughout this dissertation and, therefore, we only distinguish between complete
and incomplete contracts explicitly when referring to the linkage between the regulator and
the banks.
1.3 Summary and contributions
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Detailed contributions to the literature are pre-
sented in the literature review at the beginning of each chapter. In order to avoid repetitions,
we concentrate in this section on some key papers from which the models presented below
borrow specic elements.
The following part of Chapter 1 (Introduction) describes the regulatory developments on
the global, European and German level. We focus on the euro area and on Germany as this
country plays a major role in the European banking sector. Besides, as this regulation is led by
European authorities, the cornerstones of bank regulation are the same in all countries which
belong to the European (Monetary) Union and, as such, Germany is a representative case for
all European countries.
Chapter 2 analyses the impact of a bank levy on the risk-taking behaviour of banks in a
competitive environment. The setup is similar to Repullo (2004), though he focuses on the
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relation between capital requirements and risk-taking behaviour of banks competing on the
deposit market. As a main result, we show that a bank levy may decrease banksrisk-taking
behaviour depending on whether banksare nanced through secured or unsecured debt and
depending on whether banks are transparent or opaque. Although the e¤ects of fees on banks
have already been discussed (Shin (2010), Perotti & Suarez (2009) and Gorton & Huang
(2004)), the relation between a bank levy and banksrisk-taking in a competitive environment
has not been studied extensively.
Chapter 3 examines how ex ante announced bank guarantees inuence the risk-taking
behaviour of banks in a competitive environment. In general, we proceed with the setup of
Repullo (2004) and combine it with one ingredient of the setup used in Cordella & Yeyati
(2003), who analyse the impact of bank bailouts on a banks risk-taking behaviour where
no competition is involved. We show that competition matters with regard to the impact
of bank bailouts on banksrisk-taking. The success of the bailout policy in avoiding moral
hazard depends on the regulators ability to condition his bailout policy in accordance with
the macroeconomic environment, which has an impact on the banksprobability of success,
or on his ability to condition the bailout policy on the bankssystemic relevance. This essay
contributes to the recent literature by challenging some assumptions used in the paper of
Cordella and Yeyati, and by investigating the combination of bank competition, charter value
and systemic relevance of banks.
Chapter 4 takes both a bank guarantee and a bank levy into account. It borrows from
the setup in DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011), where the failure of banks can spill over to
other banks which do not compete with each other. The main nding is that bailouts can
decrease banks risk-taking behaviour if the authorities only rescue struggling banks which
are systemic. This contrasts with the nding of the previous chapter, where bank bailouts
reduce risk-taking if banks are not too systemic. Furthermore, by extending the basic setup of
DellAriccia and Ratnovski, the essay examines under which conditions a coordination of bank
bailouts is desirable in a case where banks are located in their home country, but their failure
a¤ects the survival of banks in neighbouring countries. The main result is that coordination
of bailouts through a multinational regulator can improve welfare. Finally, a bank levy, which
depends on the systemic relevance of banks, has an impact on the e¢ cient bailout policy. This
essay provides a simple contagion setup, allowing for several extensions in order to analyse the
impact of coordination upon authorities on the risk-taking behaviour of banks.
Chapter 5 analyses the incentives of a multinational bank which is located in a host country,
but monitored by its home country. The main result is that the desirability of internationally
coordinated bailouts depends on the dimension of the crisis. If the crisis is severe, it may
be more e¢ cient to delegate bank bailouts to a multinational regulator. However, such a
delegation is not always feasible. Therefore, a pre-dened burden sharing of bank bailouts is
necessary in order to achieve an e¢ cient resolution of banks in distress. This analysis is in
line with Mikkonen (2006), who, however, does not ask how an e¢ cient bailout policy can
be implemented. The essay also contributes to Repullo (2000), who asks whether a central
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bank or a deposit insurance should rescue a failing bank, and to Kahn & Santos (2005), who
examine whether the lender of last resort and deposit insurance functions should be allocated
to one authority. In addition to Niepmann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Goodhart &
Schoenmaker (2009), we justify the optimal coordination and nancing arrangement from a
moral hazard (risk-taking) point of view.
Chapter 6 complements the previous chapters by focusing on crisis resolution barriers. It
follows a case-study approach and detects obstacles which deter regulators from pursuing an
e¢ cient bailout policy (Yin (2003)). As the impacts of the recent nancial crisis are still
on-going, we draw lessons from Japan and the Nordic countries in the 1990s. This essay is
in line with Calomiris, Klingebiel & Laeven (2004), who draw lessons from several crises in
Japan, Mexico and Sweden, for example. The approach presented in this thesis di¤ers in the
country sample and in the focus. In contrast to Calomiris et al. (2004), we link the case-study
to the recent literature on the relation between bank bailouts and banksrisk-taking behaviour
as well as direct scal costs of bailouts.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. It provides some policy implications and lists some
open questions for further research. A summary of the chapters will be provided in each
chapter separately and, therefore, will not be repeated in the conclusion.
The literature which deals with similar topics is described in each chapter separately. Since
the chapters are similar to the papers which were already presented on several conferences,
repetitions are inevitable, especially with regard to the cited literature and the framework.
Nevertheless, we tried to avoid as many repetitions as possible and mainly used the same
symbols in each chapter in order to facilitate reading.
1.4 Legal background of bank bailout and bank res-
olution
The objective of this section is threefold. Firstly, it aims to summarize the recent developments
and current situation of cooperation among national supervisory authorities. Due to the fact
that this is the key topic in Chapters 4 and 5, the current legal framework for cooperation
is described in more detail. Secondly, it provides some insights into the regulation of the
bank levy in Germany because this topic becomes important in Chapters 2 and 4. Thirdly,
this section describes the instruments available in a situation where individuals or a group of
institutions are in trouble. Moreover, it species the requirements for recovery and resolution
processes.
1.4.1 Global level
In the aftermath of the nancial crisis of 2007-2008, the stabilization of nancial markets
became a major goal, and nancial sector reforms were an important instrument to achieve
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it. The nancial crisis illustrated the importance of cross-border crisis management because
the tools and techniques for handling cross-border bank crisis resolution did not evolve at the
same pace as the scope and complexity of international nancial transactions expanding in
the pre-crisis period. The crisis management revealed gaps in intervention techniques and the
absence of an appropriate set of resolution tools in many countries. Actions taken to resolve
cross-border institutions during the crisis were rather ad hoc and severely limited by time
constraints. In order to ll these gaps, the Basel Committees Cross-border Bank Resolution
Group developed a set of recommendations.8 At the summit in Washington D.C. in 2008, the
G-20 announced guidelines for the development of new rules which were to ensure cooperation
among national regulators, support market discipline, avoid adverse impacts on other countries,
and promote competition and innovation.
The Basel Committees recommendations are intended to strengthen national resolution
powers and their cross-border implementation. They also provide guidance for bank-specic
contingency planning, as banks, as well as key home authorities and host authorities, must
develop practical and credible plans to promote resiliency in periods of severe nancial distress
and to facilitate a rapid resolution, should that be necessary. The recommendations also aim
to reduce contagion by advocating the use of risk mitigation mechanisms, such as the use of
regulated central counterparties.9
Due to the fact that large nancial institutions operate in home jurisdictions and in host
jurisdictions, an international coordination of national bank resolution measures is essential
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)). Information sharing among national au-
thorities and the recognition of foreign crisis management and resolutions are seen as major
steps in achieving such coordination. Cooperation between national authorities should be en-
sured by the establishment of supervisory colleges for major cross-border nancial institutions.
Guidelines for the colleges and for sharing information are provided by the re-established Fi-
nancial Stability Board (FSB).10 These colleges already exist for major banks in Europe and
convene on a regular basis. Their task is to coordinate bank regulation in normal times, i.e.
intervene at early stages, but also to prepare resolution strategies for emergencies.
Agreements between host and home authorities should dene the role and responsibility of
home and host country regulators for managing the resolution of failed systemic institutions.
These plans might even force the multinational banks to change their legal and operational
structure and business practice in order to facilitate their resolution and recovery in times of
distress. The procedures should, for instance, facilitate the transfer of ownership of systemically
8The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks
and it provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. For an overview of the members
of the Committee, see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm (3 February 2014).
9http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.htm (15 March 2014).
10The FSB was established to coordinate the work of national nancial authorities and international
standard-setting bodies and to develop the implementation of e¤ective regulatory and supervisory policies.
The initial mandate was given to the Financial Stability Forum by the Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors of the Group of Seven in 1999. A broadened mandate was given by the Group of Twenty
in London in 2009. See https://www.nancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf (3 February
2014).
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relevant parts of failed institutions to another private rm or to a bridge nancial institution
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)).
Early interventions include the requirement to facilitate nancial institutionsgroup struc-
tures in order to guarantee the orderly resolution of such banks. Individual units should, for
instance, be separable, intra-group blanket guarantees should be minimised and the separabil-
ity of global payment and settlement services should be ensured (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2010); Financial Stability Board (2010)). Apart from ensuring the resolution of
individual nancial entities, the authorities in each country should enable the resolution of
conglomerates by providing the power for resolution authorities to intervene into these insti-
tutions. The FSB also provides guidelines for the handling of systemic nancial institutions
which cannot be liquidated (Financial Stability Board (2010)). Accordingly, these institutions
should be subject to higher loss-absorbency capacity than non-systemic institutions. This
would include capital and liquidity surcharges as well as tighter exposure restrictions. Further-
more, national authorities should intensify the supervision of these institutions and develop
adequate resolution schemes which do not pass the burden to tax payers. Therefore, author-
ities should strengthen on-site supervision and require stress tests measuring the resilience of
credit institutions to shocks and their ability to absorb liquidity and solvency shocks.
1.4.2 European level
On the European level, the recent nancial crisis and the aims proclaimed by the G-20 changed
the regulation and supervisory framework tremendously. By the implementation of the banking
union, bank supervision has been partially transferred from national regulators to a multina-
tional authority. The cornerstones of the new supervisory framework in the European Monetary
Union are the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM),
a European bank deposit insurance scheme and the harmonization of the rulebook. The SSM
has the task of harmonizing bank supervision in the European Monetary Union by transfering
part of the regulatory power to the European Central Bank.11 It is complemented by the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which aims to achieve a harmonization of banking res-
olution and the funding for the resolution of banks. The level of deposit protection has been
increased to 100.000 e in the EU. However, a pan-EU deposit guarantee scheme is currently
not under discussion. Therefore, this topic will not be treated within this context. Major parts
of the single legal framework are the new capital regulations, Capital Requirement Regulation
(CRR)12, which came into force in January of 2014, and the Capital Requirements Directive
11The SSM is called a mechanism because the European Treaty framework did not provide the possi-
bility of creating a centralized European institution with the power of bank supervision. However, the
Treaty allows the transfer of specic tasks to the ECB.
12Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment rms and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012, OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, p. 1.
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IV (CRD IV)13, which has to be transposed into national law, as well as the Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which has been adopted in April 2014 by the European
Parliament and in Mai 2014 by the European Council. Member States must comply with this
Directive at the beginning of 2015.14 The European Banking Authority (EBA) will continue
with the development of a single rulebook for banks and a single handbook for supervisors by
designing technical standards.
Single Supervisory Mechanism
On 12 September 2012, the Commission adopted two proposals for the establishment of a
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for banks led by the European Central Bank (ECB).
The Euro area summit in summer 2012 called on the Commission to present proposals for
the setting up of a Single Supervisory Mechanism as a precondition for a possible direct
recapitalisation of banks by the ESM (European Stability Mechanism). This was followed by
national parliamentary procedures which have been completed in the meantime. The SSM
has come into force in the autumn of 2013. The supervisory powers of the ECB will be
fully e¤ective and operational one year after coming into force. In order to separate ECBs
monetary tasks and supervisory tasks, the governance structure of the ECB will consist of a
separate Supervisory Board supported by a steering committee, the ECB Governing Council,
and a mediation panel for solving disagreements that may arise between national competent
authorities and the Governing Council.15 Before the ECB starts with the supervision, the
balance sheets of the large banks are assessed in the spring of 2014, and the institutes will
have to undergo a stress test.
The SSM applies to all the euro-area Member States, but non-euro area Member States
can decide to join the SSM by establishing a cooperation with the ECB. The Regulation confers
key supervisory tasks and powers over all the credit institutions established within the euro area
to the ECB, i.e. investment rms are not included.16 The ECB carries out its tasks in close
cooperation with national authorities through the establishment of joint supervisory teams.
Hence, the ECB does not have omnipotent tasks and powers. It shall ensure the coherent and
consistent application of the single rulebook in the euro area and contribute to the safety and
soundness of credit institutions. The ECB will directly supervise signicant banks which are
measured in an economically relevant manner, for instance, by their size, and those belonging
to the three most signicant credit institutions in each Member State. In addition, institutions,
receiving direct assistance from the ESM, will also be supervised by the ECB. The national
authorities will, in general, remain the competent authority for the daily supervision of less
13Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment
rms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176,
27 June 2013, p. 338.
14Some exceptions apply for certain parts of this Directive. See article 130 BRRD.
15http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-899_en.htm?locale=en (15 March 2014).
16This may lead to conicts of interests between bank supervision and monetary policy.
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signicant credit institutions. The ECB will send instructions to national supervisors, and
national supervisors will have the duty to notify the ECB of supervisory decisions of material
consequence. For cross-border banks which are active both within and outside Member States
participating in the SSM, current home/host supervisor coordination procedures will continue
to exist as they do today. Despite the fact that daily supervision of less signicant institutions
remains the responsibility of national authorities, the ECB has exclusive competences with
respect to all credit institutions of the Member States, such as the licensing and withdrawl
of license. The ECB has exclusive competences for certain functions that are core banking
supervisory functions and enumerated in the SSM Regulation, such as to carry out supervisory
reviews, including stress tests.17
Single Resolution Mechanism
The European Parliament and the Council have adopted the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) for the Banking Union in April and May 2014, repectively. The SRM Regulation builds
on the rulebook on bank resolution set out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD). It covers all countries participating in the SSM, i.e. the Member States in the EMU
and those non-eurozone countries that decide to join the SSM via cooperation agreements. A
Single Resolution Board will prepare resolution plans and resolve all banks directly supervised by
the ECB and cross-border banks. National resolution authorities will be responsible for banks
which only operate nationally and are not subject to full ECB direct supervision, provided that
this will not involve any use of the single fund. The SRM will be fully operational from 1
January 2016.
The agreement includes arrangements for the transfer of national contributions to the
fund with an 8-year transitional phase. The fund will be administered by the Single Resolution
Board. It will endorse the bail-in rules established in the BRRD as applicable to the use of the
single fund. The single resolution fund will be nanced by national bank levies and initially
consist of national compartments that will be gradually merged over the transitional phase.
While during the rst years the cost of resolving banks (after bail-in) will mainly come from
the compartments of the member states where the banks are located, the share will gradually
decrease as the contribution from other countriescompartments increases. During the initial
build-up phase of the fund, bridge nancing will be available from national sources, backed by
bank levies, or from the European Stability Mechanism, in accordance with agreed procedures.
Lending between national compartments will also be possible.
Upon notication by the ECB that a bank is failing or likely to fail, or on its own initiative,
the board will adopt a resolution scheme placing the bank into resolution. It will determine
the application of resolution tools and the use of the single resolution fund. The board will
consist of an executive director and the representatives of the national resolution authorities
17http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-899_en.htm?locale=en (15 March 2014). The new
framework of the SSM raises questions on several topics such as the division of tasks between national
authorities and the ECB.
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of all the participating countries. It will be responsible for the planning and resolution of
cross-border banks and those directly supervised by the ECB. National resolution authorities
will be responsible for executing bank resolution plans under the control of the single resolution
board.18
Recovery and Resolution
On 6 June 2012, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD). The proposed framework sets out the necessary steps and powers
to ensure that bank failures across the EU are managed in a way which avoids nancial
instability and minimises costs for taxpayers. An agreement was reached on 12 December
2013 between the European Parliament, EU Member States and the Commission on the
directive. In April and May 2014, respectively, the BRRD has been approved by the European
Parliament and the European Council. Now it has to be transposed into national law.19
The directive is aimed at providing national authorities with common powers and instru-
ments to avoid bank crises and to resolve any nancial institution in an orderly manner in the
event of failure, while, at the same time, preserving essential bank operations and minimis-
ing taxpayersexposure to losses. The directive establishes a range of instruments to tackle
potential bank crises at three stages: preparatory and preventative, early intervention, and
resolution (Table 1.1).20 To ensure that institutions always have a su¢ cient loss-absorbing
capacity, the national authorities should set minimum requirements for own funds and eligible
liabilities for each institution. This capacity depends on the size, risk and business model of
the institution.21
As a preventive measure, recovery and resolution plans ("living wills") have to be designed.
Member States shall ensure that the institutes develop a recovery plan which entails, for
instance, a communication and disclosure plan outlining how the rm intends to manage any
potentially negative market reactions, a range of capital and liquidity actions to restore the
institutions nancial position in the recovery period, a detailed description of any material
impediment to the e¤ective and timely execution of the plan, identication of critical functions
which the institution fullls, arrangements and measures to conserve or restore the institutions
capital base and measures to reduce risk and leverage. Moreover, the plans shall include a
range of scenarios of severe nancial stress, including system-wide events, legal-entity-specic
stress and group-wide stress. Recovery plans shall not assume any access to extraordinary
18http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-77_en.htm?locale=en (4 April 2014).
19http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm (15 March 2014)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-119_en.htm (20 May 2014)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/econ/142492.pdf (20 May
2014).
20Table 1.1 is based on DG Internal Market and Services (2011) and the BRRD. See
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/crisis_management/
consultation_paper_en.pdf (20. Mai 2013).
21http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/econ/142492.pdf (20 May
2014).
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public nancial support, but shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may
apply for the use of central bank facilities in stress scenarios and identify those assets which
would be expected to qualify as collateral (article 5 BRRD).22 The competent authority can
require revised plans and even direct the institution to make specic changes to its business
and risk prole if there are material deciencies or potential impediments to its implementation
(article 6 BRRD).
The resolution authority, in cooperation with the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions
in which any signicant branches and subsidiaries are located, shall draw up a resolution plan for
each institution (article 10 BRRD). The resolution plan shall prepare the resolution authority
for emergencies. It shall take into consideration a range of ideosyncratic and systemic scenarios
and, in general, not assume any extraordinary public nancial support. It shall include, among
others, a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be separated
from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution.
Resolution authorities shall assess the extent to which an institution is resolvable without
extraordinary public nancial support apart from the use of the nancing arrangements (article
15 BRRD). An institution shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the
resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it
by applying the di¤erent resolution tools and powers without giving rise to signicant adverse
consequences for nancial systems. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities
have the power, for instance, to require the institution to draw up service agreements in order
to cover the provision of critical functions, to require the institution to limit its exposures and
to require the institution to divest specic assets (article 17 BRRD).
Moreover, Member States shall ensure that a parent institution and its subsidiaries covered
by the consolidated supervision may agree on the provision of nancial support for any other
party that meets the conditions for early intervention (article 19 BRRD). Financial support
may only be provided by a group entity in accordance with a group nancial support agreement
if specic conditions listed in this article and article 23 BRRD are met.
Early intervention measures are, for instance, to require the management of the institution
to implement measures set out in the recovery plan or to require the institution to remove and
replace one or more members of the management if these persons are found unt to perform
their duties (article 27 et seq. BRRD). Competent authorities may appoint a temporary
administrator to the institution and confer the powers of the management of the institution,
including the power to exercise some or all of the administrative functions of the management
of the institution (article 29 BRRD).
Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities take a resolution action to achieve
the objectives listed in article 31 BRRD and in accordance with the principles dened in article
22The ESRB is part of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which was implemented
to ensure the supervision of the Unions nancial system. Besides the ESRB, the ESFS comprises the
EBA. For more information, see www.esrb.europa.eu. The legal text of the BRRD can be found on
the website: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PE%2014%202014%20REV%202 (20
May 2014).
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34 BRRD if the resolution authority considers that all of the following conditions are met:
the resolution authority has determined that the institution is failing or likely to fail; there
is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action taken with
respect to the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable time
frame; a resolution action is necessary in the public interest (article 32 BRRD). The resolution
objectives are, for instance, to ensure the continuity of critical functions, to avoid signicant
adverse e¤ects on nancial stability and to protect public funds by minimising reliance on
extraordinary public nancial support (article 31 BRRD). The shareholders of the institution
under resolution shall bear rst losses, creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses
after the shareholders, the management of the institution under resolution is replaced, unless
their retention is considered necessary for the achievement of the resolution objectives, and
"no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the institution...had
been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings" (article 34 BRRD).
The resolution tools are the following (article 37 BRRD):
 the sale of business tool,
 the bridge institution tool,
 the asset separation tool,
 the bail-in tool.
When the resolution tools are used to transfer only part of the assets or liabilities of the
institution under resolution, the residual institution shall be wound up under normal insolvency
proceedings (article 37 BRRD). According to article 57 et seq. BRRD Member States may
become a temporary shareholder of an institution.
Group level resolution authorities shall establish resolution colleges and cooperate with
third countries (article 88 BRRD). Cooperation arrangements concluded between resolution
authorities of Member States and third countries may include provisions such as the exchange
of information necessary for the preparation and maintenance of resolution plans. The nancing
arrangements shall consist of: national nancing arrangements, the borrowing between national
nancing arrangements and the mutualisation of national nancing arrangements in the case
of a group resolution (article 99 BRRD). Financing arrangements shall, in particular, have:
 the power to raise ex ante contributions,
 the power to raise ex post extraordinary contributions and
 the power to contract borrowings and other forms of support.
The nancing arrangements may be used for the following purposes (among others): to
guarantee the assets or the liabilities of the institution under resolution, to make loans to
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Table 1.1: Prevention, early intervention and resolution measures
Prevention
(sound institution)
Early intervention
(problem detected)
Resolution
(failed or likely to fail)
- Stress tests
- Resolution and recovery
plans
- Agreements between
parent institutions and
subsidiaries
- Recovery measures
- Remove/replace
management
- Special managers
- Ordinary wind up
- Sale of business
- Bridge institution
- Asset separation
- Bail-in
the institution under resolution, to purchase assets of the institution under resolution, to
contribute capital to a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle (article 101 BRRD).
The contribution of each institution shall be pro rata to the amount of its liabilities (excluding
its own funds) minus covered deposits with respect to the aggregate liabilities (excluding
its own funds), minus covered deposits of all the institutions authorised in the territory of
the Member State (article 103 BRRD). Moreover, these contributions shall be adjusted in
proportion to the risk prole of institutions. In the case of a group resolution, the national
nancing arrangement of each of the group entities, with respect to which resolution action
is proposed, contributes to the nancing of the group resolution (article 107 BRRD).
1.4.3 German level
By the implementation of the German Bank Restructuring Act (Figure 1.1), Germany al-
ready meets several requirements dened by international agreements. Further amendments
are necessary due to the nalization of the BRRD. The German Bank Restructuring Act
(RStruktG)23, implemented 2010 and in force since January 2011, modied the German Bank-
ing Act (KWG)24 as well as the Financial Market Stabilization Fund Act (FMStFG)25 and
implemented the Credit Institution Reorganization Act (KredReorG)26 and the Restructuring
23Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur Errichtung
eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist der aktien-
rechtlichen Organhaftung (Restrukturierungsgesetz - RStruktG), BGBl. 2010 I, p. 1900, with subsequent
amendments.
24Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz - KWG), BGBl. 1998 I, p. 2776, with subsequent
amendments.
25Gesetz zur Errichtung eines Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz
- FMStFG), BGBl. 2008 I, p. 1982, with subsequent amendments.
26Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten (Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz - Kre-
dReorgG), BGBl. 2010 I, p. 1900, with subsequent amendments.
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Fund Act (RStruktFG)27.
The KWG species general requirements for credit institutions, such as their rights and
duties, and for the bank supervision. Moreover, it comprises measures for special situations,
e.g. insolvency, and it regulates the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions. In
the latter case, the KWG di¤erentiates between systemic and non-systemic credit institutions.
The RStruktG accounts for the potential failure of systemically relevant institutions. Its major
aim is to guarantee the recovery or reorganization of credit institutions whose failure might
cause severe disturbances in the proper functioning of the nancial system.28 The instruments
should take cross-border banking into consideration and enable an internationally coordinated
recovery or reorganization of multinational institutions.
The Credit Institution Reorganization Act regulates two kinds of procedures for institutions
in trouble: a resturcturing procedure ("Sanierungsverfahren") and a reorganization procedure
("Reorganisationsverfahren"). The di¤erence between the restructuring and the reorganiza-
tion procedure is, rst, that only systemic banks can pursue a reorganization procedure and,
second, that only in the latter procedure measures adopted can a¤ect shareholdersand cred-
itorsrights. The Credit Institution Reorganisation Act aims to achieve a consensus between
supervisors, the credit institution and its creditors. It does not a¤ect the powers of the Fed-
eral Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), including its right to apply for the initiation of
insolvency proceedings under the Banking Act.
The Restructuring Fund was established with the Financial Market Stabilization Act, which
was implemented in 2008 to stabilize the nancial market. Pursuant to the Restructuring
Fund Act (RStruktFG), all credit institutions have to contribute to the Fund by paying a levy
on certain liabilities. The Fund can be used to establish bridge banks or acquire stakes in
transferees, to issue guarantees or to recapitalize credit institutions. Details of the levy are
regulated in the Restructuring Fund Regulation (RStruktFV)29.
German Banking Act
The German Banking Act regulates early intervention and resolution measures targeting in-
solvent credit institutions or institutions in trouble (section 45 et seqq. KWG). In case of
liquidity or/and equity shortages, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ("Bundesanstalt
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht", BaFin) can order the institution to take measures to im-
prove adequacy of its equity and liquidity. In particular, the BaFin can order the institution
to consider measures to reduce material risks and to report to the BaFin and the Bundesbank
to increase its equity and liquidity reserves (section 45 (1) and (2) KWG). If an institutions
equity does not comply with the regulatory requirements, the BaFin is entitled to restrict or
27Gesetz zur Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute (Restrukturierungsfondsge-
setz - RStruktFG), BGBl. 2010 I, p. 1900, with subsequent amendments.
28See Deutscher Bundestag - Drucksache 17/3024.
29Verordnung über die Erhebung der Beiträge zum Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute
(Restrukturierungsfonds-Verordnung - RStruktFV), BGBl. 2011 I, p. 1406, with subsequent amend-
ments.
16
Chapter 1. Introduction
Figure 1.1: Overview of bank recovery, reorganization, restructuring and resolution regu-
lation in Germany
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•Details of the bank levy
prohibit prot distributions and/or prohibit or restrict the granting of loans (section 45 (2)
KWG). Moreover, the BaFin is allowed to instruct a special deputy who can be endowed with
all the rights and duties of one or several managers (section 45c (1) and (2) KWG).
In case of debt overload, failure to pay or imminent failure to pay, insolvency proceedings
begin (section 46b (1) KWG). Information sharing is required by section 46b (2) KWG, which
forces the BaFin to inform the European Systemic Risk Board. Moreover, the BaFin informs
regulators of other countries belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA) before a credit
institution is in danger, especially if the failed credit institution has subsidiaries in these coun-
tries (section 46d (1) KWG). Therefore, information sharing is not only ensured if insolvency
proceedings start, but already if a credit institution is likely to fail and recovery measures have
to be applied. Section 46d (5) KWG forces the BaFin to support recovery measures of credit
institutions which are located in another country of the EEA. section 46e (1) KWG clearly
states that in the EEA the home country is responsible for the opening of insolvency pro-
ceedings. For example, if a multinational bank, located in Germany, has a subsidiary bank in
Austria, the German authorities open insolvency proceedings of the multinational bank, while
insolvency proceedings of the subsidiary bank are started by Austrian authorities.
Systemic banks have to develop a restructuring plan (i.e. a recovery plan) and to have it
available (section 47 KWG). Accordingly, banks have to describe measures which are avail-
able in a restructuring scenario. Moreover, the plan must consider barriers to recovery and
recovery triggers allowing for an early intervention by the credit institution. Guidance for the
establishment of restructuring plans are provided by the Minimum Requirements for the De-
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sign of Recovery Plans ("Mindestanforderungen an die Ausgestaltung von Sanierungsplänen",
MaSan). The plan is complemented by a resolution plan which has to be developed by the
competent authority, i.e. the BaFin (section 47f KWG). If the BaFin discovers potential bar-
riers to the resolution of an institution, it is allowed to require measures which remedy such
impediments (section 47e KWG). If an institution is insolvent and if it is not or no longer
systemically relevant, an insolvency proceeding is started, according to the German Insolvency
Act (section 46b KWG). Pursuant to section 47d KWG, it has to be ensured that all credit
institutions are resolvable. Resolvability entails the transfer of assets and liabilities to a trans-
feree. If such a transfer is ensured as a "measure of last resort", all credit institutions can
pursue an insolvency proceeding.
Credit Institution Reorganisation Act
If the credit institutions management feels that restructuring is necessary, i.e. if the credit
institution will in all likelihood not be able to meet its regulatory capital and/or liquidity require-
ments, it may notify the BaFin about the need for restructuring by presenting a restructuring
plan and proposing a restructuring advisor. The plan can favour certain loans raised during
the process of restructuring by giving preferential treatment to the creditors of loans in the
potential insolvency procedure (section 2 KredReorG). The Higher Regional Court orders the
recovery procedure to be conducted and appoints the proposed recovery adviser, provided the
person who has been put forward is not obviously unsuitable (section 3 (1) KredReorgG).
The recovery adviser implements the recovery plan and is obliged to report regularly to the
Higher Regional Court and BaFin on recovery progress. He has wide-ranging rights to obtain
information and the right to issue instructions to senior management.
If restructuring fails, the institution may notify the BaFin about the need for reorganization
by presenting a reorganization plan. BaFin can apply to the competent Higher Regional Court
to carry out a reorganization procedure only if there is a going-concern risk to the credit
institution pursuant to section 48b (1) KWG that results in a systemic risk pursuant to section
48b (2) KWG (section 7 (2) KredReorG). Reorganization can include conversion of debt into
equity (section 9 KredReorG), transfer of assets to another institution (section 11 KredReorG)
or even liquidation of a credit institution (section 8 (1) KredReorG). According to section
48a KWG, the BaFin can issue a "transfer order" if the stability of the nancial system is
threatened by a failed credit institution.30 If this is the case, then (parts of) assets and
liabilities are transferred to a transferee, e.g. a bridge bank. Immediately after the transfer
order has become e¤ective, the BaFin can withdraw the credit institutions license (section 48l
KWG).
30With regard to the systemic importance of a credit institution, section 48b KWG points to the
interconnection with other nancial institutions and to liabilities to other nancial institutions. The
systemic relevance is examined by the BaFin and the Bundesbank. See also guidance by the FSB, IMF
and BIS, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109a.pdf (24 January 2014).
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Restructuring Fund Act
The Restructuring Fund Act regularizes the scope of the institutions that have to pay a levy
and the government of the fund. Pursuant to section 4 RStruktFG, the Federal Agency for
Financial Market Stabilisation (FMSA) decides about the disposal of the funds in cooperation
with the BaFin. All credit institutions with place of business in Germany and subsidiaries of
institutions with place of business outside the EEA have to pay a levy (section 2 RStruktFG).
For example, a subsidiary of an institution whose parent bank is located in Austria does not
have to pay the levy. This exception avoids double taxation of banks located in the European
Economic Area. This levy aims at building up a cushion of bank resolution or/and recovery
funding and to capture the size and interconnectness of credit institutions.
The levy depends on the systemic relevance of an institution which is characterized by its
size and interconnectness. Furthermore, it depends on all liabilities, except liabilities towards
customers, jouissance right capital, funds for general bank risks and equity, and derivatives
(section 1 (1) RStruktFV). The size is characterized by the assessment base (total assets)
and the interconnectness by the fact that customer claims, for instance, do not a¤ect the
assessment base.31
The levy is the sum of liabilities multiplied by a certain factor which depends on the
size of the bank (section 1 (1) RStruktFV). However, the levy must not exceed 20% of the
annual prot determined in the income statement (section 3 (1) RStruktFV) and must not fall
below 5% of the amount determined in section 1 (1) RStruktFV (section 3 (2) RStruktFV).
Moreover, it must not be higher than three times the average of the three recent levies paid
by the institution. The minimum amount always has to be paid, which is justied by the
fact that credit institutions always benet from the existence of a safety net, even if they do
not pay any levy. The annual payment must not exceed 50% of the average annual prot of
the recent years (section 3 (4) RStruktFV). In case the levy exceeds the reasonable amount
determined in section 3 (1) and (2) RStruktFV, the institution has to pay the di¤erence in
the following years. However, the regular and the additional payment have to be in line with
section 3 (4) RStruktFV. In order to avoid the circumvention of the payment, prot pooling
and prot transfer do not decrease the assessment base (section 3 (1) RStruktFV).
31The German government justies the inclusion of derivatives as they played an important role of
contagion in the recent crisis (RStruktFV).
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Bank Levy and Bank Risk-Taking
2.1 Introduction
For many years, taxation of nancial institutions was rather a side issue for tax and public
nance economists. The current crisis and the need for large recapitalisation amounts for banks
have changed this, and taxation for banks now forms part of a broader debate on regulatory
reform (Beck (2011)). During the recent nancial crisis, some major banks had to be bailed
out in order to avoid a break-down of the nancial system. Such bank bailouts are costly for at
least two reasons. Firstly, they increase scal costs (Honohan & Klingebiel (2003)). Secondly,
they may change the risk-taking incentives of banks. This is why the bailouts launched during
the recent crisis caused a debate about who should bear the costs and how to prevent banks
from gambling, as required by the G-20 on their summit in Toronto.1 As a response, many
countries, such as Germany, France, Sweden and United Kingdom have introduced a bank
levy or a stability fee which forces banks to participate in the nancing of crisis resolution
measures.2
The motivation of banks to behave more prudently and the collection of funds for res-
olution scenarios may be achieved by various measures. Banks could be required to pay a
systemic risk charge, which only addresses systemic banks in either form (Weder di Mauro
(2010)). Shin (2010) suggests a tax on non-core liabilities which would lower banks risk-
taking incentives because non-core liabilities are more expensive than core liabilities. Perotti
& Suarez (2009) suggest liquidity risk charges depending on the maturity of fundings because
short-term uninsured liabilities induce re sales in a crisis and thus increase nancial distress.
Gorton & Huang (2004) propose a tax on high-value, i.e. projects with a high payo¤, but
illiquid projects. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon & Richardson (2013) propose a tax on systemic
risk. Such a tax could be based on the expected loss a bank may incur in a nancial crisis.
Finally, regulators could tax nancial transactions.
In the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis, several countries announced to implement
1http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/toronto/g20-declaration.pdf (16 March 2014).
2http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/RS_SpecialFeature_2013_Classication%20of%20bank%20
levies.pdf (24 January 2014).
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a levy. However, the announced base for the levy di¤ers from country to country. In Sweden
and Germany, for instance, the levy is based on banksliabilities (and derivatives). While in
Sweden the levy has to be paid on total liabilities minus intra-group liabilities, in Germany,
the levy is based on liabilities minus customer deposits and equity and on o¤-balance sheet
derivatives. In Austria, the levy is based on capital assets and on derivatives. The scope of the
levy also di¤ers among these countries. While in Sweden, Germany and Austria only banks
(credit institutions) are burdened, in the US other nancial companies with assets exceeding
a certain amount also have to pay a fee. In Hungary, the scope even includes insurance
companies (Schich & Kim (2010)).
In Germany, the amount must not exceed a certain percentage of annual prot, but it
must not fall below a certain minimum amount either (section 3 RStruktFV).3 Consequently,
each credit institution has to pay an amount which is independent of its nancial performance.
Neglecting discount e¤ects, such a minimum payment can be regarded as a pre-payment. We
take such a pre-payment into consideration and ask whether its implementation alters banks
risk-taking behaviour. Moreover, we analyze the impact of a prot tax on banksrisk-taking
as an alternative funding instrument and compare its e¤ectiveness with the levy.4 In order to
consider the possibility that banks may transfer the burden to depositors, we examine bank
behaviour in a competitive environment.
The levy is required for banks and is based on the banks debt level (e.g. deposits) as a
proxy for their size.5 We use a similar framework as Repullo (2004), where banks compete in
the market for secured debt (secured by an insurance, e.g. a deposit insurance) or unsecured
debt and invest their funds in either a prudent or a gambling asset. Competition is modeled
à la Hotelling (1929), where two rms (here: banks) are located at the end of a straight line
and where customers (here: depositors) are continuously located on this line. We consider two
scenarios. In the rst scenario, banks compete in the market for debt which is insured ("secured
debt"), while in the second scenario they compete in the market for "unsecured debt". The
di¤erentiation between secured and unsecured debt is important because unsecured creditors
take the banks risk-taking into account and therefore may inuence the impact of a levy
on banks risk behaviour. Within the second scenario (unsecured debt), we consider two
di¤erent patterns of information revelation: transparent and opaque banks. In the benchmark
pattern, where banks are transparent, depositors can observe the banksbehaviour, while in
the opaque case, the banksinvestment behaviour is private information to the banks. In this
case, depositors have to form beliefs about the banksinvestment decision. We assume that
the depositorsbeliefs depend on the deposit rate o¤ered by banks and that banks, o¤ering
a higher return for their customers, must engage in riskier assets in order to be able to pay
them o¤. Therefore, if the o¤ered deposit rate exceeds a certain threshold, depositors believe
that banks gamble. Otherwise, the behaviour of the banks is seen as prudent.
3Banks have to pay a minimum levy. For more details, we refer the reader to Chapter 1.
4Among other instruments, a prot tax surcharge was suggested by the European Commission (2010)
as an alternative to a bank levy.
5In Chapter 4, the levy will instead depend on the interconnectivity of banks.
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We obtain the following results: A levy on secured debt can prevent banks from excessive
risk behaviour if the regulator demands a pre-payment from the banks. Otherwise, their risk
decision is not a¤ected by the levy. This arises from the fact that a minimum payment ensures
that banks have to pay the levy e¤ectively if the project fails (otherwise depositors have to
bear the costs). This induces banks to behave more prudently. Interestingly, even if the levy
cannot be passed to depositors, it reduces moral hazard unless it exceeds a certain threshold.
A levy on unsecured debt reveals a less clear picture because the impact of the levy on banks
risk-taking depends on whether banks are transparent or opaque. In the rst case, banks
always coordinate towards the prudent equilibrium and a bank levy does not change the banks
risk incentives, independent of whether the regulator requires a minimum levy or not. By
contrast, the levy a¤ects the equilibrium conditions of opaque banks. It decreases the range
where banks gamble. A prot tax decreases risk-taking, too, though less e¤ectively and only
if the regulator demands that banks hold a minimum amount of equity capital.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2:2 reviews the related literature. Section 2:3
introduces the model and Section 2:4 derives the impact of a bank levy on banksrisk behaviour
if banks compete in the market for secured debt. Section 2:5 derives the impact of the levy on
banksrisk-taking if banks compete in the market for unsecured debt. There, we di¤erentiate
between transparent and opaque banks. In Section 2:6, we extend our model and allow for
alternative investments for creditors and compare the e¤ectiveness of the levy with a prot
tax. Section 2:7 concludes Chapter 2.
2.2 Literature review
There are several strands in the literature that are related to the model presented in this
chapter. One strand analyzes the e¤ects of taxes on bank prots. A second strand studies the
relation between insurance premiums and banksrisk incentives. A third strand examines the
impact of competition on the risk behaviour of banks.
Taxes on bank incomes may have the same e¤ect as taxes on bank loans as they tend to
increase interest rates on loans. This decreases investments from the corporate sector. The
greater part of the burden is shifted to bankscustomers (Albertazzi & Gambacorta (2010)).
Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (1999) provide empirical evidence that corporate taxes
(direct taxes on banks) are passed on to bankscustomers and thus do not negatively impact
banksprots. However, the burden shift may not only take place in the case of direct taxes,
such as income taxes, but also if indirect taxes, such as reserves on liabilites, are required (Fama
(1985); James (1987)). However, these e¤ects may di¤er between domestic and foreign banks.
Since foreign banks may be able to o¤set tax payments by receiving tax credits from their home
authority, customers of foreign banks are less burdened than customers from domestic banks,
which inuences prot di¤erentials, too. Moreover, foreign banks may have more access to
alternative investments outside the scope of local taxes (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (2001)).
Besides, a tax on high-value but illiquid projects may avoid moral hazard. If liquidity is needed
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at an earlier point in time, high-value projects cannot be monetized. The government may
monetize these high value projects and provide liquidity to these banks by issuing bonds. A
tax on these high-value projects guarantees a transfer from high-value projects to short-term
projects. This ensures that a private liquidiation market exists for troubled projects. Such
a liquidation market is necessary in order to avoid moral hazard caused by banks which hold
troubled projects (Gorton & Huang (2004)). Similarly, we analyse how charges on banks a¤ect
the banksbehaviour. However, the focus of the model described below is on the impact of a
bank levy, but the e¤ects of an income tax are examined, too. Like Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga
(1999) and Albertazzi & Gambacorta (2010), we ask whether bankscustomers have to pay the
fee e¤ectively. In contrast to Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (2001), the model described below
does not di¤erentiate between domestic and foreign banks. This will be done in Chapters 4
and 5.
Insurance premiums are another form of charges on banks. An ex ante charged insurance
premium may increase funding costs of banks, which decreases expected prot and thus lowers
opportunity costs of risk-taking (Calem & Rob (1999)). They di¤erentiate between well-
capitalized and under-capitalized banks, where the risk premium surcharge depends on the
banks capitalization. A higher risk premium surcharge does not a¤ect risk incentives of a
well-capitalized bank. This arises from the fact that, on the one hand, a higher risk premium
increases funding costs and thus decreases expected prots, but, on the other hand, it supports
the capitalization of banks as the surcharge depends on the banks capitalization, i.e. the
higher the capitalization of a bank, the lower the risk premium. Calem & Rob (1999) provide
examples where the latter e¤ect o¤sets the cost e¤ect. A risk-based deposit insurance may
lower banks risk incentives as the costs of risk-taking increase (Matutes & Vives (2000);
Cordella & Yeyati (2002)). By contrast, a at-premium deposit insurance, which charges
banksprots, may increase competition among banks and intensify gambling behaviour. The
reason is that investors do not have incentives to punish banksexcessive risk-taking, as they
are secured, and gambling behaviour is not punished through a higher risk premium (Matutes
& Vives (2000)). The risk premium is not in the focus of the model described below. However,
similar to the bank levy, it is a charge which has to be paid ex ante. As in the models of
this strand, we focus on the relation between a charge on banks and the banksrisk-taking
behaviour. A key ingredient of the model described below is competition among banks.
Our model is in line with various studies analysing the impact of competition on banks
risk-taking (Keeley (1990); Hellmann, Murdock & Stiglitz (2000); Boyd & De Nicoló (2005);
Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2010)). This relationship is ambiguous since competition in the
deposit market has e¤ects on banksrisk-taking behaviour which are di¤erent from the e¤ects
of competition in the loan market. This ambiguity is also shown in empirical studies (Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine (2006); Jiménez, Lopez & Saurina (2007); Berger, Klapper & Turk-
Ariss (2009)). In contrast to Boyd & De Nicoló (2005) and Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2010),
we account for competition in the market for secured and unsecured debt. Similar to Matutes
& Vives (1996), the depositorsexpectations a¤ect the banksrisk decision. In our model,
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banks can inuence the depositorsexpectation by o¤ering an adequate deposit rate. For an
overview of the relation between bank competition and bank risk-taking, we refer the reader
to Carletti (2008) and Beck, Coyle, Dewatripont, Freixas & Seabright (2010). The model
described in the next section is closest to Repullo (2004) who examines the relation between
minimum capital requirements and banks risk-taking. In our model, this key ingredient in
Repullo (2004) is replaced by a bank levy.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 Players and action sets
The model extends the results of Repullo (2004) by introducing a regulator who requires a
levy on secured or unsecured debt. We consider the following groups of risk-neutral players:
shareholders who own n = 2 banks, secured (unsecured) depositors, and a regulator who
decides about the level of the levy ex ante. Each group of players only lives for one period,
does not have alternative investment possibilities and desires to consume at the end of its life,
i.e. at the end of the investment period, when the payo¤s are distributed among shareholders
and depositors. Henceforth we sometimes write "banks" (i.e. bank managers) instead of
shareholders. As we do not take any principal-agent-problems into account, shareholders and
banks have the same incentives. Hence, a di¤erentiation between shareholders and banks is
not necessary.
Banks
The two banks are located on the ends of a "street" of length one. At the beginning of the
investment period (discrete time), shareholders invest an innitesimal amount of equity capital
in the bank. In excess of this innitesimal amount of equity capital, shareholders have to pay
a levy. This levy might be required ex ante (Section 2.4.1) or ex post of the banks investment
(Section 2.4.2). If this levy has to be paid ex ante, the shareholders have to pay the levy before
the bank is allowed to invest. Shareholders have then invested the equity capital and the levy,
but only the equity capital appears on the balance sheet, i.e. can be invested in projects by
the bank. If this levy has to be paid ex post, shareholders only have to pay the innitesimal
amount equity capital before the bank is allowed to invest. In the ex post case, the levy has
to be paid only if the banks project has been successful.
Each bank j and  j chooses its deposit rate r and either invests in a prudent asset or in
a gambling asset.6 All characteristics of the prudent asset (e.g. return, probability of success)
are indexed with "P". The characteristics of the gambling asset are indexed with "G". The
balance sheet total of bank j consists of the innitesimal amount of equity capital and deposits
denoted by Dj.
6The equity capital investment does not have an impact on the banksbehaviour. The investment
only claries that the banks are owned by shareholders who receive the net return of the investment.
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The prudent investment yields a rate of return (henceforth we often write return) P 2
(0; 1) with probability pP and a return of zero, otherwise. The gambling investment generates
a return G 2 (0; 1) with probability pG and a return of zero otherwise. Consequently, the
banks can choose between a project with a relatively high return, but low probability of success,
and a project with a relatively low return, but a high probability of success. The return function
R can be summarized as follows, where RG is the return for the gambling investment and RP
for the prudent investment:
RG =
(
G with probability pG
0 with probability 1  pG
RP =
(
P with probability pP
0 with probability 1  pP .
We assume that the return of the gambling asset is higher than the return of the prudent
asset, i.e. G > P , but the expected return of the gambling asset is lower, i.e. pPP > pGG.
Limited liability of banks provides incentives to invest in the gambling asset and thus to cause
moral hazard.
The residual of the project payo¤ (after depositors are paid) is distributed among the banks
shareholders. We further assume that shareholders have a time preference for consumption,
which is represented by the discount factor  > 0.
Depositors
The depositors are continuously distributed on the "street".7 The aggregate market volume
of deposits is constant to one. Depositing funds in a bank causes transportation costs per unit
of distance,  > 0, which can be interpreted as the heterogeneity among banks. Imagine, for
instance, that interest rates on deposits are not the only feature a customer takes into account
when depositing his funds in a bank. Advisory services or/and the number of cashpoints might
also play an important role for his decision. Following the cashpoint argument, we can assume
that potential depositors are located between two cashpoints, owned by di¤erent banks, and
customers choose the bank with the nearest one.
The amount of depositors that bank j attracts depends on its o¤ered deposit rate, on the
deposit rates o¤ered by its neighbour and on the transportation costs . We denote the deposit
rate of bank j by rj 2 (0; 1) and of bank js neighbour by r j. The banks investment is
private information and cannot be observed by depositors, except in Section 2.5.1. A depositor
located between bank j and bank  j is indi¤erent between these banks if he receives the same
net return from both banks, i.e. if
rj   z = r j    [1  z] ,
7See also Freixas & Rochet (2008) who use an extended version with n banks.
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where z is the distance between the indi¤erent depositor and bank j (or its cashpoint) and
1   z the distance between the indi¤erent depositor and bank  j.8 We do not explicitly
exclude negative net payo¤s for depositors. This is in line with Repullo (2004). Solving for z
reveals the "amount" (mass) of depositors on the line between bank j and  j who decide to
deposit their funds in bank j:9
z (rj; r j) = Dj (rj; r j) =
1
2
+
rj   r j
2
; (2.1)
where Dj (rj; r j)  0 (a negative amount of depositors is impossible). The demand of
deposits, Dj, decreases in  and r j and increases in rj. The more heterogenous banks are,
i.e. the higher the distance between the cashpoints (higher ), the less the impact of deposit
rates on deposit demand.
Finally, the insurance premium is normalized to zero.10
Regulator
In the initial period, the regulator announces:
 the bank levy rate ,
 the minimum amount of equity kDj each bank has to hold, where k is greater than the
innitesimal amount of equity (Section 2.6.2),
 the prot tax rate  (Section 2.6.2).
Dj is supposed to be observable and veriable. Hence, the announcement to require a
levy is credible as both parties can sign a contract concerning the duty to pay the levy. If the
project fails, shareholders receive zero payment and depositors are paid by the regulator unless
they are unsecured.
2.3.2 Sequence of events
Figure 2.1 illustrates the sequence of events for the case, in which the levy has to be paid ex
ante. At the beginning of the investment period, the regulator announces the bank levy rate
(or the tax rate and the minimum amount of capital 2.6). Thereafter, the banks o¤er a deposit
rate and decide about the type of investment simultaneously. Then, depositors choose a bank
8Note that the comparison between transportation costs and returns is possible because of the nor-
malization of payo¤s and returns.
9Note that the demand of deposits does not depend on the banksinvestment risk because deposits
are covered by a deposit insurance.
10An insurance premium of zero is the extreme of an unfairly priced insurance. Unfairly priced means
that the insurance premium is not equal to the expected payment of the insurance to the depositors.
The introduction of a fairly priced insurance premium is impossible if several banks are insured and
the characteristics of the banks are private information (Chan, Greenbaum & Thakor (1992)). For the
impact of deposit insurance on risk-taking, see, for instance, Matutes & Vives (2000) and Cordella &
Yeyati (2002).
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in order to store their funds. Finally, payo¤s are realized and distributed among depositors and
shareholders.
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events
t
Regulator
announces the
required bank
levy
1=t0=t
Banks offer a deposit rate
and decide about their
type of investment
simultaneously
Returns realized and
distributed among
shareholders and
depositors
Depositors
choose a bank
simultaneously
2=t
2.3.3 Equilibrium concept
We focus on symmetric equilibria: a prudent equilibrium, where both banks choose the prudent
asset P and the optimal deposit rate in equilibrium rP , and a gambling equilibrium, where
both banks choose the gambling asset G and the optimal deposit rate in gambling equilibrium
rG. A prudent (a gambling) equilibrium, respectively, exists if neither bank j nor bank  j
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally by choosing the gambling (prudent) investment and
the respective optimal deposit rate and if depositors do not have an incentive to change their
decision about where to deposit their funds.
Competition between the banks only takes place in the deposit market because the in-
vestment of bank j does not have an impact on bank  j. We solve the game by backward
induction, beginning with the second stage where depositors choose between bank j and bank
 j. Taking the decision of depositors into account, we proceed with the rst stage of the
game where the banks decide simultaneously about the asset type and the deposit rate they
o¤er. Since the banks choose their assets and the deposit rate simultaneously, they cannot
observe their neighbours choice.
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2.4 The impact of a bank levy on banksrisk-taking
in case of secured debt
2.4.1 Ex ante paid bank levy
The lower bound of the levy, as required by German law, is determined by the fact that
each bank has to pay this amount ex ante, i.e. before it invests its funds, and is therefore
independent of the outcome of its investment. The levy rate is denoted by . If the levy
has to be paid ex ante, shareholders have to invest Dj for each bank j in addition to the
innitesimal amount of equity. Such a minimum payment di¤ers from the equity capital in as
much as it cannot be invested in the project and hence does not generate a return.
Notice that we already solved the last stage of the game where depositors choose between
bank j and bank  j (2.1). Therefore, we can already proceed with the rst stage of the game
where banks choose their asset and the deposit rate. In order to be able to solve the game, we
have to determine the payo¤s in the potential equilibria and o¤ (outside of) the equilibrium
where bank j deviates unilaterally.
At the beginning of the investment period, bank j chooses the deposit rate rj and the
investment type  2 P ; G	 in order to maximize its value V lj (the index "l" stands for
"lower" bound), i.e. the net present value of expected prot minus levy. Before investing in
either the prudent or the gambling asset, bank j has to pay the levy. In order to be able to
determine the banksasset choice, we have to ascertain the payo¤s for the prudent and the
gambling investment. Beginning with the prudent investment, the maximization problem of
bank j in a symmetric prudent equilibrium is given by:
V lPj = max
rj
 DlPj (rj; r j) + lPj (rj; r j) , (2.2)
if it invests in the prudent assets. The expected period prot lPj (rj; r j) amounts to:
lPj (rj; r j) = p
P

P   rj

DlPj (rj; r j) . (2.3)
P   rj is the net return of the project. lPj (rj; r j) is equivalent to the di¤erence be-
tween expected gross payo¤ of investment pP
 
1 + P

DlPj (rj; r j) and expected liabilities
pP (1 + rj)D
lP
j (rj; r j). Notice that the levy does not inuence the expected prot because
it has to be paid ex ante and in addition to the innitesimal amount of equity.
The deposit rate in symmetric, and prudent equilibrium amounts to:
rlP := P      
pP
. (2.4)
Notice that in the equilibrium, we can omit the indices j and  j. Obviously, rlP increases in
P , pP ,  and decreases in  and . In Section 2.6.1 we analyze a situation which does not
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enable banks to o¤er their rst-best deposit rate.
After inserting (2.4) into (2.2), we obtain:
V lP = pP

2
(2.5)
as the value of bank j (and equivalently the value of bank  j) in a prudent equilibrium.
Accordingly, the bank value does not depend on the levy rate . The intuition is quite simple.
As long as banks can pass the whole burden to depositors, a higher levy is compensated by a
higher prot through a lower deposit rate (see 2.4).
In the same way, we can derive the bank value if both banks choose the gambling asset,
where this investment is an equilibrium. In this case, the deposit rate is equal to:
rlG := G      
pG
(2.6)
and the bank value is given by:
V lG = pG

2
. (2.7)
To derive the equilibrium conditions, we analyse under which conditions a unilateral devi-
ation is not benecial. Thus, we have a prudent equilibrium if
max
rj
 DlGj  rj; rlP j+ lGj  rj; rlP j  V lP .
The right side of the inequation represents bank js payo¤ if both banks choose the prudent
asset (prudent equilibrium). The left side of the inequation represents the case where bank j
deviates and chooses the gambling asset and the respective deposit rate, while bank j behaves
prudently and o¤ers rlP , i.e. the optimal deposit rate in a symmetric prudent equilibrium.
Equivalently, we have a gambling equilibrium if
max
rj
 DlPj  rj; rlG j+ lPj  rj; rlG j  V lG.
The equilibrium condition can be found in the appendix. Proposition 1 summarizes the impli-
cation of a bank levy.
Proposition 1 An increase in  lowers the range where banks choose the gambling asset.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although the bank values do not depend on the levy rate, the gambling area decreases in
. The intuition is as follows: Depositors are charged e¤ectively by the levy, but only if the
project is successful. By contrast, if it fails, the levy is e¤ectively paid by the banks themselves.
Since the levy is paid in advance, the higher the levy, the more they can lose if the project
fails. Consequently, a higher levy increases the banksincentives to behave prudently.
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2.4.2 Ex post paid bank levy
Alternatively to the bank levy, which has to be paid before the investment project is realized,
a regulator may introduce a levy which has to be paid when project returns are realized. This,
for instance, is the case when the regulator does not require a minimum levy. Then, the levy
depends on whether the project is successful. If the prot is less than the levy , the banks
do not have to pay anything, whereas if the prot exceeds the levy, they have to pay the full
amount required by the regulator. In this case, bank js maximization problem can be written
as:
V Pj = max
rj

pP

P   rj   

DPj (rj; r j)

(2.8)
if the banks are in a symmetric prudent equilibrium. The deposit rate in a potential prudent
equilibrium is then given by:
rP := P      . (2.9)
As a result, if pP < 1, the deposit rate in (2.4) is lower than in (2.9). Intuitively, the
banks pass the potential loss (potential failure of the project) to the depositors and, therefore,
depositors earn less if banks have to bear the levy ex ante. The bank value is the same as in
(2.5), i.e. V P = V lP .
Similarly, in a symmetric equilibrium, where both banks gamble, bank js maximization
problem is given by:
V Gj = max
rj

pG

G   rj   

DGj (rj; r j)

. (2.10)
The deposit rate in a potential gambling equilibrium is equal to:
rG := G      . (2.11)
Again, the bank value is the same as in (2.7), i.e. V G = V lG.
Proceeding with the equilibrium conditions, banks behave prudently if
max
rj

pG

G   rj   

DGj
 
rj; r
P
 j
  V lP ,
i.e. if the expected prot of the deviating bank is lower than the expected prot it receives
when it behaves prudently. Equivalently, banks gamble if
max
rj

pP

P   rj   

DPj
 
rj; r
G
 j
  V lG.
The equilibrium conditions are determined in the same way as in the previous section.
Proposition 2 The levy  does not have an e¤ect on the banksinvestment decision.
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix. The proof of Proposition 2 is
equivalent.
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The intuition is the following: The burden is completely passed to the depositors (see 2.9
and 2.11). Hence, banks do not have to bear the levy if prots are successful. Since the levy
only has to be paid in case the project succeeds, banks never have to bear this burden. By
contrast, if the levy has to be paid ex ante, banks have to bear the levy at least in case of
failure. Consequently, as the levy does not a¤ect the payo¤s of the banks, it does not inuence
their investment decision.
2.5 The impact of a bank levy on banksrisk-taking
in case of unsecured debt
Now depositors expected returns depend on the project risks and therefore they take the
banksinvestment decision into account. As in Hakenes & Schnabel (2010), we di¤erentiate
between transparent and opaque banks. If banks are transparent, their risk decision is public
information. By contrast, if they are opaque, their investment decision is private information.
Then depositors have to form beliefs about the banksinvestment decision. Whether banks are
opaque or transparent with regard to their risk-taking is ambiguous in the literature (Hannan
& Hanweck (1988), Avery, Belton & Goldberg (1988), Flannery & Sorescu (1996), Sironi
(2003)). As a consequence, we consider both cases when determining the impact of the levy
on banksrisk behaviour.
The levy is paid ex ante, i.e. as in Section 2.4.1.
2.5.1 Transparent banks
The timing is the same as in Figure 2.1. In contrast to the previous section, banks o¤er know
an expected return. Due to the fact that the banks are transparent, this expected return can
be enforced by legal action. We solve the game by backward induction, beginning with the
last stage, where depositors decide where to deposit their funds. In contrast to the secured
case, depositors take the expected net payment into account.
Beginning with the depositorsdecision, a depositor receives the o¤ered return rj if bank
j is successful, i.e. with probability pG (gambling investment) or with probability pP (prudent
investment). Now depositors take the banks investment decision into account, i.e. the
expected return instead of the ex post return (previous chapter). Assume that both banks
choose the prudent asset at the rst stage of the game. Then the indi¤erent depositor receives:
pP rj   z = pP r j    (1  z) .
After solving for z, we get the mass of depositors choosing bank j:
z (rj; r j) = DTPj (rj; r j) =
1
2
+ pP
rj   r j
2
,
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where the index "TP" stands for "transparent and prudent bank".
If banks choose the gambling asset, the indi¤erent depositor receives:
pGrj   z = pGr j    (1  z)
and therefore the mass of depositors who choose bank j amounts to:
z (rj; r j) = DGTj (rj; r j) =
1
2
+ pG
rj   r j
2
,
where the index "GT" stands for "transparent and gambling bank". Equivalently, we can
determine the deposit level of a deviating bank.
At the rst stage of the game, banks decide about the deposit rates and the type of
investment. We begin with the optimal deposit rate in the potential prudent equilibrium
(symmetric) and proceed with the optimal rate in a potential gambling equilibrium (symmetric).
Assume that each bank has to pay a levy on its liabilities. Then, bank j0s maximization
problem in a potential prudent equilibrium is given by:
V PTj = max
rj
 DPTj (rj; r j) + PTj (rj; r j) ; (2.12)
where the expected period prot PTj (rj; r j) amounts to:
PTj (rj; r j) = p
P

P   rj

DPTj (rj; r j) . (2.13)
The deposit rate in the potential (symmetric) prudent equilibrium is given by:
rPT := P   
pP
  
pP
(2.14)
which di¤ers from (2.4) in as much as the impact of transportation costs is higher in (2.14)
since  < 
pP
. Obviously, the deposit rate increases in the probability of success.
After inserting rPT (2.14) in (2.12), we obtain the bank value in the prudent equilibrium:
V PT = 

2
. (2.15)
In the same way, we obtain the deposit rate in symmetric gambling equilibrium given by:
rGT := G   
pG
  
pG
. (2.16)
The bank value is V GT = V PT . In comparison with secured deposit rates in equilibrium (2.4),
unsecured deposit rates are lower. To say it in a di¤erent way, although depositors can observe
the banksinvestment decision, the banks o¤er a lower deposit rate. If  ! 0, the deposit
market is "very" competitive, i.e. transportation costs do not matter, and banks have to pass
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the whole return to depositors. If  > 0, transportation costs matter. These costs matter
more if depositors cannot be sure that they will be repaid by the banks. Hence, there are more
possibilities for the banks to keep deposit rates low. By contrast, if deposits are secured, the
probability of success a¤ects the deposit rate, but not the probability of being remunerated.
Therefore, transportation costs do not matter as much as in the unsecured case and the banks
do not have the possibility of reducing the deposit rates comparably.
To determine the gambling equilibrium, we check whether a unilateral deviation pays, i.e.
whether bank j chooses the prudent asset while the other banks gamble. Such a deviation is
not benecial if
max
rj
 DPTj  rj; rGT j + PTj  rj; rGT j   V GT ,
where the optimal o¤-equilibrium deposit rate for the deviating bank equals:
rj =
rPT + p
G
pP
rGT
2
. (2.17)
After inserting the optimal deposit rate into the inequation (i.e. equilibrium condition), we
obtain:
pP rPT   pGrGT
2
+

pP rPT   pGrGT 2
8
 0
Since pP rPT   pGrGT > 0 and   0, this inequation does not have a solution (notice that
D > 1
2
> 0 if the deviating bank o¤ers a higher expected deposit rate). Consequently, rGT
(which is the unique candidate for a gambling equilibrium) cannot be the deposit rate in a
gambling equilibrium. Of course, in this case no other candidate exists. The intuition is as
follows: For the deviating bank, it is benecial to o¤er a deposit rate which leads to a higher
expected return for depositors. As the depositors can observe the investment decision, the
higher expected return attracts more funds involving a higher bank value. In the previous
section, the bank, which deviates from the gambling asset, o¤ers a lower deposit rate and
thus attracts fewer depositors. In that case, the benet from a unilateral deviation depends
on whether the lower deposit rate, i.e. the higher expected prot per depositor, outweighs the
lower level of deposits.
In the same way, we can derive the conditions for a prudent equilibrium, where the following
conditions must be fullled:
max
rj
 DGTj  rj; rPT j + GTj  rj; rPT j   V PT . (2.18)
The optimal deposit rate for the deviating bank equals:
rj =
rGT + p
P
pG
rPT
2
. (2.19)
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After insterting (2.19) into (2.18), we obtain:

2
 p
P rPT   pGrGT
8
.
Moreover, we must ensure that D  0, which holds true if

2
>
pP rPT   pGrGT
4
.
Since D  0 is binding, a prudent equilibrium exists whenever the deviating bank o¤ers a
deposit rate which leads to a positive deposit level.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric equilibrium, banks always choose the prudent asset if they are
transparent.
Proof. The proof has already been presented.
The intuition is the following: In a strategy combination, where all banks o¤er rGT and
gamble, banks always have an incentive to deviate unilateraly by o¤ering a deposit rate which
leads to a higher expected return for depositors. Since banks are transparent, depositors are
aware of this higher expected return o¤ered by the deviating bank. Hence, the deviating
bank attracts more depositors because depositors "walk" to the bank which o¤ers the highest
expected return. This higher deposit volume o¤sets the higher expected deposit rate. If
depositors are secured, depositors only look at the deposit return and, therefore, the deviating
bank cannot pitch a safer investment to the depositors and the higher expected return o¤ered
by the deviating bank does not always attract more depositors.
By contrast, if all banks o¤er the deposit rate rPT and behave prudently, no bank has
an incentive to deviate and o¤er a lower expected deposit rate. Although the lower expected
deposit rate would increase the banks margin, this positive e¤ect on net prot would be o¤set
by the lower deposit volume. Hence, there is a prudent equilibrium where banks choose rPT
and behave prudently, whereas a gambling equilibrium does not exist.
As a result, since banks always behave prudently, the bank levy does not have an impact
on their investment decision, independent of whether the regulator requires a minimum levy
or not.
2.5.2 Opaque banks
If banks are opaque, depositors cannot observe the banksinvestment decisions. Due to the
fact that the investment decisions depend on the decisions of depositors who cannot observe
the banksinvestment decisions, we have to make assumptions on the depositorsbehaviour.
Similarly to Matutes & Vives (1996) depositors have certain homogeneous beliefs which are
known to the banks. The equilibria of our model can be understood as perfect Bayesian
equilibria (PBE) of a game with Bayesian depositors having prior (ex ante) beliefs. Two
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requirements must be fullled at a PBE: (i) beliefs must be consistent, that is, the beliefs
must equal the true investment, and (ii) banks must maximize expected prots, taking into
accont the updating rule followed by depositors. We assume the following posterior beliefs,
i.e. the beliefs of depositors at their decision point (node):
prob
 
G j r  rS = 1
and
prob
 
G j r < rS = 0,
where the index "S" stands for "suspiciousness". To say it di¤erently, if the deposit rate,
o¤ered by the bank, exceeds a deposit rate rS  0, which is exogenous and given ex ante,
depositors believe that this bank gambles with probability one. If the deposit rate, o¤ered by
the bank, is lower than rS, depositors believe that this bank gambles with probability zero.
Consequently, depositors believe with probability one that the bank behaves prudently if the
deposit rate, o¤ered by this bank, is lower than rS. They believe that banks behave prudently
with probability zero if r  rS.
In a similar setup, Niu (2008) assumes that subordinated (unsecured) creditors believe that
banks gamble whenever they o¤er a deposit rate which di¤ers from the deposit rate, o¤ered
to secured creditors in a potential prudent equilibrium. His framework contrasts to the setup
presented here. In his framework banks raise secured deposits and issue subordinated debt,
where subordinated creditors can observe the deposit rates o¤ered by the banks to the secured
creditors. The belief assumed in this section is in line with the core concepts of portfolio
theory (capital asset pricing model) and the adverse selection in credit markets with imperfect
information where high-risk borrowers can be identied because they prefer loan contracts with
(lower collateral and) a higher interest rate (Stiglitz & Weiss (1981); Bester (1985)). Similarly
in the setup here, depositors become suspicious and expect banks o¤ering high deposit rates
to invest in risky assets. While in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.1, deposit rates only serve to attract
depositors, in this case, deposit rates serve as an instrument for banks to commit to a certain
asset choice.
From the previous section, we already know the candidates for the deposit rates in a po-
tential prudent and a potential gambling equilibrium: rPT and rGT . Notice that the depositors
base their decision on the expected return and on the transportation costs in the same way
as in the transparent case. However, in the gambling case, this deposit rate is only consistent
with depositorsbeliefs if rS  rGT . Otherwise, rGT causes depositors to believe that the
banks behave prudently and banks have a benecial deviation possibility with regard to rGT .
Equivalently, rPT can only be the deposit rate in a prudent equilibrium if rS > rPT . Finally,
we assume that the depositors do not wish to be fooled.
Again we determine the equilibrium conditions by examining whether a unilateral deviation
is benecial. The equilibrium conditions can be determined in the same way as in Sections 2.4
and 2.5.1.
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Proposition 4 The existence of a gambling and a prudent equilibrium depends on the level
of rS in such a way that
(a) a gambling equilibrium exists if
rS  r
PT + p
G
pP
rGT
2
 
q
[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] 
2pP
=: mG,
(b) a prudent equilibrium exists if
rS  p
G
pP
rGT   2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ]
pP
=: mP ,
(c) We have
mG > mP .
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
As a result, in contrast to the transparent case, a gambling equilibrium exists if rS  mG
is su¢ ciently small. Intuitively, if rS is su¢ ciently low, the banks can o¤er their rst-best
deposit rate in a potential gambling equilibrium, i.e. rGT . Due to the fact that rS is low, a
unilateral deviation from the gambling path is costly because depositors only believe that the
deviating bank behaves prudently, if it o¤ers a deposit rate which is lower than rS. Such a low
deposit rate only attracts few depositors which are located su¢ ciently close to the deviating
bank. A prudent equilibrium only exists if rS is su¢ ciently high. In this case, a deviation
from the prudent path is costly because the deviating bank has to o¤er an even higher deposit
rate. This may attract more depositors, but lowers the expected net prot. The latter e¤ect
dominates if rS  mP .
A low threshold rS may be an indicator for mistrust (suspiciousness) towards banks. In-
terestingly, this mistrust leads to the fact that banks gamble. This result is in line with the
theory of self-fullling expectations.
It is easy to show that pP rPT + pGrGT decreases in . Therefore, a higher bank levy
decreases the range where banks gamble. Figure 2.2 illustrates the equilibrium conditions in
case of opaque banks. Notice that the decrease of mG in  is lower in absolute terms.
2.6 Discussion
Throughout this section we return to the assumption that bank deposits are secured by a
deposit insurance like in Section 2.4. Hence, it does not play a role whether banks are opaque
or transparent because depositors receive their return independently of whether the project is
successful or fails.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibria in the opaque case
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2.6.1 Opportunity costs
The e¤ect of the bank levy might change if we introduce opportunity costs for depositors. For
example, they might be able to invest in alternative assets without risk. To see how the results
change, assume that only depositors have an alternative investment opportunity with risk-free
return denoted by ropp > 0. This interest rate can be interpreted as the opportunity costs for
depositors who invest in the banks. The index "opp" stands for "opportunity costs". According
to the level of the risk-free interest rate, we assume P   = ropp and G   
pG
< ropp <
G   . Consequently, independent of the investment type, banks cannot pass the whole
burden of the levy to depositors. While banks choosing the gambling asset can pass a part of
the levy to depositors, banks choosing the prudent asset have to bear the whole levy. Hence
in both cases, the optimal deposit rate is ropp and the levy lowers the bank values V oppP and
V oppG.
To see this, we start again with the determination of bank values depending on the type
of asset. In the case where all banks gamble, bank j0s maximization problem equals:
max
rj
 Dj (rj; r j) + pG G   rjD (rj; r j) , (2.20)
This leads to the equilibrium rate:
rj = 
G      
pG
< ropp.
Since ropp is binding, banks choose ropp. Inserting this deposit rate into the objective function
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(2.20) leads to the following bank value if all banks choose the same risky asset:
V oppG =

pG   1
2
+ pG

2
;
where  := G      ropp. That is,  is the di¤erence between the optimal deposit rate
in equilibrium for  = 0 and the depositorsalternative investment ropp. Therefore, the bank
value only decreases by pG . If pG = , bank j can pass the whole burden to depositors
and we obtain the same result as above.
In the case where all banks behave prudently, bank j0s maximization problem is given by:
max
rj
 Dj (rj; r j) + pP P   rjD (rj; r j) , (2.21)
and the equilibrium rate equals:
rj = 
P      
pP
< ropp.
Since ropp is binding, bank j chooses ropp. Inserting the equilibrium rate into the objective
function (2.21), we obtain:
V oppP =  1
2
 + pP

2
.
In contrast to the gambling case, banks in the prudent case have to bear the whole burden
imposed by regulators. Henceforth, we assume that bank values fulll V oppG  0 and V oppP 
0.
We have a gambling equilibrium if
max
rj
 Dj (rj; ropp) + pP P   rjDj (rj; ropp)  V oppG,
where the optimal deposit rate for the deviating bank amounts to:
rj = r
opp   1
2

pP
=: rGj .
However, since rj  ropp, the optimal deposit rate is still ropp, i.e. the lowest possible rate.
Equivalently, we have a prudent equilibrium if
max
rj
 Dj (rj; ropp) + pG G   rjDj (rj; ropp)  V oppP ,
where the optimal deposit rate amounts to:
rj =
G   
pG
   + ropp
2
=: rPj .
Since G   
pG
   < ropp we have rPj < ropp and, therefore, the optimal deposit rate is
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again given by ropp.
Proposition 5 With positive opportunity costs ropp, we obtain the following equilibrium con-
ditions:
 Banks choose the gambling asset if
 

pP   pG
pG

2
=: crit.
 Otherwise they invest in the prudent asset.
Proof. The derivation of the equilibrium conditions follows the same pattern as described for
Proposition 1 in the appendix.
Accordingly, we do not have multiple equilibria and the e¤ect of the levy on risk behaviour
changes. If banks cannot pass the burden to depositors, deposit rates are always the same,
even for a unilateraly deviating bank. Therefore, deviating in order to attract more depositors
does not pay. However, as deposit rates in the gambling case are higher than in the prudent
case, gambling banks can pass a higher part of the burden to depositors than prudent banks.
If this part is su¢ ciently high, i.e.   crit, banks prefer the gambling asset. Otherwise, they
behave prudently.
2.6.2 Comparison between bank levy and bank prot tax
At the end of the investment period, banks have to pay a prot tax, which is denoted by  .
Accordingly, each bank can only retain 1    of the prot. In this section, we introduce a
minimum capital requirement k > 0. If banks do not have to hold a minimum amount of
equity capital, a prot tax does not change the banksinvestment decision. Therefore, we have
to introduce a minimum amount of equity. The way of modelling such a capital requirement is
in line with Repullo (2004). Under this model, the maximization problem of bank j (all banks
behave prudently) can be described as (the index "" stands for "tax"):
V Pj = max
rj
 kDPj (rj; r j) + (1  ) Pj (rj; r j) . (2.22)
The expected prot Pj can be written as:
Pj = p
P
 
1 + P

[1 + k]  [1 + rj]

DPj (rj; r j) ,
where

1 + P

[1 + k]DPj (rj; r j) is the payo¤ of the project and [1 + rj]D
P
j (rj; r j) the
liability which has to be paid back.
The equilibrium rate amounts to:
rP := P    + k

1 + P   1
(1  ) pP

. (2.23)
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According to (2.23), an increase in  decreases the deposit rates. The tax rate does not a¤ect
rP for k = 0.
Inserting (2.23) in (2.22) leads to the following bank value V Pj :
V P = (1  ) pP 
2
. (2.24)
Obviously, the bank value decreases if the tax ratio increases. In contrast to the levy,
depositors and shareholders share the tax payment because shareholders have to pay the tax
on their net return    r. The value V P does not depend on the capital requirement k
because the banks adjust the deposit rates.
Equivalently, if all banks gamble, the deposit rate for bank j equals:
rG := G    + k

1 + G   1
(1  ) pG

(2.25)
and the bank value amounts to:
V G = (1  ) pG
2
. (2.26)
To be able to compare the e¤ect of a prot tax and a bank levy, we have to introduce a
minimum amount of equity k into our levy model. If the banks have to pay a levy ex ante and
if they are required to hold a minimum amount of equity k, bank is maximization problem in
the prudent case can be described by:
V
lP
j = max
rj
h
  (k + )DlPj (rj; r j) + 
lP
j (rj; r j)
i
. (2.27)
This objective function di¤ers from (2.2) only in k. In Section 2.4.1, k is innitesimal. The
expected prot can be written as:

lP
j = p
P
 
1 + P

[1 + k]  [1 + rj]

D
lP
j (rj; r j) .
The deposit rate in a potential prudent equilibrium equals:
rlP := P      
pP
+ k

1 + P   1
pP

. (2.28)
The deposit rate rlP di¤ers from (2.4) in k
h
1 + P   1
pP
i
. Inserting (2.28) in (2.27), leads
to the same prudent value as in (2.5) because k is passed on to the depositors (see 2.28).
In the equivalenty way, we can determine the deposit rate in a potential gambling equilib-
rium:
rlG := G      
pG
+ k

1 + G   1
pG

.
Similarly to the prudent case, the value of the gambling bank in the potential gambling
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equilibrium is the same as (2.7).
The equilibrium conditions are determined in the same ways as in the Appendix "Proof of
Proposition 1".
Proposition 6 Similarly to a bank levy, a prot tax can decrease the risk-taking of banks. An
increase in the tax rate  decreases the range in which all banks gamble. The risk-reducing
e¤ect of a prot tax increases in the minimum capital requirement k. In comparison with the
prot tax, a bank levy is more e¤ective in preventing excessive risk-taking only if the regulator
requires a minimum levy.
Proof. The equilibrium conditions in the tax case and the levy case only di¤er in their deposit
rate di¤erential. We immediately see that rlG   rlP < rG   rP for k = 0. Moreover, the
decrease of rlG  rlP in k is smaller in absolute terms than the decrease of rG  rP because
1
pG
  1
pP
<
1
(1  ) pG  
1
(1  ) pP
which is equivalent to:
pP > pG.
For k = 0, the prot tax does not have an e¤ect on the equilibrium conditions. The tax
rate reduces bank values in absolute terms, but not in relative terms. Moreover, for k = 0,
the prot tax does not change optimal deposit rates. As a result, the payo¤ of a deviating
bank does not change in  , which leads to the fact that the incentives to deviate unilaterally
remain unchanged. Therefore, the equilibrium conditions are not a¤ected by  .
By contrast, if k > 0, the prot tax matters because it changes deposit rates which, in
turn, alters the equilibrium conditions. The reason is the following: Assume that all banks
invest in the prudent asset. A deviating bank then requires a higher compensation for the tax
on equity capital return (to receive a payo¤ which is at least as high as opportunity costs),
which attracts fewer depositors and thus reduces prot. Hence, banks have fewer incentives
to deviate. Assume, by contrast, that banks choose the gambling asset. Then a deviating
bank requires less compensation for the tax on equity capital which attracts more depositors
and thus increases the prot. Consequently, banks have stronger incentives to deviate.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the risk-reducing e¤ect of a prot tax and a bank levy for  = .11,
where the bank levy is paid ex ante. In case of a bank levy, a gambling equilibrium exists if
  mGl (k), and a prudent equilibrium if   mPl (k). Notice that mGl (k) and mPl (k) dene
the equilibrium conditions. We dispense with their explicit derivation. In case of a prot tax, a
gambling equilibrium exists if   mG (k), and a prudent equilibrium exists if   mP (k). In
order to avoid complexity, only the equilibria in the tax case are labeled in the gure (P  and
11Recall that we normalized the payo¤s and returns, which allows a comparison between the e¤ective-
ness of a bank levy and a prot tax.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibria: Bank levy versus prot tax
p
)(kGmt
)(kPmt
k
)(kGlm
)(kPlm
tP
tG
tt GP +
G ). These equilibrium conditions can be determined in the same way as in the appendix of
Proposition 1. Figure 2.3 shows that a bank levy depending on the level of liabilities is more
e¤ective than a prot tax if the regulator is only concerned about the investment risk. This
is due to the fact that in case of a bank levy, the whole burden is passed to depositors. By
contrast, in case of a prot tax, only part of the burden is borne by depositors.
2.7 Conclusion
We determined the e¤ect of two possibilities for funding government bailouts on the risk be-
haviour of banks: a bank levy on deposits and a prot tax. The paper accounts for competition
in the deposit market by using the imperfect competition framework à la Hotelling (1929).
The banks fund their assets with secured deposits and invest in either a prudent or a gambling
project. High competition leads to an equilibrium where all banks gamble, whereas a prudent
equilibrium exists if the number of banks is su¢ ciently low. Our results suggest that both a
levy on deposits and a prot tax can induce banks to switch from gambling to prudent assets.
While a bank levy is completely passed on to depositors, a prot tax is partially borne by
banksshareholders. Consequently, a bank levy is relatively more e¤ective in decreasing the
risk level of banks.
The e¤ectiveness of the levy depends upon whether the regulator can force the bank to
pay the levy ex ante, i.e. before the funds are invested. In this case, they bear the risk of
paying the levy e¤ectively and, therefore, they have larger incentives to behave prudently. The
implementation of a minimum levy may fulll this requirement because the banks have to
ensure that they are always su¢ ciently liquid in order to be able to pay the bill. Apart from
such a minimum requirement, other instruments may be available. However, the regulators
always have to ensure that the banks share at least a part of the burden e¤ectively. Moreover,
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the levy must neither be too small nor too large. In the former case, the bankspotential loss
is too small to be able to a¤ect banksbehaviour (Buch, Hilberg & Tonzer (2013)). In the
latter case, the banksmargins decrease to such a degree that they have even higher incentives
to gamble. Consequently, when the authorities whish to generate funds from the banks and
to inuence the banksrisk-taking, nding the optimal instrument and the optimal fee can be
quite di¢ cult.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Gambling equilibrium
We have to solve the following inequation (see main text):
max
rj
 DlPj  rj; rlG j+ lPj  rj; rlG j  V lG. (2.29)
First of all, we have to determine the optimal deposit rate of the deviating bank. This bank
chooses:
rj =
rlG + rlP
2
. (2.30)
After inserting this deposit rate into (2.29), we obtain:
pP

P   
pP
  r
lG + rlP
2
"
1
2
+
rlG+rlP
2
  rlG
2
#
 V lG,
which is equivalent to:
42

1  p
G
pP

  4 rlG   rlP + rlP   rlG2  0.
The solution of this inequation is given by:
rlG   rlP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
i    rlG   rlP
2
h
1 
q
pG
pP
i . (2.31)
However, we must ensure that the debt level of the deviating bank is not negative, i.e. that:
  r
lG   rlP
2
.
Hence, if the deposit rate is positive,  exceeds the lower bound in (2.31). Consequently, we
can neglect the lower bound. Since rlG   rlP decreases in  (see 2.4 and 2.6), a higher levy
lowers the area where banks gamble.
Prudent equilibrium
We have to solve the following inequation (see main text):
max
rj
 DlGj  rj; rlP j+ lGj  rj; rlP j  V lP . (2.32)
Again, we rst have to determine the optimal deposit rate for the deviating bank. It is easy
to show that the deposit rate is the same as in (2.30). After inserting this deposit rate into
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(2.32), we obtain:
pG

G   
pG
  r
lG + rlP
2
"
1
2
+
rlG+rlP
2
  rlP
2
#
 V lP .
Simple rearrangements lead to:
42

pP
pG
  1

  4 rlG   rlP   rlG   rlP 2  0.
The solution of this inequation is given by:
    r
lG   rlP
2
h
1 +
q
pP
pG
i or   rlG   rlP
2
hq
pP
pG
  1
i .
However, remember that  > 0. Consequently, a higher  lowers rlG   rlP and, therefore,
increases the range within which banks behave prudently.
Proof of Proposition 2
The bank levy a¤ects the equilibrium conditions again through its e¤ect on the di¤erence
between deposit rates rG and rP . However, since rG  rP does not depend on  (see 2.9 and
2.11), a bank levy does not inuence the investment decision of banks in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
When we identify the equilibrium conditions, we check whether a unilateral deviation from the
potential equilibrium path is benecial. We only allow from deviations which are consistent
with depositorsbeliefs. The rationale for this constraint is the following: Consider a bank
that deviates unilaterally from the potential prudent equilibrium path and o¤ers a deposit rate
which makes depositors believe that it still behaves prudently although it aims to invest in
the gambling asset. Depositors know that this o¤er is only optimal for the deviating bank if
they believe that the bank still invests in the prudent asset. Remember that the depositors are
aware of the banksobjective functions. If the depositors do not want to be fooled, they do
not o¤er their deposit rate to this deviating bank. This, in turn, is known by the banks and,
therefore, they will not o¤er such a deposit rate.
Conditions for a gambling equilibrium
We already know from the transparent case that rGT is a candidate for the deposit rate in
equilibrium. To determine the equilibrium conditions, we have to examine whether a unilateral
deviation is benecial for any bank. For didactic reasons, it may be worthwhile to di¤erentiate
between two cases:
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1. rS < rGT
2. rS > rGT .
Case 1 Since rGT exceeds rS, rGT could be a candidate for the deposit rate in equilibrium.
A gambling equilibrium where banks o¤er rGT exists if the following condition is fullled:
max
rj

pP

P   
pP
  rj
 
1
2
+
pP rj   pGrGT
2

 
2
,
where  
2
is the bank value in a potential gambling equilibrium. Notice that depositors expect
the deviating bank to invest in the prudent asset. From the transparent case, we already know
that a deviating bank prefers (see 2.17):
rj =
rPT + p
G
pP
rGT
2
. (2.33)
If rj < rS, this deposit rate is consistent with the depositorsbelief. Then, we already know
from the transparent case that such a deviation is always benecial, i.e. that we do not have
a gambling equilibrium.
However, if rj > rS, the deviating bank cannot choose rj, but has to o¤er at least rS. Of
course, rS is then the optimal choice for the deviating bank. In this case, a unilateral deviation
is not benecial if
pP

P   
pP
  rS
 
1
2
+
pP rS   pGrGT
2

 
2
.
Recall that rPT := P   
pP
  
pP
. Hence, the equilibrium condition is equivalent to:
pP

rPT   rS + 
pP
 
1
2
+
pP rS   pGrGT
2

 
2
.
Rearrangements lead to:
0  pP rS2   pP rPT + pGrGT  pP rS + pGrGT   pP rPT  + pP rPTpGrGT . (2.34)
The corresponding equation has the following solutions:

pP rS

1=2
=

pP rPT + pGrGT
q[pP rPT + pGrGT ]2   4 [[pGrGT   pP rPT ]  + pP rPTpGrGT ]
2
,
where

rS

1
=

pP rPT + pGrGT
 q[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] 
2pP
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and 
rS

2
=

pP rPT + pGrGT

+
q
[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] 
2pP
.
The inequation (2.34) is fullled if
rS <

rS

1
or rS >

rS

2
.
However, remember that we are in the case, in which rj =
rPT+ p
G
pP
rGT
2
> rS. This inequation is
equivalent to p
P rPT+pGrGT
2
> pP rS. Notice that

pP rPT   pGrGT 2 4 pGrGT   pP rPT  >
0. As we are in the case, in which pP rS < p
P rPT+pGrGT
2
<

pP rS

2
, we cannot obtain
pP rS >

pP rS

2
. Therefore, we only have a gambling equilibrium if rS <

rS

1
. However,
the deviating bank can only choose rS as long as its deposit volume is non-negative. Hence,
the deviating bank cannot choose rS if
1
2
+
pP rS   pGrGT
2
< 0
or equivalently if
rS <
pG
pP
rGT   
pP
.
Notice that:
pG
pP
rGT   
pP
<

pP rPT + pGrGT

+
q
[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] 
2pP
.
Hence,

rS

1
is binding.
Finally, we have to check whether rS1 or r
GT is binding. Note that rS1 is binding if
rGT >

pP rPT + pGrGT
 q[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] 
2pP
.
This holds true if
2pP rGT > 2pGrGT >

pP rPT + pGrGT
 q[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] .
Since 2pP rGT > 2pGrGT is always fullled, this condition holds true:
2pGrGT >

pP rPT + pGrGT
 q[pP rPT   pGrGT ]2   4 [pGrGT   pP rPT ] .
This is fullled because
4

pP rPT   pGrGT  > 0.
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Case 2 Finally, we may have rGT < rS. Then, a gambling equilibrium, where banks o¤er
rGT , cannot exist if the beliefs of the depositors are consistent in the equilibrium. In this case,
banks will o¤er the lowest possible deposit rate, which is equal to rS. Hence, the bank value
in a potential gambling equilibrium is given by:
bV G = 1
2
pG

G   
pG
  rS

.
If the deviating bank o¤ers a deposit rate, which leads depositors to believe that the bank
is behaving prudently, we may have a gambling equilibrium in the case of:
max
rj

 

1
2
+
pP rj   pGrS
2

+ pP

P   rj
 1
2
+
pP rj   pGrS
2

 bV G.
The optimal deposit rate of the deviating bank fullls:
 p
P
2
+ pP

P   rj
 pP
2
  pP

1
2
+
pP rj   pGrS
2

= 0,
which can be rearranged to:
pP

P   rj   
pP

pP   pP  + pP rj   pGrS = 0
and
P   rj   
pP
  
pP
  rj + p
G
pP
rS = 0.
Hence the optimal deposit rate of the deviating bank is given by:
rPT + p
G
pP
rS
2
= rj:
As before, we have to di¤erentiate between rj < rS and rj > rS. Assume that the rst
inequation holds. In this case, the deviating bank can o¤er rj. Then a gambling equilibrium
may exist if
pP
"
P   r
PT + p
G
pP
rS
2
  
pP
#2641
2
+
pP
rPT+ p
G
pP
rS
2
  pGrS
2
375  bV G.
Rearrangements lead to: 
pP rPT   pGrS2
4
 pGrGT   pP rPT .
The right side of the inequation is negative, whereas the left side of the inequation is positive.
Consequently, we cannot have a gambling equilibrium. Assume, by contrast, rj > rS. In this
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case, the deviating bank cannot o¤er rj because this causes depositors to believe that the
bank gambles. Thus the deviating bank o¤ers the highest possible deposit rate, i.e. a deposit
rate which is marginally smaller than rS. If we approach the limit, i.e. the deviating bank
chooses rS, a gambling equilibrium exists if:
 

1
2
+
pP rS   pGrS
2

+ pP

P   rS 1
2
+
pP rS   pGrS
2

 bV G.
This inequation is equivalent to:
pP

rPT +

pP
  rS
 
1
2
+
pP rS   pGrS
2

 pG

rGT +

pG
  rS

1
2
.
Remember that we are in the case, in which
rPT + p
G
pP
rS
2
> rS
or equivalently
rPT > 2rS   p
G
pP
rS.
Since pP > pG, we obtain rPT > rS. This means that rPT   rS > 0. Due to the fact that
pP rS pGrS
2
> 0, the inequation
pP

rPT +

pP
  rS
 
1
2
+
pP rS   pGrS
2

 pG

rGT +

pG
  rS

1
2
can only be fullled if rGT > rS. However, this is not the case, in which we are. Remember
that we are in the case, in which rS > rGT .
To summarize, a gambling equilibrium does not exist if rS > rGT .
Prudent investment
As before, we di¤erentiate between two cases:
1. rS > rPT
2. rS < rPT .
Case 1 Assume that the deviating bank chooses the gambling asset and a deposit rate which
makes depositors believe that it gambles. From (2.19) in Section 2.5.1, we already know that
the deviating bank o¤ers rj = 12
h
rGT + p
P
pG
rPT
i
, which is only consistent with the depositors
beliefs if rj > rS. We have then the same result as in the transparent case. Hence, a prudent
equilibrium always exists if rj > rS.
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Of course, if a deviation is not benecial where the deviating bank can choose its rst-
best deposit rate rj = 12
h
rGT + p
P
pG
rPT
i
, a deviation where the deviating bank chooses a
second-best deposit rate, i.e. rS, cannot be benecial either.
To summarize, a prudent equilibrium always exists if rS > rPT .
Case 2 Assume rS < rPT , i.e. the banks cannot o¤er rPT as it induces depositors to believe
that they gamble. In a symmetric equilibrium, where banks o¤er a deposit rate, which causes
depositors to believe that they are behaving prudently, the banks will then o¤er the highest
possible deposit rate, i.e. rS, and the bank value is equal to:
bV P = 1
2
pP

P   
pP
  rS

.
Consider the maximization problem of the deviating bank. A unilateral deviation is not
benecial if
max
rj

 

1
2
+
pGrj   pP rS
2

+ pG

G   rj
 1
2
+
pGrj   pP rS
2

 bV P ,
where the optimal deposit rate of the deviating bank is equal to:
rGT + p
P
pG
rS
2
= rj.
We have to di¤erentiate between rj < rS and rj > rS. If rj < rS, rj is not optimal as it
leads depositors to believe that it behaves prudently. Hence, the deviating bank chooses the
highest possible deposit rate which is equal to rS. Then, a prudent equilibrium exists if
pG

rGT +

pG
  rS
 
1
2
+
pGrS   pP rS
2

 1
2
pP

rPT +

pP
  rS

.
Remember that we are in the case, in which rj < rS, i.e.
rS >
rGT + p
P
pG
rS
2
or equivalently
rGT < 2rS   p
P
pG
rS.
Since pP > pG, we know that rj < rS can only be fullled if rGT < rS. This, however, means
that (remember that rS < rPT ):
pG

rGT +

pG
  rS

< pP

rPT +

pP
  rS

.
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Due to the fact that pGrS < pP rS, the inequation
pG

rGT +

pG
  rS
 
1
2
+
pGrS   pP rS
2

 1
2
pP

rPT +

pP
  rS

cannot be fullled. Therefore, we obtain a prudent equilibrium if rj < rS.
By contrast, if rj > rS, the deviating bank can o¤er rj. A deviation is, nevertheless, not
benecial if
pG
"
G   r
GT + p
P
pG
rS
2
  
pG
#2641
2
+
pG
rGT+ p
P
pG
rS
2
  pP rS
2
375  cV P .
Rearrangements lead to:

pGrGT   pP rS2  4 pP rPT   pGrGT  .
The solution of the corresponding equation is given by:

pP rS

1=2
= pGrGT  2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ].
Hence, the solution is:

pP rS

1
= pGrGT   2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ]
<

pP rS

<

pP rS

2
= pGrGT + 2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ].
Notice that D  0 has to be fullled. Therefore, we must have:
1
2
+
pGrGT   pP rS
4

 0
or, equivalently,
pP rS  pGrGT + 2.
We have
pGrGT + 2 < pGrGT + 2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ],
which is equivalent to:
2 < 

pP rPT   pGrGT  ,
if
0 <  < pP rPT   pGrGT .
Notice that pP rS  pGrGT + 2 is the same condition which has to be fullled in order to
guarantee a non-negative expected net return.
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To summarize, a prudent equilibrium exists if
rS < rPT
and
rS >
rGT + p
P
pG
rS
2
,
which is equivalent to:
rS >
pGrGT
2pG   pP ,
or
rS <
pGrGT
2pG   pP
and

pP rS

1
= pGrGT   2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ]
<

pP rS

<

pP rS

2
= pGrGT + 2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ].
These conditions for a prudent equilibrium (case 1 and 2) can be simplied. Notice that
only

pP rS

1
is binding if pP rPT <

pP rS

2
(remember that pP rPT > pGrGT , i.e. we
cannot have pP rPT <

pP rS

1
). This holds true because we also have a prudent equilibrium if
pP rS > pP rPT . Therefore,

pP rS

2
may only be binding if pP rPT >

pP rS

2
. This inequation
is fullled if
pP rPT   pGrGT
4
> .
However, if this inequation is fullled, we know that pGrGT+2 < pGrGT+2
p
 [pP rPT   pGrGT ],
i.e. the condition for a non-negative deposit volume of the deviating bank (pP rS  pGrGT+2)
is binding. As a deviation is never benecial if the deposit volume is negative, the condition
pP rS  pGrGT + 2 does not have to be indicated explicitely. Therefore, the only binding
condition is

pP rS

1
. Hence, we have a prudent equilibrium if
rS >
pGrGT   2p [pP rPT   pGrGT ]
pP
.
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Contingent Public Bailout,
Contagion and Bank Risk-Taking
3.1 Introduction
During the recent nancial crisis, the bailout of some major banks was perceived as necessary
to prevent a break-down of the nancial system. Although bailouts might be able to avoid
a spill-over to sound banks, it is often argued that they create moral hazard. The economic
theory provides diverging predictions with regard to the impact of bank bailouts on the risk-
taking of banks. On the one hand, the announcement of bailouts can be considered to be
implicit government protection against failure in the future. This may encourage banks to
increase their risk-taking (Hakenes & Schnabel (2010); Dam & Koetter (2012)). On the other
hand, bailouts increase the charter value of banks, which prevents them from investing in risky
assets (Keeley (1990)). Cordella & Yeyati (2003) take both e¤ects into account and show that
ex ante announced bank bailouts in times of macroeconomic distortions can reduce a banks
risk-taking because the value e¤ect outweighs the moral-hazard-e¤ect.
This result depends on several assumptions which will be challenged in this chapter. First,
the "macroeconomic environment" must be a factor that is outside the banks sphere of
inuence but which a¤ects their probability of success. Otherwise these banks may attempt
to bring about such conditions in order to be secured by the regulator (Acharya & Yorulmazer
(2007); Farhi & Tirole (2012)). Second, in order to be able to rescue them "prudentially",
authorities must have perfect information about the impact of the macroeconomic conditions
on the banksbusiness. Third, Cordella & Yeyati (2003) consider a monopoly bank and neglect
the impact of competition on the banksinvestment decision. Fourth, they do not di¤erentiate
between globally systemic institutions and local banks, which are less important for the stability
of the nancial system. Hence, each bank should be rescued in times of macroeconomic
distortions. Macroeconomic conditions may play a role when deciding whether to rescue or
to liquidate a bank. However, a banks impact on the stability of the nancial system is also
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a crucial factor for the authorities.1 We take this into account in the second part of this
paper, where the interconnectedness of the banks plays an important role for the stability of
the nancial system.2
To address these issues, we use a similar framework as Repullo (2004). In contrast to Chap-
ter 2, we use a dynamic model, endogenize the bankscharter value and model competition à
la Salop (1979), i.e. banks are located on the circumference of a circle instead of a straight
line. This enables us to study both the impact of bank competition and the interconnected-
ness (systemic relevance) of banks on the linkage between bank bailouts and the risk-taking
of banks. Similarly to the pevious chapter, banks compete in the deposit markets and invest
their funds in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The probability of their project success
depends on the asset type and on a state of nature (i.e. macroeconomic conditions). We
assume that this state of nature can be observed and veried by a third party, which enables
the regulator and the banks to sign a contract on a certain bailout policy (complete-contract
approach). Consequently, the regulator is able to announce a credible bailout policy ex ante.
After the announcement, the banks o¤er deposit rates and invest their funds. In contrast to
the o¤ered deposit rates and the investment decisions, the bailout policy is announced once
for the entire game. The investment decision is private information and cannot be observed by
the regulator, except in the basic scenario. We focus on strategy combinations in equilibrium
which form equilibria at every stage of the game. To solve the game, we apply backward
induction.
These assumptions lead to the following results: Under symmetric information, the reg-
ulator can di¤erentiate between prudent and gambling banks, and the optimal bailout policy
suggests liquidating gambling and rescuing prudent banks with probability one, i.e. always.
Asymmetric information forecloses the possibility of di¤erentiating between sound (prudent)
and unsound (gambling) banks. In this case, the regulator should bail out insolvent banks with
probability one in times of macroeconomic distortions and liquidate them with probability one
otherwise. Such a bailout policy does not alter banksinvestment behaviour if the banking
market is too competitive. The intuition is the following: A higher bailout probability increases
the bankscharter value independently of whether it invests in a gambling or a prudent asset.
If the regulator rescues banks in rather instable times and liquidates them in rather stable
times, the relative charter value from investment in prudent assets increases and thus raises
opportunity costs of the gambling asset. In highly competitive banking markets, the banks
charter value is too low, so that an increase of this charter in the course of a well-suited bailout
policy is not su¢ cient to induce prudential behaviour. This also has the consequence of neg-
ative e¤ects of an ill-suited bailout policy. Such a policy does not cause gambling behaviour
if the banking market is su¢ ciently competitive.
1In Germany, for instance, Commerzbank and Hypo Real Estate were rescued due to their importance
for the nancial stability, at least in Germany.
2We do not postpone the analysis presented in this section to Chapter 4 because in that chapter we
restrict our attention on two-stage games which do not allow for the internalization of the bankscharter
value.
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If the regulator conditions his bailout policy on the basis of macroeconomic situations
which do not inuence banksprobability of success to a su¢ ciently large extent, he increases
moral hazard. We model this by assuming that the regulator receives a signal about the true
impact of the banksenvironment on their probability of success. Then the regulator should
rescue only if he receives a su¢ ciently reliable signal about whether the failure arises from bad
luck or from risky investments. To say it in a di¤erent way, the regulator should rescue only
if he is certain about the impact of these conditions on the banksprobability of success.
Alternatively, he can condition his bailout policy on the systemic relevance of banks. There-
fore, we assume that the failure of a bank causes contagion resulting in the failure of neigh-
bouring banks with a pre-dened probability. Although banks may be able to inuence the
contagion probability, we argue that this takes time. Consequently, at least in the short and
medium term, the bankssystemic relevance may be constant. We nd that a regulator who
rescues banks, whose systemic relevance is not too high, decreases moral hazard, even if his
policy is too accomodative with regard to the policy based only upon on macroeconomic fac-
tors. The critical threshold increases with the number of banks, so that even systemic banks
which cause contagion with a rather high probability should be rescued.
The bailout of an insolvent bank is not in the focus of the current draft version of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). This chapter illustrates some stabilizing e¤ects
of a bailout and argues that regulators should not deny such a measure categorically. The
bail-in tool prefered in the BRRD ensures that taxpayers do not have to bear all the costs of
a failure. This may be a step in the right direction. However, since such a policy has not yet
been tested, and, therefore, may fail in emergency, bank bailouts should not be demonized,
but considered, at least, as a "tool of last resort".
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3:2 provides an overview of the related litera-
ture. Section 3:3 introduces the model, and Section 3:4 derives the optimal bailout policy
under symmetric and asymmetric information when the regulator conditions his bailout policy
on macroeconomic indicators. In Section 3:5, we determine the optimal bailout policy of a
regulator who conditions his bailout policy on the systemic relevance of banks. Section 3:6
concludes Chapter 3.
3.2 Literature review
Two strands in the literature are related to our model. One strand analyses the impact of
private and public bank bailouts on the behaviour of banks. A second strand deals with the
impact of bank competition on the risk behaviour of banks.
Perotti & Suarez (2002) argue that private bailouts, i.e. bailouts by solvent banks, are
more e¢ cient than public bailouts because the charter value of acquiring banks is increased,
which induces them ex ante to behave more prudently. Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) show
that the private solution is e¢ cient if the number of insolvent banks is su¢ ciently small. This
results from the fact that a bailout policy which depends on the banks interconnectedness
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induces them to increase it. To avoid this, the regulator should rely on solvent banks acquiring
insolvent institutions. If the number of insolvent banks becomes su¢ ciently high, there will not
be enough solvent banks that are able to a¤ord an acquisition. As a consequence, failed banks
have to be sold to investors outside the banking sector, which leads to welfare losses since these
investors do not have the same skills. In this case, the regulator should assist solvent banks
so that acquisitions become a¤ordable (Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008)).3 If private bailouts
are not feasible, a public bailout may be desirable, as liquidation is costly, too. According to
Freixas (1999), an insolvent bank should be bailed out with probability one if rescue costs are
su¢ ciently lower than liquidation costs. Otherwise, the regulator should not liquidate with
probability one, but implement "ambiguity" and rescue with a probability between zero and
one. Gorton & Huang (2004) argue that even if private bailouts are feasible, government
bailouts may be desirable, since privately supplied liquidity is costly for society. We restrict
our attention to public bank bailouts and do not ask whether private or public bailouts are
more desirable (Gorton & Huang (2004)). While the size of the bank is not the key ingredient
(Freixas (1999)), the interconnectedness between banks plays an important role, as described
by Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) and Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008).
Moreover, even if costs are not taken into account, properly designed bailouts can be
desirable. Nagarajan & Sealey (1995) and Cordella & Yeyati (2003) nd that such a bailout
policy should be contingent on the banks macroeconomic environment. Assuming that the
regulator can credibly commit to his bailout policy, Cordella & Yeyati (2003) nd that a
properly designed policy can decrease a banks portfolio risk and thus reduce moral hazard.
The reason is that a higher bailout probability increases a banks charter value, which induces
it to behave more prudently (value e¤ect). However, a higher bailout probability also decreases
the inuence of the banks choice of risk on its probability of surviving (moral-hazard-e¤ect).
The value e¤ect outweighs the moral-hazard-e¤ect in the case of adverse macroeconomic
conditions. Similarly, Keeley (1990), Suarez (1994), Hellmann et al. (2000) and Repullo
(2004) nd that the charter value causes banks to behave more prudently. Mailath & Mester
(1994) show that when regulators cannot credibly commit themselves to future actions, but
monitor banks perfectly, the closure of a bank may reduce welfare, independently of whether
the regulator cares about the costs of a bank closure and the net return of the projects funded
by the bank or only about the costs of a closure and depositor payouts costs. Hakenes &
Schnabel (2010) nd that guarantees for unsecured depositors may have a risk-reducing-e¤ect
of the protected bank, but they increase the risk-taking of the competitor bank.
According to DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011), bank bailouts can reduce moral hazard if
the regulator can credibly commit himself to a bailout policy which promises the bailout of
systemic banks. Similarly to Cordella & Yeyati (2003), they show that bank bailouts have two
e¤ects. On the one hand, a higher bailout probability gives a failing bank some rent if it is
assumed to cause contagion, which leads to higher risk-taking. On the other hand, it protects
3By contrast to Cordella & Yeyati (2003), Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) do not consider an exogenous
solvency shock, but assume that banks enforce the occurence of crisis by investing in similar projects.
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banks from being hit by a failing neighbour-bank, which increases expected prot and thus
induces banks to behave more prudently. When systemic banks are rescued, the latter e¤ect
dominates. Consequently, the regulator should rescue them with probability one. Although
we also examine the relation between bank bailouts, interconnectedness of banks and bank
risk-taking, we do not restrict our attention to this. We also ask how bank bailouts a¤ect the
risk-taking behaviour of banks which are not interconnected. Similarly to Cordella & Yeyati
(2003), we take the macroeconomic environment into account. In contrast to Cordella &
Yeyati (2003), we examine how the bailout policy should be designed if the regulator cannot
perfectly condition on macroeconomic situations and allow for competition among banks.
While DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011) choose a static framework, we analyse the e¤ects of
the bailout policy in a dynamic setup. Consequently, we are able to endogenize the banks
charter value. As in Keeley (1990), Suarez (1994), Hellmann et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004),
the charter value plays a key role. Repullo (2004) shows that minimum capital requirements
can decrease banks risk-taking incentives as they lower deposit rates in equilibrium, which
increases the banksmargin.
Apart from the regulators bailout policy, the risk-taking of banks is also inuenced by
competition on the deposit and the loan market. Boyd & De Nicoló (2005) nd that higher
competition can prevent banks from investing in particularly risky projects. On the one hand,
higher competition in the deposit market increases deposit rates and decreases expected prof-
its, which raises banksincentives to invest in riskier projects. On the other hand, competition
decreases the loan rates of corporates, which increases their incentives to stay solvent (risk-
shift e¤ect). A lower loan rate, in turn, decreases the banksmargin and therefore increases
the incentives to gamble (margin e¤ect). According to Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2010),
the risk-shifting e¤ect dominates in monopolistic markets, whereas the margin e¤ect domi-
nates in competitive markets. De Nicoló & Lucchetta (2011) provide evidence that imperfect
competition might be optimal from a welfare point of view if information technology features
constant returns to scale, while in the case of increasing returns to scale perfect competition
is desirable. In contrast to Boyd & De Nicoló (2005) and Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2010),
we only account for competition in the deposit market.
As in this model, some papers also use the Salop model and analyse the relation between
competition and bank risk-taking. Matutes & Vives (1996) assert that the fragility of nancial
institutions is due to depositorsdi¤erentiated expectations. If depositors perceive a bank to
be safe, the bank receives a higher margin and thus decreases its risk level. Consequently,
the probability of failure results from the self-fullling expectation of depositors. Hellmann
et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004) suggest higher capital reserves in order to induce prudent
behaviour.4 As in this chapter, they model competition among banks à la Salop and focus on
competition on the deposit market. Repullo (2004) is closest to the model presented in this
4See also Bolt & Tieman (2004). However, Hellmann et al. (2000) assert that capital controls are
not su¢ cient to achieve a Pareto e¢ cient outcome and deposit rate controls are necessary. Gale (2010)
argues that capital controls can increase investment risk if banks try to maximize rates of return.
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chapter. However, while he focuses on the relation between minimum capital requirements
on banks risk-taking behaviour without taking bank bailouts into account, we restrict our
attention to the e¤ects of bank bailouts on the risk-taking behaviour of banks.
3.3 The model
3.3.1 Players and action sets
This model extends the ndings of Repullo (2004) by introducing a regulator who can bail out
insolvent banks. We consider the following groups of risk-neutral players: shareholders who
run n > 2 banks (henceforth, we often write "banks"), secured depositors, and a regulator
who decides about the bailout policy. Each generation of depositors and shareholders lives for
one period, does not have alternative investment possibilities and desires to consume at the
end of its life, i.e. at the end of the investment period. This means that at the end of each
investment period, the payo¤s are distributed to the depositors and the shareholders and a
new investment period begins, unless the bank is liquidated.
Banks
The banks are symmetrically located on a circumference of length one. As in the previous
chapter, shareholders invest an innitesimal amount of equity into the banks. In contrast to
the previous chapter, the investment takes place at the beginning of each period. Additionally,
at the beginning of each investment period (discrete time), each bank j = 1; :::; n chooses
the deposit rate rj and either invests in a prudent asset or in a gambling asset. The prudent
investment is indexed with "P" and the gambling investment is indexed with "G". The
investment decision is private information to the banks, except in Section 3.4.1. Hence, the
balance sheet total consists of the innitesimal amount of equity and deposits.
The prudent investment yields a rate of return (henceforth, we often write return) P 2
(0; 1) with probability pP and a return of zero otherwise. The gambling investment generates
a return G 2 (0; 1) with probability pG and a return of zero otherwise.
The probability of project success depends on the asset type, P or G, and on an exogenous
state of nature which can be either "good" (economic boom) or "bad" (economic downturn
or even a crisis) for the banks. This state of nature represents the macreconomic conditions
which inuence the success of the projects. If these macroeconomic conditions are in favour
of the banks (good), the probability of project success is predominantly determined by the
banksasset choice. By contrast, if these conditions are bad, the probability of success is, to a
relatively low extent, inuenced by the bankschoice. We denote the probability that the good
state H appears with probability q and that the bad state L appears with probability 1   q.
Notice that the banksinvestment decision does not have an impact on the macroeconomic
condition.
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In order to connect these macroeconomic conditions with the banksprobability of success,
we assume that in the good case H, the probability that banks are hit by a shock is low. This
probability is denoted with 1   boom (the index "boom" stands for good macroeconomic
conditions). Hence, in the good state, banks are not hit by a shock with probability boom.
By contrast, in the bad case L, this probability is high and denoted with 1  bust (the index
"bust" stands for bad macroeconomic conditions), where boom > bust. If the shock occurs,
the project return is zero, independent of whether a bank chose the prudent or the gambling
investment. Hence, the return can be zero due to the solvency shock and/or due to project
failure. The insertion of  and q allows one to di¤erentiate between the two reasons for
the failure of a bank: failure of the project or bad circumstances. Notice that the banks
investment decision does not have an impact of the probability that a shock occurs.
Following these assumptions, we can summarize the return functions RG and RP :
RG =
(
G with probability pG

qboom + [1  q] bust
0 with probability 1  pG qboom + [1  q] bust
RP =
(
P with probability pP

qboom + [1  q] bust
0 with probability 1  pP qboom + [1  q] bust .
For example, assume that the macroeconomic conditions are good (q = 1) and boom = 1.
Then the probability of project success is solely determined by the banksasset choice. By
contrast, if the conditions are bad (q = 0) and bust is very low, let us say close to zero, the
probability of success is very low, even if the bank chooses the prudent asset. Since the bank
does not know the true state of nature ex ante (when the investment decision is taken), the
probability of success depends on the expected conditions. The return of the gambling asset
is supposed to be higher than the return of the prudent asset, G > P , but the expected
return is lower, i.e. pPP > pGG. Limited liability of banks provides incentives to invest in
the gambling asset and thus induces moral hazard.
In order to get more familiar with the di¤erent probabilities, consider Figure 3.1. This
gure illustrates the "decision tree" for an isolated bank which can and will only choose the
prudent asset. The node, denoted with B, is the "decision node" of the isolated bank, and
the nodes, denoted with N , are the "decision nodes" of the nature. The gure also indicates
the probabilities for the paths. Remember that the bank only obtains a positive return if the
project is successful and no shock occurs. As a consequence, the probability that the bank
receives the return P is pP

qboom + (1  q) bust.
The residual of the project payo¤ (after depositors have been paid) is distributed among
the banksshareholders. We further assume that shareholders have a time preference which is
represented by the discount factor  > 0.
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Figure 3.1: "Decision tree" of an isolated and prudent bank
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Depositors
Deposits are secured by a deposit insurance. The aggregate market volume of deposits is
constant to one. To derive the deposit demand function, we use a modication of the Salop
model. The depositors are continuously distributed on the circumference. Depositing funds in
a bank induces "transportation costs per unit of distance",  > 0, which can be interpreted
as a heterogeneity factor for banks. Imagine, for instance, that interest rates on secured
deposits are not the only feature a customer takes into account when depositing his funds
in a bank. Advisory services or/and the location of cashpoints might also play a role for
his decision. Following the cashpoint argument, we can assume that potential depositors are
located between two cashpoints, owned by di¤erent banks, and they choose the bank with the
nearest one.
The amount of creditors which bank j attracts depends on its o¤ered deposit rate, on
the deposit rate o¤ered by its neighbours j + 1 (to the right) and j   1 (to the left) and on
the transportation costs . We denote the deposit rate, o¤ered by bank j, with rj 2 (0; 1)
and the deposit rates, o¤ered by the neighbour banks, j + 1 and j   1, by rj+1 and rj 1. A
depositor located between bank j and bank j + 1 is indi¤erent towards these banks if his net
returns are the same, thus if
rj   z = rj+1   

1
n
  z

holds,5 where z is the distance between the indi¤erent depositor and bank j (or its cashpoint)
5In contrast to Chapter 2, the distance between bank j + 1 (i.e.  j) and the indi¤erent depositor is
now given by 1n   z instead of 1  z.
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and 1
n
 z the distance between the indi¤erent depositor and bank j+1.6 Solving for z reveals
the "amount" of depositors on the line between bank j and j+1, who decide to deposit their
funds in bank j:
z (rj; rj+1) =
1
2n
+
rj   rj+1
2
.
Due to the symmetrical order, the distance between bank j and j +1 is equal to the distance
between bank j and j   1. As a result, the total demand of depositors who lend their funds
to bank j, amounts to:7
Dj (rj; rj 1; rj+1) =
1
n
+
2rj   rj+1   rj 1
2
, (3.1)
whereDj (rj; rj 1; rj+1)  0 has to be fullled (a negative amount of depositors is impossible).
The demand of deposits, Dj, decreases in n, rj+1 and rj 1 and increases in rj. The more the
banks are heterogenous, i.e. the higher the distance between the cashpoints (higher ), the
lower the impact of deposit rates on deposit demand. The aggregate demand of deposits is
constant and normalized to one. As we only consider symmetric equilibria, we can henceforth
write 2r j instead of rj+1 + rj 1.
Finally, we normalize the deposit insurance premium to zero.
Regulator
The regulator prefers prudent investments over gambling investments of the banks. Therefore,
his payo¤ function is quite simple, as he is only interested in the investment decision of the
banks.
We assume that the state of nature is observable and veriable by a third party (complete-
contract approach). Hence, the regulator and the bank can sign a contract which promises a
bailout in the case of pre-dened circumstances (states of nature). Therefore, the regulator
can announce a credible bailout policy ex ante. The bailout policy then remains constant over
time. We allow for bailout probabilities 0    1 which might be ensured by institutional
arrangements making it unclear (i.e. ambiguous) for the banks whether the regulator intervenes
or not (DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011)).
If a bank is insolvent at the end of an investment period, which is equivalent to the
fact that its project was not successful, the regulator bails it out with probability H if the
macroeconomic conditions are good. If the macroeconomic conditions are bad, the regulator
bails a failed bank out with probability L. Hence, the regulator conditions his bailout policy
on the macroeconomic condition. For the time being, the regulator has perfect information
about the impact of the macroeconomic conditions on the banksprobability of success. For
6Notice that the comparison between transportation costs and returns is possible because of the
normalization of payo¤s and returns.
7Notice that the demand of deposits does not depend on the banksinvestment risk because deposits
are covered by a deposit insurance.
61
Chapter 3. Contingent Public Bailout, Contagion and Bank Risk-Taking
example, if these conditions are good, q = 1, the regulator knows that the banksprojects will
fail with probability 1  boom.
Bailout means that depositors are paid by the regulator and the bank can continue to
operate in the following period. Liquidation means that the bank is closed and replaced by
another bank. Hence, if a bank is liquidated, it loses potential charter value.
Following these assumptions, the probability s of surviving in P is given by:
sP = q

pPboom +

1  pPboom H+ [1  q] pPbust + 1  pPbust L (3.2)
and in G by:
sG = q

pGboom +

1  pGboom H+ [1  q] pGbust + 1  pGbust L . (3.3)
For example, if q = 1, i.e. the macroeconomic conditions are good and therefore a bank
survives if
 its project is successful and it is not hit by the shock, i.e. with probability pPboom in
the prudent case and with probability pGboom in the gambling case, or
 its project is not successful, but it is rescued by the regulator, i.e. with probability
1  pPboom H in the prudent and with probability 1  pGboom H in the gambling
case.
In the symmetric information case, the regulator can also di¤erentiate between the project
type, whereas in the asymmetric information case, the regulator has to apply the same bailout
probability for prudent and gambling banks.
3.3.2 Sequence of events
The time structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 3.2. At the beginning of an initial period,
the regulator announces and can credibly commit himself to a bailout policy that is contingent
on the state of nature  and applied in all of the following periods. Then each bank o¤ers a
deposit rate and decides about the type of investment, i.e. prudent or gambling. Thereafter,
depositors decide where to store their funds. If the project is successful, shareholders and
depositors share the payo¤ and the bank can continue to operate in the second period where
it collects funds again from shareholders and depositors. If the project fails, the regulator either
rescues or liquidates the bank in accordance with his announced bailout policy. A rescued bank
can continue to operate and invest again in the following period. A liquidated bank is always
replaced by another bank so that the number of banks remains constant. This sequence is
repeated in each period t.
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Figure 3.2: Sequence of events
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3.3.3 Equilibrium concept
The presented game is a repeated game. In such a game, various equilibria may exist. Banks
could, for instance, base their decisions on past decisions taken by neighbouring banks. More-
over, we might have an equilibrium, where banks are able to coordinate over time in such
a way that they receive all the surplus. In this game, we do not consider such possibilities.
We rather assume that the players cannot know or/and do not care about the past. Hence,
after the payo¤s have been realized at the end of an investment period, the players forget the
decisions they made in the past and the decisions made by the other players. Consequently,
we have a "repeated game".
In order to simplify this, we restrict our attention to strategy combinations, which form
an equilibrium at each stage of the game. We look at a representative stage of the game and
determine the equilibria at this stage. Markov strategies lead to such equilibria because they
only depend on state variables which summarize the impact of the past on the current play
(Fudenberg & Tirole (1995)). In our case, the state variable It represents whether the bank
is left open or is closed at the beginning of period t. Tomorrows state, i.e. It+1, depends on
the banksactions in period t and on the regulators bailout decision. Consequently, the past
only matters in such a way that if the bank is still open, i.e. has survived, it can invest again.
If the bank has been liquidated, it cannot invest any more.
We focus on two types of symmetric equilibria at the representative stage t: a prudent
equilibrium, where all banks choose the deposit rate rP and the prudent asset P , and a
gambling equilibrium where all banks choose the deposit rate rG and the gambling asset G.
In the prudent equilibrium, bank j does not have an incentive to choose a deposit rate r 6= rP
and G in period t and rP and P in periods t + 1; :::;1, while all other banks  j choose
rP and P in periods t; ::::;1 and depositors do not have an incentive to change the bank.
Equivalent conditions hold in the gambling equilibrium.
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In the representative period t, we can solve the game by applying backward induction.
We begin with the third stage where depositors choose their bank. Taking this decision into
account, banks decide at the second stage in which asset they invest and which deposit rate
they o¤er. This decision is taken simultaneously, i.e. the banks cannot observe the decision
of their neighbours. At the rst stage, the regulator announces the bailout policy.
The bailout policy, which is always a best strategy, that is, independent of the competition
parameters  and n, is called the "optimal" bailout strategy. Of course, in many cases where
the bailout policy does not have an impact on the banksinvestment decision, this optimal
bailout policy is not the only strategy in an equilibrium.
3.4 Public bank bailouts contingent on the macro-
economic environment
3.4.1 Symmetric information on investment decisions
In this basic scenario, the banksinvestment decision is supposed to be public information and
veriable by a third party. Therefore, the regulator and the banks can sign a contract which
promises a bailout, depending on the investment decision. Consequently, the regulator can
credibly announce such a bailout policy ex ante. We denote the bailout probability for banks
investing in prudent assets by HP and 
L
P and the bailout probability for gambling banks by
HG and 
L
G. Following these assumptions, the probability esP of surviving in P is given by:
esP = q pPboom + 1  pPboom HP + [1  q] pPbust + 1  pPbust LP 
and in G by:
esG = q pGboom + 1  pGboom HG+ [1  q] pGbust + 1  pGbust LG .
At the beginning of each period, bank j chooses the deposit rate rj and the investment
type  2 P ; G	 in order to maximize its value Vj, i.e. the net present value of expected
period prots. The game is solved by backward induction starting with the equilibrium deposit
rate and investment decision in period t. Thereafter, we determine the optimal bailout policy.
In a prudent equilibrium, bank j does not have an incentive to deviate unilateraly in period
t by choosing the gambling asset (the others behave prudently) and the corresponding deposit
rate which maximizes the net expected value of investment in period t. Equivalently, in the
gambling equilibrium, no bank has an incentive to deviate unilateraly in period t by choosing
the prudent asset and the corresponding deposit rate which maximizes the net expected value
of investment in period t. Therefore, we have to determine the payo¤ of the banks which
choose the gambling asset and the corresponding deposit rate in each period t as well as
the payo¤ of banks which choose the prudent asset in each period. Moreover, we have to
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determine the payo¤ of a deviating bank.
To begin with, assume that bank j chooses the prudent investment at stage one. Then its
optimization problem is given by:
max
rj
h
Pj (rj; r j) + esP eV Pj i ; (3.4)
where Pj (rj; r j) is the expected period prot dened by:
Pj (rj; r j) = p
P

qboom + [1  q] bust P   rjDPj (rj; r j) . (3.5)
P   rj is the net payo¤ on deposits. Notice that j   rj is equal to
 
1 + P
  (1 + rj), i.e.
gross return minus gross debt. Equivalently, the expected net period prot is the di¤erence
between gross expected payo¤ of investment pP

qboom + [1  q] bust  1 + P DPj (rj; r j)
and gross expected liabilities pP

qboom + [1  q] bust (1 + rj)DPj (rj; r j).
After solving the maximization problem in (3.4), we obtain the equilibrium deposit rate:
rP := P   
n
: (3.6)
Obviously, rP increases in P and n and decreases in .8 Not surprisingly, depositors receive
the gross project return P less the "transportation costs". This results from the fact that
banks compete in price, thus we have imperfect Bertrand competition where the "rms" do
not receive a payo¤ beyond their costs. Banks only receive the costs of capital and a surplus

n
. Substituting rP = rj in the objective function (3.4), and taking into account the fact that
the maximized value is also eV P , the optimal bank value in the prudent is given by:
eV P = pP qboom + [1  q] bust
1  esP n2 : (3.7)
eV P increases in  and decreases in the number of banks n, the market power for each
bank. This is due to the fact that higher competition leads to higher returns on deposits
(3.6) and thus to lower expected prots. Therefore, the opportunity costs of the gambling
investment decrease. Perfect competition, n!1, increases the deposit rates in such a way
that the bank value converges to zero.
Equivalently, the equilibrium deposit rate in case of the gambling investment amounts to:
rG := G   
n
(3.8)
which leads to the bank value
eV G = pG qboom + [1  q] bust
1  esG n2 : (3.9)
8Apart from a decrease in deposit rates, higher competition, thus a higher number of banks, might
reduce loan rates, too (Hauswald & Marquez (2006)).
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In a prudent equilibrium bank j does not have an incentive to deviate unilateraly in period
t by choosing the gambling asset (the others behave prudently) and the corresponding deposit
rate, which maximizes the net expected value of investment in period t, i.e.:
max
rj
h
Gj
 
rj; r
P
 j

+ esGeV Pi  eV P .
In the gambling equilibrium, no bank has an incentive to deviate unilateraly in period t by
choosing the prudent asset and the corresponding deposit rate, which maximizes the net
expected value of investment in period t, i.e.:
max
rj
h
Pj
 
rj; r
G
 j

+ esP eV Gi  eV G.
The equilibrium conditions and the optimal bailout policy are indicated in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The investment decisions in equilibrium (i) and the optimal bailout policy (ii)
are as follows:
(i) Investment decisions:
 Banks choose the gambling asset if

n
 r
G   rP
2

1 
q eV GeV P
 =: emG.
 Banks choose the prudent asset if

n
 r
G   rP
2
q eV PeV G   1
 =: emP .
 We have emG > emP .
(ii) The optimal bailout policy is given by:
HP = 
L
P = 1
HG = 
L
G = 0.
Proof. For the derivation of the equilibrium conditions, consult the appendix!
Figure 3.3 illustrates the equilibrium conditions. Note that emP and emG measure the degree
of competition and hence the market power of the banks. A su¢ ciently small number of banks,
thus a su¢ ciently high market power, mitigates excessive risk-taking, i.e. induces banks to
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choose the prudent asset. In line with the current literature, a more competitive deposit
market increases deposit rates and thus decreases banksprots, which generates higher risk
level (Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004) and Boyd & De Nicoló (2005)). The area where
banks gamble increases in the di¤erence of deposit rates rG   rP .
Figure 3.3: Equilibria under symmetric information
n
pPm~ Gm~
Gambling Equilibrium
Prudent Equilibrium
The intuition for the optimal bailout policy is the following: As the regulator prefers prudent
investments, it cannot be optimal for the regulator to favour gambling over prudent banks.
The optimal strategy of the regulator is to choose the bailout probabilities HG , 
L
G and 
H
P , 
L
P
in such a way that emP and emG decrease. By doing so, the regulator minimizes the range of

n
where banks gamble. Since esG increases in HG and LG and esP increases in HP and LP , the
regulator should choose HG = 
L
G = 0 and 
H
P = 
L
P = 1. Notice that there might be other
equilibria, for instance, where the regulator bails out all banks independently of whether they
behave prudently. This might be true if competition is so severe that the regulators bailout
policy is ine¤ective, i.e. if he cannot inuence the banksinvestment.
Due to the fact that the regulator has perfect information about the investment risk, he
can punish banks investing in gambling assets. By rescuing prudent banks with probability one
and gambling banks with probability zero, the regulator increases the relative bank value eV PeV G
and thus decreases the area of the gambling equilibrium because emG and emP decrease. If the
regulator di¤erentiates between prudent and gambling banks, he accounts for more informa-
tion than in the case of di¤erentiating between stable and instable periods and, therefore, a
di¤erentiation between H and L cannot improve welfare.
Likewise, a bailout policy which increases the area where banks gamble does not induce
banks to gamble if the banking market is too competitive. Then banks already invest in risky
assets.
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3.4.2 Asymmetric information on investment decisions
The information of the project risk is asymmetric as far as the investment risk is private
information and the regulator cannot reveal the asset type. Hence, the regulator cannot base
the bailout policy on the banksrisk behaviour and has to apply the same bailout policy for
each type of bank asset. Remember that the regulator can still di¤erentiate between H and
L.
As the deposit rates do not depend on the bailout policy, banks choose again the deposit
rates indicated in (3.6) and (3.8) in equilibrium. Substituting esP by sP in (3.7) and esG by sG
in (3.9), we immediately obtain the bank values bV P and bV G (the circumex signals that we
are in the case of "asymmetric information"). The determination of the equilibrium conditions
follows the same procedure as before.
Proposition 8 The equilibrium conditions (i) and the optimal bailout policy (ii) are as fol-
lows:
(i) Equilibrium conditions:
 Banks invest in the gambling asset if

n
 r
G   rP
2

1 
q bV GbV P
 =: bmG.
 Banks invest in the prudent asset if

n
 r
G   rP
2
q bV PbV G   1
 =: bmP .
 We have bmG > bmP .
(ii) The optimal bailout policy b is given by:
H = 0
and
L =

1 if 
boom
bust
 1 +q
q
0 if 
boom
bust
< 1 +q
q
.
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Proof. We can take the equilibrium conditions from the symmetric information case and
replace esG by sG dened in (3.3) and esP by sP dened in (3.2). The derivation of the optimal
bailout policy is provided in the appendix.
Asymmetric information hinders the distinction between "prudent" (P ) and "gambling"
(G) projects. However, the regulator can discriminate between "good" (H) and "bad" (L)
circumstances and punish banks in state H and support banks in state L, which increases the
relative charter value bV PbV G . The reason is as follows: In both types of investment, the marginal
increase of charter value with respect to H is higher than with respect to L. However,
H is relatively "more important" for gambling banks and L is relatively more important
for prudent banks. Technically speaking, gambling banks have a comparative advantage of a
high H , whereas prudent banks have a comparative advantage of a high L. Consequently, a
low H and a high L punishes gambling banks more than prudent banks and, therefore, the
relative charter value of prudent investment increases. Intuitively, if macroeconomic conditions
are good, regulators presumably rescue banks whose failure arises from risky investments. By
contrast, if macroeconomic conditions are bad, failed banks rather had bad luck.
Besides, the right side of the inequation 
boom
bust
 1 +q
q
decreases in the discount factor
. Hence, for higher , b = 1 is optimal for even higher values of bust. The optimal
bailout policy does not depend on the probability of project success in equilibrium, i.e. the
threshold, where optimal bailout probability changes from zero to one, does not depend on
pP or/and pG. Consequently, the optimal policy is not a¤ected by the number of banks.
However, the e¤ectiveness of the bailout policy does depend on n. If n is too high, the banks
gamble independently of the regulators announcement, whereas in the case of su¢ ciently low
competition they always behave prudently. Only for intermediate values of n do the banks
respond to the regulators decision and the bailout policy b and turn to prudent behaviour.
3.4.3 Imperfect information on the state of nature
Although the bailout policy, described in Proposition 8, has a clear policy implication - rescue
only in times of macreoconomic distortions - its implementation can be di¢ cult. Apart from
the commitment problem, regulators have to dene ex ante under which conditions they rescue.
On the one hand, being too strict might cause damage to the nancial system when bank
failures cause contagion. On the other hand, being too accomodative increases moral hazard,
as is shown below.
To see this, assume that the regulator does not perfectly know how macroeconomic con-
ditions a¤ect banksprobability of success. After nature has chosen H or L, the regulator
receives a signal about the macroeconomic conditions. The signal is symmetric and reveals
the true state of nature with probability a (Bayesian rule):
prob
 
aH j state = H = prob  aL j state = L =: a  0:5.
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Consequently, if nature chooses H, the regulator receives the right signal, i.e. the signal that
conditions are good, with probability a. With probability 1 a he receives a wrong signal. While
the regulator could previously respond to the true state of nature, he can now only respond
to his signal. HS denotes the bailout probability in the case where the regulator receives the
signal that the macroeconomic conditions are good. To say it di¤erently, if the regulator
receives the signal that macroeconomic conditions are good, he rescues with probability HS .
LS denotes the bailout probability for the case where the regulator receives the signal that
the macroeconomic conditions are bad. Then the probability of surviving for prudent banks is
given by:
sPS = q
 
boompP +
 
1  boompP   aHS + (1  a) LS
+(1  q)  bustpP +  1  bustpP   aLS + (1  a) HS 
and for gambling banks by:
sGS = q
 
boompG +
 
1  boompG  aHS + (1  a) LS
+(1  q)  bustpG +  1  bustpG  aLS + (1  a) HS  .
For example, consider the probability of surviving in the prudent case, i.e. sPS . Nature
chooses H with probability q (rst term). Hence, with probability boompP the project is
successful and the regulator does not have to intervene. With probability
 
1  boompP  the
project fails and the regulator rescues or liquidates. He receives the right signal with probability
a, which induces him to believe that the nancial market is stable (i.e. macroeconomic
conditions are in favour of banks). Therefore he applies HS . With probability 1   a, he
receives the wrong signal and chooses the bailout probability LS , although the true state of
nature is good. The second term represents the case where nature chooses L. In this case,
the banks project is successful with probability bustpP . With probability
 
1  bustpP  the
bank fails and the regulator has to intervene. Then the regulator receives the right signal with
probability a, which induces him to apply LS . With probability 1  a the signal is wrong and
the regulator believes that macroeconomic conditions are good. Therefore, he chooses HS
although the true state of nature is low, i.e. macroeconomic conditions are bad.
The sequence of the game remains similar to the one in the previous section. Remember
that bV G is a function of sG and that bV P is a function of sP . To derive the optimal bailout
probabilities HS and 
L
S , we only have to replace s
P by sPS and s
G by sGS in Proposition 8,
where the index "S" stands for "signal". In order to keep our calculations simple, we assume
q = 0:5.
Proposition 9 The optimal bailout policy bS is given:
HS = 0
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and
LS =

1 if 
boom
bust
 2a 
 2+2a
0 if 
boom
bust
< 2a 
 2+2a
.
Proof. The proof follows the same pattern as the proof for Proposition 8.
While LS can be either one or zero, 
H
S always has to be zero if a  0:5. This arises from
the fact that a wrong decision in H (rescuing instead of liquidating) more than outweighs the
benet of a right decision in L (rescuing in L).
If the quality of the signal, a, decreases, 2a 
 2+2a increases. Consequently, the worse the
signal quality, the lower the range of 
boom
bust
, where a bailout with probability one is e¢ cient.
Hence, the regulator should only announce to bail out with probability one in L if his signal is
of su¢ ciently good quality. In other words, if he cannot predict the impact of his conditions on
the banksprobability of success, he should liquidate insolvent banks in order to avoid moral
hazard.
3.5 Public bank bailouts contingent on banksinter-
connectedness
As an alternative to macroeconomic conditions, the regulator can also condition his bailout
policy on the bankssystemic relevance. We model systemic relevance by assuming that the
failure of one bank causes the failure of the neighbouring bank with a certain probability,
denoted with c. A high c of a bank j indicates that the failure of j causes contagion with
high probability. This contagion probability is the same for all banks. For the time being,
we assume that a bank can only be hit by one of its neighbours. The probabilities of project
success are uncorrelated. That is, the failure of one banks project does not a¤ect the success
of the other banks project.
As before, the regulator announces his bailout probability in advance and can credibly
commit himself to it. He cannot determine the causes of the failure. Hence, if one bank
fails, he does not know whether this is due to contagion or not. However, he knows the
probability of contagion ex ante, for example, due to the size or/and the interconnectedness
of the bank. If he rescues a bank, the bank can preserve its charter value. For example, the
bailout of Commerzbank at the end of 2008 guaranteed the survival of the bank and, therefore,
preserved at least parts of the charter value for the shareholders.
As the deposit rates do not depend on the probabilities of survival, they are equal to
(3.8) and (3.6). For simplicity, we assume that q = 1 and boom = 1, which means that
macroeconomic conditions are always in favour of the banks and that they are never hit by
a shock. Thus, it remains to specify the probability of surviving. Assume both banks behave
prudently. Then bank js probability of surviving is given by:
sPC =
 
pP
2
+ pP
 
1  pP  ((1  c) + c) +  1  pP  c. (3.10)
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Accordingly, bank j survives if
 both projects are successful, i.e. with probability  pP 2,
 its own project is successful and the neighbours project fails, but contagion does not
occur, i.e. with probability pP
 
1  pP  (1  c),
 its own project is successful and the neighbours project fails and contagion occurs, but
the regulator rescues, i.e. with probability pP
 
1  pP  c,
 its own project fails, but contagion would occur and thus the regulator rescues, i.e. with
probability
 
1  pP  c.
Equivalently, if both banks gamble, bank j0s probability of surviving is given by:
sGC =
 
pG
2
+ pG
 
1  pG ((1  c) + c) +  1  pG c. (3.11)
Even if a regulator announces to bail banks out in case of distress, the intervention process
may take some time. Therefore, it might be di¢ cult to avoid a loss for neighbouring banks.
We take this into account by the fact that the regulator cannot save the neighbouring banks
prot in the period in which the failure occurs, but he can save its charter value. Consequently,
the bailout policy has an impact on the banksprobability of survival, but not on their expected
prot. This leads us directly to the bank value of bank j if all banks behave prudently and if all
banks gamble. In the rst case, the bank value is equal to (index Cstands for "contagion"):
V PC =
pP
1  sPC

n2
and, in the latter one, it amounts to:
V GC =
pG
1  sGC

n2
.
To derive the equilibrium conditions, we must specify the probability of survival if a bank
deviates unilateraly. Assume that bank j deviates from the prudent path and chooses the
gambling project. Then its probability of surviving from the deviating period t to t+1 is equal
to: esPC = pGpP + pG  1  pP  ((1  c) + c) +  1  pG c.
The probability of survival in case of deviation is similar to (3.10), though the deviating bank
chooses pG instead of pP .
Equivalently, if bank j deviates unilateraly from the gambling path, its probability of sur-
viving is given by:
esGC = pPpG + pP  1  pG ((1  c) + c) +  1  pP  c.
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The derivation of the equilibrium conditions follows the same steps as in Section 3.4.
Proposition 10 The equilibrium conditions (i) and the optimal bailout policy (ii) are as
follows:
(i) Equilibrium conditions:
 Banks invest in the gambling asset if

n
 r
G   rP
2

1 
r
V GC
V PC
 =: emGC .
 Banks invest the prudent asset if

n
 r
G   rP
2
r
V PC
V GC
  1
 =: emPC
 We have emGC > emPC .
(ii) To reduce moral hazard, the regulator should decrease emPC and emGC . emPC decreases in  if
c   pP
(1 pP ) =: c
crit
L whereas emGC decreases in  if c   pG(1 pG) =: ccritH with ccritH > ccritL .
Proof. The equilibrium conditions can be derived in the same way as was described for the
proof of Proposition 7.
The intuition is as follows: A higher bailout probability has three e¤ects. First, a higher
bailout probability  prevents a bank with a successful project from being hit by the failure of
its neighbouring bank. Second, a higher bailout probability increases the bankscharter value.
Both e¤ects induce the banks to behave prudently. Third, a higher bailout probability enforces
moral hazard because a failing bank is probably rescued due to its systemic relevance. In
the case of su¢ ciently low contagion probability, the rst and the second e¤ect outweigh the
moral-hazard-e¤ect. Otherwise the moral-hazard-e¤ect dominates and the regulator should
liquidate an insolvent bank with probability one. Consequently, even if q = 1 and boom = 1,
i.e. a bank is never hit by a macroeconomic shock, it might be better for the regulator to
rescue in order to reduce moral hazard. This result is opposed to the ndings in DellAriccia
& Ratnovski (2011). They nd that the regulator should rescue with probability one if the
contagion probability exceeds a certain threshold, though they do not account for the banks
charter value.
The regulators optimal bailout decision is clear-cut if the banks interconnectedness is
su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high. In the case of c  ccritL , i.e. if the systemic relevance of
the banks is su¢ ciently small, both emPC and emGC decrease in  and thus the regulator should
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rescue with probability one. If c  ccritH , i.e. the systemic relevance is su¢ ciently high, emGC
and emPC increase in , consequently the regulator should liquidate with probability one.
However, in case of ccritL < c < c
crit
H , the optimal bailout policy is less clear-cut becauseemGC decreases in , whereas emPC increases in . Hence, by announcing bailout probability
one, the regulator decreases the range where banks gamble, but he also decreases the range
where banks behave prudently, i.e. the range, where either a prudent or a gambling equilibrium
holds, decreases. Whether ccritL or c
crit
H is the relevant threshold depends on competition and
on the equilibrium which the banks choose. If competition is rather low, so that the relevant
equilibrium is close to emGC , ccritH might be more relevant, at least if banks choose the gambling
asset in equilibrium. Otherwise (the equilibrium is close to emPC), ccritL might be the relevant
threshold, at least if banks choose the prudent asset in equilibrium.
Since only less systemic banks should be rescued, the regulators trade-o¤, moral hazard
versus the possibility of contagion, seems to be unavoidable. However, this is not true if the
failure of one bank can a¤ect several banks. To see this, assume each bank can be a¤ected
by the failure of any other bank. To simplify, we neglect the case that the failure of bank j
causes contagion, while the failure of js neighbour does not spill over to other banks. These
assumptions lead us directly to the probability of surviving in the case of n banks. If all banks
behave prudently, we have:
sPC =
 
pP
n
+ pP

1   pP n 1 ((1  c) + c) +  1  pP  c. (3.12)
The last term is the same as in (3.10). The second term represents the case where bank js
project is successful and at least one of its neighbours(all banks are interconnected) projects
fails. This probability is given by 1    pP n 1. Notice that  pP n 1 is the probability that
all projects of j0s neighbours are successful. With probability
 
pP
n
all projects are successful
and the regulator does not have to intervene.
Equivalently, if all banks gamble, the probability of surviving is given by:
sPC =
 
pG
n
+ pG

1   pGn 1 ((1  c) + c) +  1  pG c. (3.13)
The derivation of the equilibrium conditions follows the same steps as above. Similarly, in order
to reduce moral hazard, the regulator should announce a bailout probability which decreases
the range in which banks gamble.
Proposition 11 A higher number of banks increases the critical thresholds.
Proof. The equilibrium condition and the optimal bailout policy can be derived in a similar
way as was described for Proposition 7 and 8.
The intuition is quite simple. A higher number of banks increases the probability that bank
j is hit by any of its neighbours. Therefore, the benet of a higher bailout probability increases
in n. The negative e¤ect, by contrast, remains unchanged.
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To see that the probability of being hit by any of the neighbouring banks increases in n,
consider the case where bank j has two neighbours. Then bank j is potentially hit by its
neighbours (at least one of the neighbours is not successful) with probability (prudent case)
2pP
 
1  pP  +  1  pP 2. Comparing this with the case where we have only one neighbour
bank, we have:
1  pP < 2pP  1  pP +  1  pP 2 = 1   pP 2 .
As a result, a higher number of banks can also have a stabilizing e¤ect if the regulator has
to rescue an insolvent bank whose failure causes contagion. Then the threshold ccrit increases
and the bailout of an insolvent bank increases risk-taking only if the probability of contagion
is relatively high. For n 7! 1, this threshold converges towards one, i.e. the regulator should
then always rescue.
3.6 Conclusion
The current literature provides diverging predictions concerning the impact of bank bailouts
on banksrisk-taking. Cordella & Yeyati (2003) combined two diverging channels and showed
under which conditions each channel dominates. We asked whether their nding persists
in a competitive banking sector where the regulator cannot perfectly foresee the impact of
macroeonomic distortions on a banks probability of survival. According to our result, an
ill-suited bailout policy, i.e. a bailout policy where the regulator rescues, although he should
liquidate from a welfare point of view, and vice versa, does not alter the banksrisk-taking
if their charter value is low, i.e. in a competitive deposit market. The determination of
macroeconomic conditions, which provide clear predictions about their impact on a banks
probability of success, is rather di¢ cult, and the results of an ine¢ cient bailout policy may be
distortive as they enforce moral hazard. Alternatively, we show that the regulator can condition
his bailout policy on the bankssystemic relevance. Then he should rescue banks which are not
too relevant for the stability of the nancial system. However, the critical threshold increases
in the number of important banks.
We are aware that our analysis is based on several assumptions. First, we assume that
banks only compete in the deposit market in an imperfect competitive framework. Second,
the number of banks might only be one indicator for the degree of competition, and we are
conscious that there is still a debate in the literature about its adequacy. However, competition
is not the driving force for the results concerning the optimal bailout policy. It is rather
important with regard to the e¤ectiveness of a properly designed policy. Third, bank returns are
uncorrelated, though banks may tend to correlate their risk exposures (Acharya & Yorulmazer
(2007); Farhi & Tirole (2012)). If returns are positively correlated, the stabilizing e¤ect of
bank bailouts will become smaller and the threshold will change. However, unless returns are
too correlated, a positive e¤ect of a bank bailout remains. Fourth, the contagion probability
is independent of the number of banks.
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Nevertheless, this chapter provides some insights into the relation between bailouts and
risk-taking behaviour of banks. First, in order to receive proper predictions about the impact of
public bailout guarantees on the risk-taking of banks, empricial studies should take competition
into account. Second, the bailout of systemic banks might not enforce moral hazard if enough
systemic banks are in the market. Consequently, the bailout of banks which are too big to fail,
does not necessarily cause moral hazard. The directive favours the bail-in tool and therefore
the loss of participation of shareholders and creditors. Although this may be a step into the
right direction, regulators should not demonize the bailouts of systemic banks. If a bail-in is
not su¢ cient or not successful in a crisis scenario, a bailout of an insolvent bank could at least
be considered and communicated as a "tool of last resort".
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7
Gambling equilibrium
The necessary condition for a gambling equilibrium is:
max
rj
h
pP

qboom + [1  q] bust P   rjDPj  rj; rG j+ esP eV Gi  eV G,
where the optimal deposit rate for the deviating bank fullls the following rst-order condition:
pP

qboom + [1  q] bust P   rj 1

  pP qboom + [1  q] bust " 1
n
+
rj   rG j

#
!
= 0.
Rearrangements lead to:
P   rj  
h
n
+ rj   rG j
i
= 0
and
rj =
P   
n
+ rG j
2
.
Since P   
n
= rP , we obtain (we can ommit the index j and  j):
rj =
rP + rG
2
.
Inserting rj into the inequation above, we obtain after some rearrangements:
pP

qboom + [1  q] bust P   rP + rG
2
"
1
n
+
rP+rG
2
  rG

#
+esP pG qboom + [1  q] bust
1  esG n2
 p
G

qboom + [1  q] bust
1  esG n2
which can be simplied to:
pP

P   r
P + rG
2
"
1
n
+
rP+rG
2
  rG

#
+ esP pG
1  esG n2  pG1  esG n2
and
pP

P   r
P + rG
2
"
1
n
+
rP+rG
2
  rG

#
+ pG
esP   1
1  esG n2  0.
77
Chapter 3. Contingent Public Bailout, Contagion and Bank Risk-Taking
In order to determine the solution of the inequation, we rst solve the corresponding equation:
pP

P   r
P + rG
2
"
1
n
+
rP+rG
2
  rG

#
+ pG
esP   1
1  esG n2 = 0.
Simplications and the replacement of P by rP + 
n
(notice that rP = P   
n
) lead rst to:

rP +

n
  r
P + rG
2
"
1
n
+
rP+rG
2
  rG

#
+
pG
pP
esP   1
1  esG n2 = 0
then to: 

n
+
rP   rG
2
 
1
n
+
rP   rG
2

+
pG
pP
esP   1
1  esG n2 = 0
and nally result in:

n2
+
rP   rG
n
+

rP   rG2
4
+
pG
pP
esP   1
1  esG n2 = 0
which is equivalent to:
1  p
G
pP
1  esP
1  esG

2
n2
  rG   rP  
n
+

rG   rP 2
4
= 0.
Remember that
esP = q pPboom + 1  pPboom HP + [1  q] pPbust + 1  pPbust LP 
and
esG = q pGboom + 1  pGboom HG+ [1  q] pGbust + 1  pGbust LG .
Hence, in order to have
1  p
G
pP
1  esP
1  esG < 0,
we must have esG >> esP . Suppose HG = LG = 1 and HP = LP = 0. Then we have:
1  p
G
pP
1   qpPboom + [1  q] pPbust
1   < 0
if
pP
pG
<
1   qpPboom + [1  q] pPbust
1   .
Rearrangements lead to:
pP
pG
<
1   pPbust + qpP boom   bust
1   .
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As a result, the inequation might be fullled if q, bust or/and pP is su¢ ciently low.
Returning to the determination of the equilibrium condition, we have to di¤erentiate be-
tween two cases:
1. esG >> esP
2. esG > esP or esG  esP .
Case 1:
The solution of the equation is given by:

n1=2
=

rG   rP r[rG   rP ]2   4 [rG rP ]2
4
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
2
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
which is equivalent to:

n1=2
=

rG   rP q[rG   rP ]2 pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
2
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
and

n1=2
=

rG   rP  h1qpG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
2
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
Rearrangements lead to the solutions:

n1
=
rG   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
and

n2
=
rG   rP
2
h
1 
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
Since 
1  p
G
pP
1  esP
1  esG

< 0,
we have a gambling equilibrium if

n
 r
G   rP
2
h
1 
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i or rG   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i  
n
.
Due to the fact that the left boundary is negative, we can only have a gambling equilibrium if

n
 r
G   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
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However, the rst inequation is always fullled if D > 0 (which is fullled by assumption since
a negative amount of depositors is impossible). This is fullled if (remind that the deviating
bank chooses rP whereas all other banks choose rG)
D
 
rP ; rG

=
1
n
+
rP   rG

> 0
which is equivalent to:

n
> rG   rP .
Since
rG   rP > r
G   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
we always have

n
 r
G   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
As a result, banks always choose the gambling equilibrium. Notice that this can only result if
the regulator subsidizes gambling banks more than prudent banks.
Case 2:
The solution of the equation is given by:

n1=2
=

rG   rP r[rG   rP ]2   4 [rG rP ]2
4
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
2
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i ,
which is equivalent to:

n1=2
=

rG   rP q[rG   rP ]2 pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
2
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
and

n1=2
=

rG   rP  h1qpG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
2
h
1  pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
Rearrangements lead to the solutions:

n1
=
rG   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
and

n2
=
rG   rP
2
h
1 
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
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Since 
1  p
G
pP
1  esP
1  esG

> 0
we have a gambling equilibrium if
rG   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i  
n
 r
G   rP
2
h
1 
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
However, the rst inequation is always fullled if D > 0 (which is fullled by assumption
since a negative amount of depositors is impossible). This is fullled if (remember that the
deviating bank chooses rP , whereas all other banks choose rG)
D
 
rP ; rG

=
1
n
+
rP   rG

> 0
which is equivalent to:

n
> rG   rP .
Since
rG   rP > r
G   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i
we always have

n
 r
G   rP
2
h
1 +
q
pG
pP
1 esP
1 esG
i .
As a result, only the right boundary is relevant and, therefore, a symmetric gambling
equilibrium exists if

n
 r
G   rP
2
h
1 
q
[1 esP ]
[1 esG] pGpP
i =: emG.
Prudent equilibrium
Equivalently, the necessary condition for a prudent equilibrium is:
max
rj
h
pG

qboom + [1  q] bust G   rjDGj  rj; rP j+ esGeV Pi  eV P ,
where the optimal deposit rate for the deviating bank fullls the following rst-order condition:
pG

qboom + [1  q] bust G   rj 1

  pG qboom + [1  q] bust " 1
n
+
rj   rP j

#
!
= 0.
Rearrangements lead to:
G   
n
+ rP j = 2rj.
81
Chapter 3. Contingent Public Bailout, Contagion and Bank Risk-Taking
After replacing G   
n
by rG (we can ommit the index  j), we obtain:
rG + rP
2
= rj.
Inserting the optimal deposit rate for the deviating bank into the equilibrium condition, we
obtain:
pG

qboom + [1  q] bust G   rG + rP
2
"
1
n
+
rG+rP
2
  rP

#
+ esGeV P  eV P .
Taking into account that G = rG + 
n
, we obtain after minor rearrangements:
pG

qboom + [1  q] bust 
n
+
rG   rP
2
 
1
n
+
rG   rP
2

+

esG   1 eV Pj  0.
Inserting the bank value eV P and rearranging the inequation further leads to:

n
+
rG   rP
2
 
1
n
+
rG   rP
2

+
pP
pG
esG   1
1  esP n2  0
which is equivalent to:
2
n2

1  p
P
pG
1  esG
1  esP

+

rG   rP  
n
+

rG   rP 2
4
 0.
As in the gambling case, we have to distinguish between two cases:
1. esG >> esP
2. esG > esP or esG  esP
Case 1:
The solutions are given by:

n1=2
=
  rG   rP r[rG   rP ]2   4 [rG rP ]2
4
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
2
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
which is equivalent to:

n1=2
=
  rG   rP q[rG   rP ]2 pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
2
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
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and

n1=2
=
  rG   rP  h1qpP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
2
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i .
Consequently, the solutions are:

n1
=
  rG   rP 
2
h
1 +
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
and

n2
=
  rG   rP 
2
h
1 
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i .
Since 
1  p
P
pG
1  esG
1  esP

> 0,
we have a symmetric prudent equilibrium if
  rG   rP 
2
h
1 
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i  
n
  

rG   rP 
2
h
1 +
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i .
However, this equilibrium cannot exist because both boundary points are negative and 
n
> 0.
Hence, we do not have a symmetric prudent equilibrium if esG >> esP .
Case 2:
The solutions are given by:

n1=2
=
  rG   rP r[rG   rP ]2   4 [rG rP ]2
4
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
2
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
which is equivalent to:

n1=2
=
  rG   rP q[rG   rP ]2 pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
2
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
and

n1=2
=
  rG   rP  h1qpP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
2
h
1  pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i .
Consequently, the solutions are:

n1
=
  rG   rP 
2
h
1 +
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
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and

n2
=
  rG   rP 
2
h
1 
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i .
Since 
1  p
P
pG
1  esG
1  esP

< 0
because
pP
pG
> 1
and
1  esG > 1  esP ,
we have a symmetric prudent equilibrium if

n
  

rG   rP 
2
h
1 +
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i or   rG   rP 
2
h
1 
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i  
n
.
However, since 
n
 0 and
  rG   rP 
2
h
1 +
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i  0,
we can only have a prudent equilibrium if

n
  

rG   rP 
2
h
1 
q
pP
pG
1 esG
1 esP
i
which is equivalent to:

n
 r
G   rP
2
hq
pP [1 esG]
pG[1 esP ]   1
i =: emP .
It can be shown without too much e¤ort that emP < emG.
Proof of Proposition 8
To determine the optimal bailout policy, we consider the following function f which is the
unique term in bmG and bmP depending on the bailout probability:
f(H ; L) =
pP

1  sG
pG [1  sP ]
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or, equivalently,
f(H ; L) = 1 + 
pP   pG 1  qH    [1  q] L
pG

1  qH    [1  q] L  qpPpGboom 1  H   [1  q] pPpGbust 1  L .
It is easy to show that the derivative of f with respect to H is negative, independent of
L. Therefore, the optimal bailout probability is H = 0. If H = 0, the derivative of f with
respect to L is positive if
bust  
boom
1 + 1 
q
and negative if
bust >
boom
1 + 1 
q
.
Hence, in the rst case, an insolvent bank should be bailed out with probability one, whereas
it should be liquidated with probability one in the second case.
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From a Moral-Hazard Perspective?
4.1 Introduction
In the recent nancial crisis, many banks have had to ask for public nancial assistance. While
some banks only needed liquidity from the central bank because the interbank market did not
function properly, some banks were even bailed out through equity capital injection because
these banks were perceived as systemic (Allen & Carletti (2010)). These interventions gave
impetus to a new discussion about making necessary amendments in the regulatory framework
in order to stabilize the banking system, to force banks to cover a share of bailout costs, and
to reduce moral hazard.
In this context, the European Commission argues that a credible regime is needed which
should provide for the threat of a failure. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
focuses on a bail-in tool which imposes losses on shareholders and creditors. Moreover, it
allocates powers to the resolution authorities which enable them to guarantee the resolvability
of institutions. Cordella & Yeyati (2003) show that such a threat is desirable, except in times
of macroeconomic distortions. DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011) argue that such a threat is
not desirable if banks are systemic. Similarly to DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011), we analyse
the impact of bank bailouts on the risk-taking practices of banks in a setup where contagion
among banks may be severe. We ask whether an international coordination of public bank
bailouts or resolutions is desirable and account for the implementation of a bank resolution
fund which already exists in some European countries.
To address these issues, we use a simple two-stage framework and follow a complete-
contract approach. This enables the regulator and the bank to sign a contract on the in-
terconnectedness of the banks. Consequently, at the rst stage, the regulator can credibly
announce a bailout policy. At the second stage, two banks invest simultaneously into a risky
asset. The key ingredient is that the failure of one bank can cause the failure of the other
bank. Bank returns are uncorrelated. The banks can inuence the probability of a failure
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by monitoring their projects, which is costly. If one bank fails, the regulator intervenes in
accordance with his bailout policy, to which he is credibly committed.1 Like DellAriccia &
Ratnovski (2011), we assume that the regulator can avoid contagion by rescuing the insolvent
bank, but the rescued institution receives a bailout subsidy. In contrast to the model presented
in Chapter 3, we use a static framework and do not take competition on the deposit market
into account. We rather focus on a regulatorsbailout game. These assumptions lead to the
following ndings:
 If the banks are equally and su¢ ciently systemically relevant and regulated by the same
authority, a higher bailout probability leads to a higher level of monitoring e¤ort. On the
one hand, bank bailouts reduce the impact of a banks risk decision on its probability
of surviving, which encourages gambling behaviour (moral-hazard-e¤ect). On the other
hand, bank bailouts avoid the contagion of a neighbouring banks failure, which increases
the expected prot and thus induces prudent behaviour. If contagion is su¢ ciently
severe, the latter e¤ect outweighs the moral-hazard-e¤ect.
 If the systemic relevance di¤ers between two banks, the regulator may face a conict
of interests. That is, a bailout of both banks may increase the e¤ort level of one bank,
while decreasing the e¤ort level of the other bank. This conict of interest is particularly
severe if only one bank is systemically relevant.
 If the banks are located in di¤erent countries and are regulated by their national authority,
we obtain three types of Nash equilibria. The strategy combination where both regulators
rescue is never a Nash equilibrium. We show under which conditions this strategy
combination is Pareto e¢ cient, which makes international cooperation desirable.
 If a resolution fund is nanced by a bank levy, which depends on bankssystemic rele-
vance, a higher bank bailout only increases the banksmonitoring e¤ort if their contagion
probability is neither too low nor too high.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 4:2, we provide an overview of the literature
which is related to our topic. Section 4:3 introduces the model, and Section 4:4 derives the
optimal bailout policy if both banks are regulated by the same authority. We rst determine
the optimal bailout policy for banks which are equally relevant from a systemic point of view
(basic scenario) and then for the case in which their relevance di¤ers. In Section 4:5, we
determine the Nash equilibria of the regulatorsgame and derive the conditions under which
cooperation is desirable and/or feasible. In Section 4:6, we alter some assumption of the basic
scenario and analyse the e¤ects of a bank levy on the optimal bailout policy. Section 4:7
concludes Chapter 4.
1Through an institutional mechanism, which is not directly addressed in this paper, he might be able
to credibly commit himself to this bailout policy.
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4.2 Literature review
The presented paper is related to four strands in the literature. The rst strand deals with the
impact of bank bailouts on the risk-taking of banks. The second strand examines contagion in
banking. The third strand merges the rst two and shows how bank bailouts a¤ect risk-taking
if banks are interconnected. The fourth strand points to conicts in the case of cross-border
regulation.
Beginning with the rst strand, the literature di¤erentiates between private and public
bank bailouts. Perotti & Suarez (2002) argue that private bailouts, i.e. bailouts by solvent
banks, are more e¢ cient than public bailouts because the charter value of the acquiring banks
increases, which induces them ex ante to behave more prudently. Cordella & Yeyati (2003) nd
that public bank bailouts can decrease a banks portfolio risk and thus reduce moral hazard.
The reason is that a higher bailout probability increases a banks charter value, which induces it
to behave more prudently (value e¤ect). This value e¤ect outweighs the moral-hazard-e¤ect
of bailouts if banks are only rescued in times of macroeconomic distortions and liquidated
otherwise. Hakenes & Schnabel (2010) argue that an ex ante announced bailout of unsecured
creditors can decrease the risk of the protected bank, but it increases the risk of the competitor
bank.
Proceeding with the second strand, contagion in banking takes place through direct linkages
between banks. Solvent banks can be hit by other banks if these banks are directly linked with
each other (Rochet & Tirole (1996) and Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth & Soussa (2000)). This is
mainly due to the fact that banks do not collateralize when lending to or borrowing from each
other. Hence, peer monitoring is an essential instrument to avoid a spill-over from one bank to
another. Rochet & Tirole (1996) provide evidence that even in the case of interbank linkages
and peer monitoring, a failure of one bank can lead to a cascade of failures. Freixas, Giannini,
Hoggarth & Soussa (2000) show that the failure of one bank does not necessarily lead to a
breakdown of the banking system if the banks are linked via the interbank market, because
this market might serve as a diversication tool, since a proportion of the losses of a bank
are transferred to other banks. Allen & Gale (2000) argue that banks hold interbank deposits
in order to insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Consequently, illiquid banks withdraw
their funds from liquid banks in order to meet the liquidity demands of their depositors. If
the overall liquidity demand of depositors is su¢ ciently small, these interbank linkages are
rst-best. However, if there is excess demand of liquidity, i.e. the shock in one region is so
high that the aggregate liquidity is too small, banks have to sell their long-term assets, which
is very costly. In the case of interbank linkages, banks can sell their claims on other banks.
The mutual liquidation of these assets can lead to bank runs and bank insolvencies. Hence, a
crisis in one region, i.e. a liquidity shock in one region, can lead to a nancial crisis in other
regions.
However, this spill-over might even take place if banks are not directly linked with each
other (informational contagion). Allen, Babus & Carletti (2009) and Allen & Carletti (2010)
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argue that the failure of one bank can induce creditors of other banks to reassess the risks which
might have been overlooked and then to withdraw their assets. Giannetti (2003) provides a
similar reason for informational contagion. Since banks may be willing to renew projects with
negative net present value and projects with only temporary di¢ culties, it might sometimes
be di¢ cult for investors to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks (Giannetti (2003);
Goodhart (1999)). Therefore, investors charge interest rates on their deposits independently
of their project type. Consequently, the failure of an insolvent bank might induce the failure
of an illiquid, but solvent bank because deposit rates are too high. Information contagion can
also be a reason for the spread of a crisis from one country to another. Vaugirard (2007) shows
in a setup, where banks also have foreign debt in their accounts and where foreign investors
have imperfect information about early liquidation yields of illiquid banksassets, that a crisis
in one country induces these investors to downgrade the liquidation yields in other countries
and thus to increase lending rates. This, in turn, makes the banks more prone to illiquidity
and thus to bank runs.
As part of the third strand, Morrison & White (2013) argue that a common regulator
can be the reason for contagion. This is because the failure of a bank can undermine the
condence in the common banking regulator and therefore induce depositors of other banks
to withdraw their funds. Public bank bailouts might avoid such a failure, but they can have a
negative e¤ect on the regulators reputation. Morrison & White (2013) show that the benet
of public bank bailouts depends on the transparency of their action. Forcing the transparency
of public bailouts ex post is denitely worse than allowing secret bailouts. In the case of a
bailout, depositors learn that the regulator has chartered an unsound bank, which undermines
the condence in the regulator. However, ex ante transparency might be benecial, especially
in countries where there is only little trust in the regulators skills. This arises from the fact
that transparency ex ante improves investorscondence in the system, since they know that
no unsound bank is being supported by the regulator.
Leitner (2005) shows that the threat of contagion can lead to private bailouts as it induces
liquid banks to rescue illiquid banks in order to avoid contagion. However, such a private solu-
tion may not exist if the liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks, for example,
because the whole network can then collapse. Then the regulators role is to coordinate private
bailouts. Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) nd that private bailouts are superior to public bank
bailouts because an ex ante announced bailout policy leads to higher correlation among banks
and thus increases the instability of the nancial system. However, a su¢ ciently high number
of insolvent banks precludes a private bailout without assistance by a regulator, since there
are not enough solvent banks able to a¤ord an acquisition. As a consequence, failed banks
have to be sold to investors outside the banking sector, which leads to welfare losses since
these investors lack the necessary skills. In this case, the regulator should assist solvent banks
so that acquisitions become a¤ordable (Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008)).2 Similarly, Farhi &
2By contrast to Cordella & Yeyati (2003), Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) do not consider an exogenous
solvency shock, but assume that banks enforce the occurence of a crisis by investing in similar projects.
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Tirole (2012) argue that banks might follow similar investment strategies when expecting the
regulator to bail out insolvent banks. Since diversication decreases, the occurence of a crisis
increases. Therefore, they propose that the regulator should require minimum liquidity and
monitor the quality of liquid assets. Niepmann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and Goodhart &
Schoenmaker (2009) determine the optimal bailout policy in a multinational context. Niep-
mann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) nd that the implementation of a multinational regulator
can improve welfare if he also has scal power. Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2009) show that
sharing ex ante the burden of bank bailouts can be welfare e¢ cient, especially when the burden
is shared by countries which are directly a¤ected by the failure of an institution. Closest to
our paper is DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011), as they also determine the e¤ect of a higher
bailout policy on the e¤ort level of banks if contagion among these banks is possible.
As part of the fourth strand, Acharya (2003) shows that the harmonization of closure
policies has to be linked to the harmonization of capital controls. He argues that banks in
more forbearing countries choose higher risks than banks in less forbearing countries, which
reduces the charter value of the latter ones. In order to avoid the exit of banks in less forbearing
countries, central banks in these countries have to adopt the same policy as central banks in
more forbearing countries, which induces a race to the bottom. DellAriccia & Marquez (2006)
show that competition between national regulators can lead to suboptimally low standards.
Beck, Todorov & Wagner (2011) argue that cross-border activities can disrupt the domestic
regulators incentives to intervene, and the implementation of a multinational regulator might
be benecial from a welfare point of view. Espinosa-Vega, Kahn, Sole & Matta (2011) consider
regulatory agenciesforbearance and information sharing incentives. They show that regulators
might be more forbearing towards systemically important institutions. When some regulators
have access to information concerning the degree of systemic relevance of an institution, they
have little incentives to share this information with other regulators. Huizinga, Bertay &
Demirgüç-Kunt (2011) provide evidence that internationally active banks have a disadvantage
compared to national banks, since they receive fewer implicit subsidies from the safety net. This
results in higher funding costs for multinational banks and therefore national safety nets might
create a burden to the internationalization of banks. Similarly, we model the interaction and
incentives of di¤erent regulators. By contrast to Acharya (2003) and DellAriccia & Marquez
(2006), we focus on bailouts as the regulator tool and exclude capital requirements. As in
Espinosa-Vega et al. (2011), the systemic relevance of the institutions plays an important role,
although information sharing between regulators is out of the focus of the model presented
below.
The model presented in the next section focuses on public bank bailouts. As in Cordella
& Yeyati (2003) and Hakenes & Schnabel (2010), we ask how public bank bailouts a¤ect the
risk-taking behaviour of banks. We follow the idea of Morrison & White (2013) and assume
that the failure of one bank can induce the failure of another bank even though the banks are
not directly linked to each other and asset returns are uncorrelated. While Morrison & White
(2013) argue that a common regulator might be the channel through which contagion occurs,
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we assume that there is an indirect bank exposure which cannot be managed by the banks.
DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011) provide the following intuition: If a bank fails, it can cause
a recession which then induces the failure of the competitor banks borrowers.3 The model
presented in this paper di¤ers in three points from DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011). Firstly, we
allow for heterogeneity among the banks. While DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011) assume that
the contagion probability for both banks is the same, i.e. both banks reveal the same systemic
relevance, we analyse the impact of a bailout policy on banks which di¤er in their systemic
relevance. Secondly, we show under which conditions internationally coordinated bank bailouts
are desirable or/and feasible. Thirdly, we also consider possible fundings of these bank bailouts
and ask how a bank levy a¤ects the optimal bailout policy. In contrast to Leitner (2005), we
only consider two banks and do not consider a network of di¤erent banks. Finally, banks in
our model do not choose their interconnection through investments in similar projects. This
might trigger a crisis as is modeled in Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008) and Farhi & Tirole (2012).
We rather o¤er an alternative way of interconnection through contagion via macroeconomic
feedbacks. In this case, bank bailouts can have a positive e¤ect on the risk-taking of banks if
this feedback is su¢ ciently high. By contrast to Niepmann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and
Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2009), we also model the risk incentives of potentially bailed out
banks, depending on who rescues them. We also show under which condition an internally
coordinated bailout is desirable.
4.3 The model
4.3.1 Players and action sets
We consider the following groups of risk-neutral players: two banks, a regulator (two regulators
in Section 4.5) who decides about the bailout policy, and secured depositors. The players
neither have time preferences nor opportunity costs and only consume at the end of the
investment period. Hence, we neglect any liquidity problems resulting from the fact that
depositors withdraw their funds during the investment period.
Depositors and banks
The demand of deposits is constant and equal to one. Depositors receive a payo¤ of one,
independently of whether they deposit their funds in bank i or j. The deposit rate is nor-
malized to zero. This assumption di¤ers from the previous chapter, where the deposit rate is
endogenous. Since the depositorspayo¤ does not depend on the banksinvestment decision,
they do not have an incentive to monitor banks. In combination with limited liability, this is
one reason for moral hazard.
3Beck et al. (2010) argue that this kind of boomerang e¤ect took place during the recent crisis, as
the distress of banks had an impact on non-bank nancial institutions, which increased the distress of
commercial banks.
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Each bank, i and j, collects one unit of deposits and nances its risky investment by
o¤ering secured deposits. As in the previous chapters, we could assume that each bank also
collects equity capital of an innitesimal unit in order to ensure that banks are owned by
shareholders. However, as in the previous chapter, this assumption is irrelevant for the results
of the model.
Neglecting contagion among banks, bank i receives a payo¤ of R > 1 with probability
qi and a payo¤ of zero with probability 1   qi. Bank i can inuence qi by monitoring its
creditors. While a higher monitoring e¤ort qi increases the probability of project success, it is
costly. These costs are equal to 1
2
q2i , where  measures the cost e¢ ciency of the bank. The
banks are homogenous with regard to their net payo¤, but they may di¤er with regard to their
systemic importance. Therefore, we di¤erentiate between two scenarios. In the basic scenario
(Section 4.4.1), the banks are equally relevant for the stability of the nancial system. In the
second scenario (Section 4.4.2), their systemic relevance can di¤er.
The relevance of the banks for the stability of the nancial system (interconnectedness)
is represented by their probability of contagion which is denoted with c. It implements a
component into the probability of success which is not under control of the bank. The banks
have imperfect information about their own systemic relevance and the one of their neighbours,
i.e. they are only aware of c. This may at least be reasonable for banks which are not globally
systemic. However, even global players may not be fully aware about the impact of their failure
on other institutions.
The contagion probability is supposed to be public information and to be veriable by a
third party (complete-contract approach). The possibility of contagion implies that bank i can
generate its net payo¤ R  1 if both projects are successful or if contagion does not occur in
the case of a failure of its neighbour j. Moreover, for simplicity, both projects are independent,
i.e. the correlation of project returns is zero. In the case of homogeneity among the banks
and the absence of any regulatory intervention, bank is expected net payo¤ can therefore be
written as (the expected prot of bank j is equivalent):
i(qi; qj) = (qiqj + qi (1  qj) (1  c)) (R  1)  1
2
 (qi)
2 .
The rst part is the expected payo¤ of the project, while the second term represents the
monitoring costs. Bank i can generate the payo¤ R   1 with probability qiqj (both banks
are successful) and, if the failure of bank j does not cause contagion, i.e. with probability
qi (1  qj) (1  c). We assume  > (R  1).
Regulator
The regulator aims at maximizing the e¤ort levels of banks. At an initial point of time,
each bank receives a license to operate. The complete-contract approach used in this setup
enables the regulator and the banks to sign a contract which promises a certain bailout policy
depending on the interconnectedness of the banks, i.e. c. Consequently, the regulator can
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credibly announce and commit himself to a bailout policy ex ante. Bailout means that the
bank survives and that it can achieve a positive terminal value. We model this terminal value
as percentage  of the projects net payo¤. This is the second reason for moral hazard ("costs"
of a bailout). However, the bailout of an insolvent bank avoids contagion and thus the failure
of the neighbouring bank ("revenue" of a bailout).
Hence, an increase of the bailout probability protects a healthy bank from contagion, but
it subsidizes the failed bank. In the presence of a regulator, the expected net payo¤ of bank i
can be written as:
i(qi; qj) = (qiqj + qi (1  qj) (1  c+ c) + (1  qi) ) (R  1)  1
2
 (qi)
2 , (4.1)
where  < 1 measures the subsidy that shareholders receive when the bank is rescued
(DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011)). It can be interpreted as a bailout e¢ ciently, i.e. the
regulators ability to avoid contagion without subsidizing a gambling bank. For example, sup-
pose  = 0. Then the regulator can rescue the failed bank without subsidizing it because its
payo¤ is then zero (which is equivalent to the payo¤ in the absence of any regulatory interven-
tion). By contrast, if  = 1, the regulator rescues, and shareholders receive the whole charter
value of the bank. Then he is not able to avoid contagion without subsidizing the bank. The
bailout of Commerzbank may be an example for 0 <  < 1. As the German regulator did
not nationalize the bank, shareholders still participate in future gains of the bank, i.e.  > 0.
However, as the regulator owns shares, the shareholders do not receive the whole stake, i.e.
 < 1.
4.3.2 Sequence of events
The game has two stages. At the rst stage, the regulator announces and credibly commits
himself to a bailout policy. At the second stage, both banks choose their monitoring e¤ort
simultaneously. Thereafter, nature reveals the outcome of the project and payo¤s are realized.
If a bank fails, either due to contagion or due to its own project failure, the regulator rescues
or liquidates in accordance with the bailout policy announced at the beginning.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the sequence of the game.
4.3.3 Equilibrium concept
We focus on subgame perfect equilibria. Therefore, we solve the game by backward induction,
beginning with the last stage where banks choose their e¤ort levels. Taking the banksdecision
into account, we determine the optimal bailout policy for the regulator at the rst stage.
Further below, we have two regulators who simultaneously decide about their bailout policy
at the rst stage of the game.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of events
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4.4 Public bank bailouts by a national regulator
4.4.1 Symmetric contagion probability
Each bank i and j seeks to maximize its net expected prot, which is equal to the expected
payo¤ at the end of the investment period minus the monitoring costs at the beginning. The
regulator rescues with probability  and liquidates with probability 1  . Consequently, bank
i faces the following maximization problem:
max
qi

(qiqj + qi (1  qj) (1  c+ c) + (1  qi) ) (R  1)  1
2
q2i

. (4.2)
Bank i0s reaction function equals (the index Rstands for reaction function):
qRi = (qj + (1  qj) ((1  c) + c)  )
(R  1)

.
We immediately see that qi and qj are strategic complements. Hence, qRi increases in qj, and
qRj increases in qi. Moreover, q
R
i increases in R and decreases in . Since the e¤ort levels
are strategic complements, we already know that the e¤ort levels in equilibrium will increase
in R and decrease in . This is quite intuitive. Higher project returns increase the benet
of monitoring the projects (direct e¤ect). Due to the fact that a higher e¤ort level of i (j)
increases the expected payo¤ of j (i), i (j) has higher incentives to behave prudently. The
impact of  on the e¤ort level in equilibrium depends on c and . To see this, consider the
e¤orts in Nash equilibrium (the index Nstands for Nash equilibrium):
qNi = q
N
j =
(1  c (1  )  ) (R  1)
  c (1  ) (R  1) .
A higher bailout probability  has two e¤ects. First, it increases qNi and q
N
j because it
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reduces the probability of contagion. Second, it reduces the e¤ort level because it raises the
payo¤ in case of insolvency and thus causes moral hazard.
Proposition 12 To increase the monitoring e¤ort of the banks, the regulator should only
rescue with probability one if c > ccrit, with
ccrit :=

R +      (R  1) .
ccrit increases in  if  R + 1 > 0.
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Similarly to DellAriccia & Ratnovski (2011), a bank bailout has a stabilizing e¤ect on the
nancial system if the rescued banks are su¢ ciently systemically relevant, i.e. the probability
of contagion is beyond a certain threshold. Hence, a bank bailout may not only be benecial
from the view point of costs, but also from the view point of risk. The reason is similar to the
argument of Cordella & Yeyati (2003). A higher bailout probability decreases the probability
of default if the failure is due to bad luck rather than the consequence of bad incentives
(excessive risk-taking). While in Cordella & Yeyati (2003), this component is represented by
the macroeconomic environment, in this framework, it is the contagion probability.
Besides, a higher expected prot increases the critical contagion threshold. Consequently,
regulatory measures which decrease banksprots independent of their systemic relevance,
should involve a bailout for even less relevant banks in order to stabilize the nancial system.
A higher  has the same e¤ect on ccrit because it supports the negative e¤ect of bailout.
Proposition 12 also explains that a less e¢ cient banking system, where  is rather high,
should evoke a more generous bailout policy.
4.4.2 Asymmetric contagion probability
Now we allow for heterogeneity of the banks with regard to their relevance for the stability of
the nancial system. Therefore, we assume that i causes contagion with probability ci and j
with probability cj. Then, we have
qRi (qj) = (qj + (1  qj) ((1  cj) + cj)  )H
as the reaction function of bank i, where H := R 1

, and
qRj (qi) = (qi + (1  qi) ((1  ci) + ci)  )H
as js reaction function.
We determine the optimal bailout policy if the regulator rescues (liquidates) both banks
with the same probability. Following this scenario, we ask under which condition a regulator
induces bank j to choose a higher monitoring e¤ort if he rescues with probability one than
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if he liquidates with probability one. In the case of a bailout with probability one, the e¤ort
levels in equilibrium are given by:
qNi = (1  )H
and
qNj = (1  )H.
As a result, the monitoring e¤ort of bank i in equilibrium does not depend on the e¤ort level
of bank j and vice versa. Intuitively, if bank i knows that it will be rescued with probability
one in case of failure, the failure of bank j does not play any role in its risk decision.
If the banks are liquidated with probability one in the case of a failure, the e¤ort levels in
equilibrium are given by:
qNi =
H
cjH2ci   1 (cj   1  cjH + cjHci)
and
qNj =
H
cjH2ci   1 (ci   1  ciH + cjHci) .
Obviously, if the regulator announces the liquidation of both banks in the case of a failure,
they will take the possibility of contagion into account.
Proposition 13 To increase bank is e¤ort level, the regulator should rescue both banks with
probability one if
cj >

(1 H +Hci   (1  )H2ci) =: c
crit
j .
To increase bank js e¤ort level, the regulator should rescue both banks with probability one
if
ci >

(1 H +Hcj   (1  )H2cj) =: c
crit
i .
ccritj and c
crit
i increase in H and .
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the optimal bailout policy for a regulator who aims at maximizing
the e¤ort levels of bank i and bank j. If both banks are su¢ ciently systemically relevant, the
regulator rescues with probability one, whereas in the case of a su¢ ciently low contagion prob-
ability, both banks are liquidated. Notice that rescuing both banks increases both monitoring
e¤orts, even if the contagion probabilities di¤er, but both exceed a su¢ ciently high threshold.
Moreover, Proposition 13 suggests that regulation measures, which lead to a decrease in
banksnet payo¤s, should lead to a change of the regulatorsbailout policy in such a way
that banks are also rescued if their contagion probability, i.e. systemic relevance, is low.
Furthermore, a higher  benets banks whose project has failed and thus raises incentives to
gamble. Therefore, the regulator should only rescue banks if the contagion probabilities are
su¢ ciently high in order to outweigh the negative e¤ect of a bailout.
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Figure 4.2: Conict of interests in the case of asymmetric contagion probabilities
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If the contagion probability of one bank is high and the contagion probability of the other
bank low, the regulator should rescue both banks in order to increase the e¤ort level of the
bank with the low contagion probability and liquidate both banks to increase the e¤ort level
of the other bank. Hence, the regulator faces a conict of interest. This raises the question
of whether a regulator should discriminate between i and j and rescue i with probability i
and j with probability j.
4.5 International coordination of public bank bailouts
We assume that bank i is located in the domestic (home) country and regulated by a domestic
(home) regulator who aims at maximizing is e¤ort level. Bank j is supposed to be located in
a foreign (host) country and regulated by a foreign (host) regulator who aims at maximizing
js e¤ort level. Therefore, the regulators may apply di¤erent bailout policies. If the regulator
can di¤erentiate between bank i and j and apply individual bailout policies, we may have two
di¤erent scenarios.
1. In the scenario "high protection possibility", if the foreign bank j fails, the domestic
regulator can protect the domestic bank also in case that the foreign bank is not rescued
by the foreign regulator. This scenario may occur when the failure of bank j can cause
the failure of bank i, but the the domestic regulator is able to support the domestic bank.
The same holds true vice versa. This scenario may be adequate for large countries which
can stabilize their banks through equity injection, for example, even if the foreign banks
are not supported by their regulator.
2. In the scenario "medium protection possibility", if the foreign bank j fails, the domestic
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regulator cannot protect the domestic bank in case that the foreign bank is liquidated.
One reason may be the fact that the home regulator cannot a¤ord such a protection.
The same holds true vice versa. This scenario may be adequate for medium countries
which cannot stabilize their bank if the foreign bank fails. A "small protection possibility"
would even enable the regulator to protect the bank in its own country if this bank has
failed. Note that protecting a bank from failure in case that the foreign bank fails is
di¤erent than rescuing a failed bank in its own country. The reason may be second and
third round e¤ects. For example, the failure of a foreign bank may cause the failure of
other foreign banks which in turn has again an e¤ect on the domestic bank.
4.5.1 High protection possibility
Again, we apply backward induction and begin with the bankschoice of e¤ort at the second
stage. Then we determine the optimal bailout strategies for the regulators on the rst stage.
There we focus on pure strategies, which means that the domestic and the foreign regulator can
either rescue with probability one or liquidate with probability one. Note that each regulator
can only protect its domestic bank, i.e. the home country regulator can only protect bank i
and the host country regulator can only protect bank j.
We denote the probability that bank i is rescued by the home regulator with i and
that bank j is rescued by the foreign (host) regulator with probability j. Then bank is
maximization problem is the following:
max
qi
 
qiqj + qi (1  qj)
 
1  cj + cj
 
j + i   ji

+ (1  qi) i

(R  1)  1
2
q2i

.
Notice that j + i   ji = ji + j (1  i) + i
 
1  j

. The intuition for the ob-
jective function is the following: Bank i survives, i.e. obtains the return (R  1), if (i) both
projects are successful (qiqj), if (ii) bank is project is successful and bank j fails (qi (1  qj)),
but its failure does not cause contagion (1   cj) or, if so, the failure of bank i is avoided
(cj
 
j + i   ji

), and if (iii) bank is project fails, but it is rescued ((1  qi) i). In
case (ii), bank i survives the failure of bank j in case of contagion if either both banks are
protected (ji) or bank j is rescued (j (1  i)) or bank i is protected (i
 
1  j

).
Bank is reaction function is given by:
qRi =
 
qj + (1  qj)
 
1  cj + cj
 
j + i   ji
  iH.
Remember that H := R 1

.
The equivalent maximization problem holds true for bank j:
max
qj
 
qjqi + qj (1  qi)
 
1  ci + ci
 
i + j   ji

+ (1  qj) j

(R  1)  1
2
q2j

.
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Bank js reaction function is equal to:
qRj =
 
qi + (1  qi)
 
1  ci + ci
 
j + i   ji
  jH.
Now we turn to the bailout decision at stage one. Considering only pure strategies of
the regulators, we have four strategy combinations: both banks are rescued, both banks are
liquidated, bank i is rescued and bank j is liquidated, and bank j is rescued and bank i is
liquidated. Henceforth, we write R for rescue (with probability one) and L for liquidate
(with probability one). The payo¤s are indicated in Figure 4.3. Some intermediate steps are
provided in the appendix.
Proposition 14 The following strategy combinations are Nash equilibria:
1. (R;L) if ci > bccriti ,
2. (L;R) if cj > bccritj ,
3. (L;L) if ci < bccriti and cj < bccritj , where
bccriti :=  + cjH   cjcjH (1  (1  )H)
and bccritj :=  + ciH   ciciH (1  (1  )H) .
Proof. The appendix provides some intermediate steps for the equivalence between ci > bccriti
and
(1  )H >
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
Hci   1cjH
.
Similarly, cj > bccritj is equivalent to:
(1  )H > H (cj   1) +
1
ci
(ci   1)
Hcj   1ciH
.
Consider (R;L). A unilateral deviation is not benecial for the host regulator because H >
(1  )H. A unilateral deviation is not benecial for the home regulator if ci > bccriti , which
is equivalent to (1  )H > H(ci 1)+
1
cj
(cj 1)
Hci  1cjH
. Hence, this strategy combination is a Nash
equilibrium if ci > bccriti . Consider (L;R). A unilateral deviation is not benecial for the
home regulator because H > (1  )H. A unilateral deviation is not benecial for the host
regulator if cj > bccritj , which is equivalent to (1  )H > H(cj 1)+ 1ci (ci 1)Hcj  1ciH . Hence, (L;R) is
a Nash equilibrium as long as cj > bccritj . Consider (L;L). This strategy combination is a
Nash equilibrium if neither the home regulator has an incentive to deviate, which holds true
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Figure 4.3: Payo¤s in the case of high protection possibility
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if ci < bccriti , nor the host country regulator wants to deviate and rescue, which holds true if
cj < bccritj .
In this scenario, the implementation of a multinational regulator cannot improve welfare
if welfare improvements are dened as an increase of the payo¤ of one regulator without
decreasing the payo¤ of the other regulator (Pareto improvements). Hence, the strategy
combinations in the Nash equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient. To see this, consider (i) the strategy
combination (R;L). If this strategy combination is an equilibrium, a multinational regulator
can not improve welfare by choosing (L;L) or (R;R). Otherwise, (R;L) would not be a Nash
equilibrium. Consider the strategy combination (L;R). In this strategy combination the home
regulator would be better o¤ than in (R;L), but the host regulators payo¤ would be lower.
If (ii) the strategy combination (L;R) is obtained in equilibrium, a multinational regulator
could not improve by choosing another strategy combination, either. This must be true due
to symmetry. Finally, if (iii) the strategy combination (L;L) is reached in equilibrium, a
multinational regulator could not improve welfare by choosing (R;L) or (L;R) due to the
denition of a Nash equilibrium. Welfare would not be improved either if the regulator chose
(R;R) because (1  )H < H(ci 1)+
1
cj
(cj 1)
Hci  1cjH
.
However, the implementation of a multinational regulator, who takes the e¤ort levels of
both banks into account, may be better for the host regulator than a resultion scenario, where
the home regulator becomes the single resolution authority. To see this, assume that bank j is a
subsidiary of bank i. The home regulator would always choose (L;R) if H >
H(ci 1)+ 1cj (cj 1)
Hci  1cjH
,
for example. However, in this case, the host country regulator is worse o¤ than in case of
(R;L), which would be the Nash equilibrium if ci > bccriti (this entails H > H(ci 1)+ 1cj (cj 1)Hci  1cjH )
and cj < bccritj . Therefore, the host regulator may not agree to a resolution strategy, where
the home regulator is the leading authority.
This should be taken into account when discussing whether a "muliple-point-of-entry ap-
proach" (MPE) or a "single-point-of-entry approach" (SPE) is regarded as the adequate res-
olution approach. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive allows for both approaches.
Therefore, the decision on the approach has to be made in the supervisory colleges. The SPE
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involves the application of resolution powers by a single resolution authority. The SPE strategy
usually aims to insure a going-concern of the subsidiaries by absorbing losses within the group.
This loss absorption may be combined with a resolution tool, such as a bail-in of debt, or a
transfer of assets and liabilities to a bridge bank. However, an SPE approach may not ensure
the going-concern of a subsidiary if the resolution tool is not successful. An MPE involves the
application of resolution powers by more than one resolution authorities to di¤erent parts of
the group. This approach may result in a break-up of the group.4
4.5.2 Medium protection possibility
While in the scenario "high protection possibility", bank i can generate (R  1) with probability
j+i ji if j fails and causes contagion, it only receives the net payo¤with probability j in
this scenario. Again, we begin with the second stage, where the banks choose their monitoring
e¤ort. Thus, bank is maximization problem can be written as (bank js maximization problem
is equivalent):
max
qi
 
qiqj + qi (1  qj)
 
1  cj + cjj

+ (1  qi) i

(R  1)  1
2
q2i

,
where bank is reaction function is given by:
qRi =
 
qj + (1  qj)
 
1  cj + cjj
  iH.
Equivalently, bank js objective function is equal to:
max
qj
 
qiqj + qj (1  qi) (1  ci + cii) + (1  qj) j

(R  1)  1
2
q2j

.
The reaction function of bank j is equal to:
qRj =
 
qi + (1  qi) (1  ci + cii)  j

H.
At the rst stage of the game, the regulators decide whether to rescue or to liquidate in
emergency. Again, we have to consider four strategy combinations: both regulators rescue,
both regulators liquidate, the home regulator rescues and the host regulator liquidates, the
home regulator liquidates and the host regulator rescues. Figure 4.4 summarizes the payo¤s
for each strategy combination. Again, some intermediate steps are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 15 The following strategy combinations are Nash equilibria:
1. (R;L) if ci > eccriti ,
2. (L;R) if cj > eccritj ,
4See http://www.nancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130716b.pdf (5 May 2014).
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Figure 4.4: Payo¤s in the case of medium protection possibility
Host regulator
R L
Home
regulator
R (1  )H; (1  )H (H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H;H
L H; (H + (1 H) (1  ci)  )H
H(ci 1)+ 1cj (cj 1)
Hci  1cjH
;
H(cj 1)+ 1ci (ci 1)
cjH  1Hci
3. (L;L) if cj < eccritj and ci < eccriti , where
eccriti := Hcj [1 + H   cjH2 + cjH  H]
and eccritj := Hci [1 + H   ciH2 + ciH  H] .
Proof. The appendix provides some intermediate steps for the equivalence between ci > eccriti
and
(H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H >
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
Hci   1cjH
as well as between cj > eccritj and
(H + (1 H) (1  ci)  )H >
H (cj   1) + 1ci (ci   1)
cjH   1Hci
.
Consider the strategy combination (R;L). The host regulator does not have an incen-
tive to deviate because R leads to a lower monitoring e¤ort due to the fact that H >
(1  )H. The home regulator cannot benecially deviate if ci > eccriti , which is equivalent to
(H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H >
H(ci 1)+ 1cj (cj 1)
Hci  1cjH
. Hence, this strategy combination is a Nash
equilibrium if ci > eccriti . Consider the strategy combination (L;R). The home regulator cannot
benecially deviate because H > (1  )H. The host regulator does not have an incentive to
deviate if cj > eccritj , which is equivalent to (H + (1 H) (1  ci)  )H > H(cj 1)+ 1ci (ci 1)cjH  1Hci .
Hence, this strategy is a Nash equilibrium if cj > eccritj . Consider (L;L). This strategy combi-
nation is a Nash equilibrium if neither the home regulator has an incentive to deviate, which
holds true if ci < eccriti , nor the host country regulator wants to deviate and rescue, which holds
true if cj < eccritj .
Figure 4.5 illustrates the functions ccriti and c
crit
j . It can be shown that the rst derivative
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of ccriti (c
crit
j ) decreases in cj (ci) and that the second derivative increases in cj (ci).
5
Figure 4.5: Equilibria in the regulatorsgame
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As a result, if ci and cj are su¢ ciently large, we have two equilibria in pure strategies,
where one of the regulators rescues and the other regulator liquidates with probability one. By
contrast, in case of a high ci and a low cj there is one equilibrium in pure strategies where
the domestic regulator rescues with probability one and the regulator in the foreign country
rescues with probability zero. Equivalently, in case of a low ci and a high cj, the regulator in
the foreign country rescues with probability one, whereas the regulator in the domestic country
liquidates with probability one.
In contrast to the scenario "high protection possibility", the equilibrium (L;L) is not
always Pareto e¢ cient which leaves room for the implementation of a multinational regulator.
If this equilibrium is obtained, i.e. cj < eccritj and ci < eccriti , Parto improvements are possible
if (1  )H > H(ci 1)+
1
cj
(cj 1)
Hci  1cjH
and (1  )H > H(cj 1)+
1
ci
(ci 1)
cjH  1Hci
. Remember that these
inequations are fullled if ci > bccriti and cj > bccritj . To summarize, pareto improvements are
possible if bccriti < ci < eccriti and bccritj < cj < eccritj . Note that bccriti < eccriti and bccritj < eccritj are
fullled if ci > 0 and cj > 0.
As a result, the implementation of a multinational regulator can improve welfare if con-
tagion is intermediate. In this case, higher monitoring e¤orts can be obtained by the an-
nouncement that both banks are rescued in emergency. However, the Pareto improvement is
only possible in case of medium protection possibilities. Therefore, the allocation of resolution
5Concerning the second derivative, we have to show that 3H4c2   6H3c2   3H3c + 3H3c +
3H2c2 + 3H2c   6H2c + H22   2H2 + 3Hc + 2H + H2   2H + 1 > 0, which is equivalent to
3Hc

(H   1)2Hc+ (H   1)2

+H22 + 2H (1 H) + 3H2c (1 H) + (H   1)2 > 0. This is always
fullled.
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powers to a multinational regulator may rather be supported by countries of medium budget.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Variation in the number of systemic banks
We now return to the symmetric case and assume that the number of banks is given by: n > 2.
In order to simplify our analysis, contagion either applies to all banks or to none of them. For
example, if two banks fail, the probability that the other banks are hit by this failure is equal
to c. The same is true if three banks fail and so on. Then bank is probability of survival can
be written as:
si (qi; q i) = qiqn 1 i + qi
 
1  qn 1 i

((1  c) + c) + (1  qi) .
The rst term, qiqn 1 i , is the probability that bank i and its neighbours are successful. The
second term is the probability that bank i is successful and at least one of its neighbouring
banks fails. Notice that the probability for the failure of at least one bank is equal to one minus
the probability that all neighbouring banks are successful, i.e. 1  qn 1 i . By assumption, with
probability 1  c, none of the failing neighbours causes contagion, whereas with probability c
contagion occurs and causes the failure of bank i, unless the regulator intervenes and rescues.
The last term is the probability that bank i fails, independent of its neighbourssuccess.
Following these assumptions, bank is maximization problem can be written as:
max
qi;ri
 
qiq
n 1
 i + qi
 
1  qn 1 i

((1  c) + c) + (1  qi) 

(R  1)  1
2
q2i

,
where the rst-order condition is equal to:
 
qn 1 i +
 
1  qn 1 i

((1  c) + c)   (R  1) = qi.
Since we assume qi = q i in equilibrium, we can rewrite this condition as: 
qn 1i +
 
1  qn 1i

((1  c) + c)   (R  1) = qi.
For n 7! 1, the probability that all neighbouring banks are successful, i.e. qn 1i , converges
towards zero. If qn 1i = 0, we obtain the following e¤ort level in equilibrium:
qNi = q
N
 i =
1  c+  (c  ) (R  1)

.
Accordingly, for a su¢ ciently high number of banks, the banks monitoring e¤ort increases in
 if c > .
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4.6.2 Introduction of a bank levy
We remain within the symmetric case with regard to the contagion probabilities, i.e. ci = cj =
c. Assume that each bank has to pay a levy , which is linear in the contagion probability and
which reduces the net payo¤. Then bank is maximization problem can be described as:
max
qi

(qiqj + qi (1  qj) (1  c+ c) + (1  qi) ) (R  1  c)  1
2
q2i

and equivalently, the maximization problem of bank j is given by:
max
qj

(qjqi + qj (1  qi) (1  c+ c) + (1  qj) ) (R  1  c)  1
2
q2j

.
To ensure that each bank receives a positive net payo¤ in case of success, we set  < R  1.
Accordingly, even if the contagion probability is given by c = 1, banks receive a positive net
payo¤.
Then the reaction functions are given by:
qRi = (qj + (1  qj) (1  c+ c)  )
(R  1  c)

and
qRj = (qi + (1  qi) (1  c+ c)  )
(R  1  c)

.
As a result, in equilibrium the banks choose the following e¤ort levels:
qNi =
P
  Pc (1  ) (1  c+ c   ) = q
N
j ,
where
P := R  1  c.
Proposition 16 The e¢ cient bailout policy is given by  = 1 if
c1 < c < c2,
where
c1 :=
R  1

and
c2 :=
  ((R  1) (   1) + ) +
q
((R  1) (   1) + )2 + 4 (1  )
2 (1  ) .
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Interestingly, a higher bailout only leads to a higher e¤ort level in case of intermediate
contagion probability. We already know from Section 4.4.1 that if c is su¢ ciently small, the
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moral hazard e¤ect dominates and therefore the regulator should liquidate with probability one.
By contrast, if c2 > c > c1, contagion is su¢ ciently severe and a higher bailout probability
leads to a higher e¤ort level. However, if c increases, it lowers the payo¤ in case of survival.
Due to limited liability, this induces moral hazard and therefore the regulator should liquidate
with probability one if c > c2. As a result, the implementation of a bank levy can reinforce
the "too big to fail" problem. In the absence of any levy (or if the levy does not depend on
the systemic relevance), su¢ ciently relevant institutions can be rescued with probability one
without inducing moral hazard.
4.7 Conclusion
We determined the optimal bailout policy for a regulator who tries to prevent banks from
taking excessive risks and who can credibly commit himself to his ex ante announced policy.
The key ingredient of the model is the assumption that the failure of one bank can lead to the
failure of another bank. The regulator can avoid such spill-over-e¤ects, though at the cost of
a subsidy for the failed bank.
Our ndings suggest that a regulator can rescue banks with probability one without causing
moral hazard if the probability of contagion is su¢ ciently large. If the systemic relevance di¤ers
among the banks, the regulator may face a conict of interests. A relatively high systemic
relevance of bank i should involve a bailout in order to increase the monitoring e¤ort of
bank j and a liquidation in order to increase the e¤ort level of bank i. This result reveals
some interesting insights, particularly with regard to the feasibility of international cooperation.
Cooperation between national authorities may not only fail because of disagreement with regard
to cost sharings of international public bank bailouts, but also with regard to the question of
who should be rescued (liquidated).
The requirements of a bank levy can cause another problem. While in the absence of any
levy the bailout of systemically relevant banks may even reduce their risk-taking, a bank levy
reduces the range where bailouts are benecial and may increase the risk incentives of banks
which are perceived as being too big to fail.
The present paper builds upon various assumptions, and it might be worthwhile to examine
how crucial they are. Firstly, we assumed a special quadratic cost function which simplies the
analysis. If the cost function was linear, we would obtain corner solutions. If the cost function
was of higher order, we might obtain multiple equilibria. This could be an interesting extention
of the model. Secondly, we argued that a bailed out bank receives some surplus (subsidy).
As long as the survival of the bank has a positive value for the shareholders, this surplus
(subsidy) can be justied. Thirdly, we assumed that asset returns are not correlated. Positive
correlation means that the positive e¤ect of a bailout becomes relatively smaller because the
probability that one bank is successful while the other fails decreases. This might increase
the critical value for the contagion probability. In the case of perfect positive correlation,
only the moral-hazard-e¤ect remains and a higher bailout policy increases banksrisk-taking.
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Apart from that, it might be interesting to examine whether a bank levy can avoid a conict
of interests between two asymmetric banks and thus increase the range where cooperation
between national regulators may be feasible and desirable. We leave this question for further
research.
Nevertheless the ndings reveal some insights into the e¤ects and design of an e¢ cient
bailout policy. First, the bailout of an insolvent bank can give incentives to banks to increase
their monitoring e¤orts. Second, cooperation agreements may be di¢ cult to establish. The
Single Resolution Mechanism may be a step into the right direction, as it aims to coordinate
and to facilitate resolutions. Nevertheless, the competent resolution authority and the colleges
may still face a conict of interests when deciding whether to support a failing institution, for
instance, if a bail-in is not su¢ cient or not successful. However, globally systemic banks operate
beyond the sphere of the EMU and, therefore, cooperation agreements are still necessary.
Due to conicting interests which may arise in a crisis scenario, it is doubtful whether such
agreements are stable, especially when it comes to the point where regulators have to decide
about supporting a failing institution or liquidating it. The awareness of such conicts could
be useful to design agreements that are not "cheap talk".
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 12
The di¤erential of qNi , where
qNi =
(1  c (1  )  ) (R  1)
  c (1  ) (R  1)
with respect to  is given by:
@qNi
@
=
(c  ) (R  1) (  c (1  ) (R  1))  (1  c (1  )  ) (R  1) 2c
(  c (1  ) (R  1)) 2
which is positive if
c >

+  (R  1)  (R  1) =: c
crit.
Proof of Proposition 13
The reaction functions are as follows:
qRi (qj) = (qj + (1  qj) ((1  cj) + cj)  )H
and
qRj (qi) = (qi + (1  qi) ((1  ci) + ci)  )H.
If  = 0, the reaction functions are:
qRi (qj) = (qj + (1  qj) (1  cj))H
and
qRj (qi) = (qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H.
Consequently, the e¤ort levels in equilibrium are given by (insertion of qRj in q
R
i ):
qi = ((qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H + (1  (qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H) (1  cj))H
which can be rearranged to:
qi
H
= (qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H + (1  (qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H) (1  cj)
and
qi
H2
  qi + qi   qici + qi   qicj   qi (1  ci) + qi (1  ci) cj
= (1  ci) + 1
H
(1  cj)  (1  ci) (1  cj) .
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This is equivalent to:
qi
H2
  qicjci = 1
H
(1  cj) + cj   cicj.
Finally, the e¤ort level in equilibrium is given by:
qi =
1
H
(1  cj) + cj   cicj
1
H2
  cjci
 =: qNi ;
or, equivalently, by:
qi =
H
1 H2cjci (1  cj +Hcj  Hcicj) =: q
N
i .
Since i and j are symmetric, the e¤ort level of j in equilibrium is:
qNj =
H
1 H2cjci (1  ci +Hci  Hcicj)
If  = 1, the reaction functions are:
qRi (qj) = (1  )H
and
qRj (qi) = (1  )H.
Therefore, the e¤ort levels in equilibrium are:
qNi = (1  )H
and
qNj = (1  )H.
Hence, the regulator should rescue bank i and j with probability one if
(1  )H > H
1 H2cjci (1  cj +Hcj  Hcicj) ,
and
(1  )H > H
1 H2cjci (1  ci +Hci  Hcicj) .
Remember that H < 1 by assumption. This leads us to:
(1  )  1 H2cjci > (1  cj +Hcj  Hcicj)
which is equivalent to:
cj
 
1 H2ci (1  ) +Hci  H

> ,
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and
(1  )  1 H2cjci > (1  ci +Hci  Hcicj) ,
which is equivalent to:
ci
 
1 H2cj (1  ) +Hcj  H

> .
Notice that since  > 0, the inequations can only be fullled if 1 H2ci (1  )+Hci H >
0 and 1 H2cj (1  ) +Hcj  H > 0. Otherwise the regulator should always liquidate. As
a result, the regulator should only rescue both banks if
cj >

(1 H2ci (1  ) +Hci  H)
and
ci >

(1 H2cj (1  ) +Hcj  H) .
Determination of e¤ort levels in equilibrium (Scenario 4.5.1)
The reaction functions in the rst scenario are given by:
qRi =
 
qj + (1  qj)
 
1  cj + cj
 
j + i   ji
  iH
and
qRj =
 
qi + (1  qi)
 
1  ci + ci
 
j + i   ji
  jH.
The payo¤s for the banks in the case of the strategy combinations (R;R), (R;L) and
(L;R) are as follows:
Consider the strategy combination (L;L). Then the reaction functions are equal to:
qRi = (qj + (1  qj) (1  cj))H
and
qRj = (qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H.
These reaction functions are equivalent to:
qRi = (1  cj (1  qj))H
and
qRj = (1  ci (1  qi))H.
Hence, bank is e¤ort level in equilibrium is given by:
qNi =
 
1  cj
 
1   1  ci  1  qNi HH
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or equivalently by:
qNi =
H   cjH + cjH2   cjciH2
(1  cjciH2) .
Rearrangements lead to:
qNi =  
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
1
cjH
 Hci .
Since bank i and j are symmetric and both are liquidiated in case of emergency, we can easily
identify js e¤ort level in equilibrium which is given by:
qNj =  
H (cj   1) + 1ci (ci   1)
1
Hci
  cjH .
Support for the proof of Proposition 14
We show that ci > bccriti is equivalent to:
(1  )H >
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
Hci   1cjH
.
Remember that H < 1. Therefore, Hci   1cjH < 0. Rearrangements lead to:
(1  )H

Hci   1
cjH

< H (ci   1) + 1
cj
(cj   1) .
This is equivalent to:
(1  )H H2cicj   1 < cjH2 (ci   1) + cjH 1
cj
(cj   1)
and
(1  )H H2cicj   1 < cjH2 (ci   1) +H (cj   1)
and
 + cjH   cj
cjH (1  (1  )H) < ci.
Determination of e¤ort levels in equilibrium (Scenario 4.5.2)
In this scenario, the reaction functions are given by:
qRi =
 
qj + (1  qj)
 
1  cj + cjj
  iH
and by:
qRj =
 
qi + (1  qi) (1  ci + cii)  j

H.
The payo¤s for the banks in the case of the strategy combination (R;R) can be determined
111
Chapter 4. Are Public Bank Bailouts Desirable From a Moral-Hazard Perspective?
easily.
For the payo¤s in the other strategy combinations, consider rst the strategy combination
(L;L). In this case, the reaction functions are given by:
qRi = (qj + (1  qj) (1  cj))H
for bank i and by:
qRj = (qi + (1  qi) (1  ci))H
for bank j. These reaction functions are equal to the reaction functions in the rst scenario
for the same strategy combination. Hence, the e¤ort levels in equilibrium are:
qNi =  
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
1
cjH
 Hci
and
qNj =  
H (cj   1) + 1ci (ci   1)
1
Hci
  cjH .
Second, consider the strategy combination (R;L). Then the reaction functions are given
by:
qRi = (qj + (1  qj) (1  cj)  )H
and
qRj = H.
Consequently, the e¤ort levels in equilibrium amount to:
qNi = (H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H
for bank i and
qNj = H
for bank j.
The symmetry allows us to identify the payo¤s in the case of the strategy combination
(L;R) very easily. We obtain the following e¤ort levels in equilibrium:
qNi = H
for bank i and
qNj = (H + (1 H) (1  ci)  )H
for bank j.
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Support for the proof of Proposition 15
We show that ci > eccriti is equivalent to:
(H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H >
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
Hci   1cjH
.
Remember that H < 1. Rearrangements lead to:
(H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H >
H (ci   1) + 1cj (cj   1)
Hci   1cjH
and
(H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H2cicj +  < cjHci.
Further simplications lead to:

(cjH   (H + (1 H) (1  cj)  )H2cj) < ci
and

cjH (1 + H  H2cj + cjH  H) < ci.
Proof of Proposition 16
By di¤erentiating qNi with respect to , we obtain:
@qNi
@
=
P
(  Pc+ Pc)2 (c     cP (1  )) .
As a result, the regulator should rescue the banks with probability one if
P (c     cP (1  )) > 0.
To solve this inequation, we rst determine the solution of c if the left term of the inequation
is equal to zero. Then we obtain:
c1 =
R  1

and it remains to solve
c     c (R  1  c) + (R  1  c) c = 0,
which is equal to:
c2 (1  ) + c ((R  1) (   1) + )   = 0.
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The results to this equation are given by:
c2 =
  ((R  1) (   1) + ) +
q
((R  1) (   1) + )2 + 4 (1  )
2 (1  )
and
c3 =
  ((R  1) (   1) + ) 
q
((R  1) (   1) + )2 + 4 (1  )
2 (1  ) .
We know that c3 < 0. Finally, we have to know whether c2 > c1. It is easy to show that this
is always fullled. Hence, an increase of  increases the e¤ort level if
c1 < c < c2.
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5.1 Introduction
Cross-border banking plays an increasing role, especially within the European Union (Allen,
Beck, Carletti, Lane, Schoenmaker & Wagner (2011)). In the aftermath of the recent global
nancial crisis, a process was initiated at the meetings of the Group of Twenty (G-20), starting
with the meeting 2008 in Washington D.C. to modify bank regulation. This process led to the
implementation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in Europe. The centralization of
bank regulation and resolution is supported by the implementation of a single rulebook. The
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has recently been adopted. It regulates crisis
prevention, early intervention and crisis resolution measures in the European Union. Resolution
authorities in the Member States shall establish resolution colleges and cooperate from the
crisis prevention stage, i.e. preparation of recovery and resolution plans, to the actual resolution
of an institution. Such cooperations should be supported by cooperation agreements and, if
necessary, by the intermediation of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The funding of
resolution tools shall be achieved by nancial arrangements and nanced by the institutions
through (at least) annual fees. This chapter presents an e¢ cient cooperation agreement and
shows how such an agreement could be implemented. While the BRRD consider the bail-in
tool as a key resolution tool for banks in trouble, this chapter shall provide a rationale for bank
bailouts. These may be desirable from a welfare point of view.
To address these issues, we consider a multinational bank which is located in a home
country and has invested one part of its funds in a host country (abroad) through a subsidiary
bank. The subsidiary bank monitors the project, which causes costs. After choosing its
monitoring e¤ort, the subsidiary bank is probably hit by a solvency shock. If this happens, the
bank becomes insolvent and cannot continue to operate, unless it is rescued. This shock is
supposed to be observable by the regulator and the banks, but it is not veriable by a third
party (incomplete-contract approach). Consequently, the regulator and the banks cannot sign
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a contract which promises a certain bailout policy depending on the shock. Hence, neither the
national nor the multinational regulator can commit themselves to an ex ante dened bailout
policy, but the subsidiary bank takes the regulators ex post incentives into account.
We consider three potential regulators who might be interested in the survival of the
subsidiary bank: a home country regulator, a host country regulator, and a multinational
(supranational) regulator. They decide to bail the insolvent subsidiary bank out if its liquida-
tion value is lower than its continuation value. These values di¤er among the regulators for
three reasons. Firstly, national regulators care only about their domestic welfare, while the
multinational regulator takes aggregate welfare into consideration. Secondly, the net payo¤s,
generated by the subsidary bank in case of success, are transferred to the home country (the
parent bank is the unique owner of its subsidiary), i.e. they only a¤ect the home country and
the multinational regulator. Thirdly, the failure of the subsidiary bank causes systemic costs
which only a¤ect the welfare of the host country and the multinational regulator.
The subsidiary bank faces the following trade-o¤: A su¢ ciently high monitoring e¤ort
ensures that its expected continuation value exceeds its liquidation value, which, in turn,
induces the regulator in charge to bail it out if the solvency shock appears. However, monitoring
is costly and this decreases the subsidary banks expected prot.
This framework reveals the following main results:
 An internationally coordinated bank bailout is desirable as it can decrease the subsidiary
banks monitoring e¤ort and thus reduce moral hazard (excessive risk-taking).
 National regulators should rescue the insolvent subsidiary bank in case of a su¢ ciently low
solvency shock, whereas the multinational regulator should rescue in case of intermediate
shocks. The allocation of tasks is unimportant if the solvency shock is su¢ ciently large.
 Without burden sharing, national regulators rely on the multinational regulators safety
net which induces the subsidiary bank to choose the lowest necessary e¤ort level in order
to be rescued.
 In order to implement the rst-best allocation of tasks, the home country regulator
should bear the multinational regulators bailout costs if solvency shock is very low. In
case of a low shock, the host country regulator should bear these bailout costs. If shocks
are intermediate, the national regulatorscontribution to the multinational regulators
bailout costs should be as small as possible. The funding of the multinational regulators
bailout costs is not important if the shock is su¢ ciently large.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5:2 provides a short overview of the literature
and Section 5:3 introduces the model. Section 5:4 derives the optimal allocation of resolution
power. Section 5:5 shows how this optimal allocation can be implemented. Section 5:6 shows
the banks e¤ort level if the bailout responsibility is allocated to the regulator and to the parent
bank. Section 5:7 concludes Chapter 5.
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5.2 Literature review
This paper is related to three strands of the literature. One strand determines the welfare-
optimal bailout strategy for national insolvent banks. As in this model, Freixas (1999) nds that
the regulators rescue decision is determined by bailout costs and liquidation costs. If bailout
costs are su¢ ciently higher than liquidation costs, the regulator should apply "constructive
ambiguity", i.e. he should bail the bank out with probability strictly between zero and one.
Otherwise, he should always rescue the bank with probability one.
Cordella & Yeyati (2003) analyse the optimal bailout strategy for an insolvent bank in
a dynamic framework where the banks probability of survival depends on macroeconomic
conditions which are outside the sphere of inuence of the bank. The optimal bailout policy is
to rescue the bank in times of macroeconomic distortions and to liquidate it otherwise. On the
one hand, a higher bailout probability raises the value of the bank and thus lowers its gambling
incentives (value e¤ect). On the other hand, a higher bailout probability reduces the impact of
the banks risk decision on the probability of its survival, which induces the bank to increase its
risk level (moral-hazard-e¤ect). If the value e¤ect outweighs the moral-hazard-e¤ect, bailout
with probability one is the regulators optimal choice. Otherwise the bank should be liquidated
with probability one. As in Cordella & Yeyati (2003), we account for such macroeconomic
conditions and assume that the subsidiary bank is hit by a solvency shock with an exogenous
determined probability.
A second strand deals with regulation in cross-border banking. Acharya (2003) shows that
harmonization of closure policies has to be linked to harmonization of capital controls. He
argues that banks in more forbearing countries choose higher risks than banks in less forbearing
countries, which reduces the charter value of the latter ones. In order to avoid the exit of banks
in less forbearing countries, central banks in these countries have to adopt the same policy as
central banks in more forbearing countries, which induces a race to the bottom. DellAriccia &
Marquez (2006) show that competition between national regulators can lead to suboptimally
low standards. However, they argue that a centralized regulator has disadvantages, too, as
he is less exible. Loranth & Morrison (2007) analyse the e¤ects of capital requirements for
cross-border banks. They provide evidence that a capital requirement, which is optimal for a
national bank, results in under-investment when it is applied to multinational banks. However,
a uniform regulation of capital requirement brings about disadvantages to multinational banks
which are invested abroad through branches and favours subsidiary bank structures (Dietrich
& Vollmer (2010)). By contrast to these authors, we focus on bank bailouts as the regulatory
tool and do not account for the welfare e¤ects of capital requirements.
Calzolari & Loranth (2011) analyse a national regulators incentive to intervene in multi-
national banks where the incentive depends on whether the bank is represented through a
subsidiary or a branch bank. They show that shared liability, i.e. branch banking, induces
higher incentives to intervene. Beck et al. (2011) argue that cross-border activities can dis-
turb the domestic regulators incentives to intervene, and the implementation of a multinational
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regulator might be benecial from a welfare point of view. Espinosa-Vega et al. (2011) con-
sider regulatory agencies forbearance and information sharing incentives. They show that
regulators might be more forbearing towards systemically important institutions. When some
regulators have access to information concerning the degree of systemic relevance of an in-
stitution, they have few incentives to share this information with other regulators. Huizinga
et al. (2011) provide evidence that internationally active banks have a disadvantage compared
to national banks since they receive less implicit subsidies from the safety net. This results in
higher funding costs for multinational banks and therefore national safety nets might create a
burden to the internationalization of banks.
We do not model the multinational banks incentives to go abroad, but assume that it
has already invested in a foreign country through a subsidiary bank. By contrast to Beck
et al. (2011), we assume that the subsidiary operating in the foreign market is only funded by
insured deposits. As in the model of Espinosa-Vega et al. (2011), we focus on the interaction
between di¤erent regulators, though we neither restrict our attention to systemic banks nor do
we assume that the national and the multinational regulators have di¤erent information about
the failed bank. We rather derive the optimal allocation of bank bailouts between a national
host country and a multinational regulator and show why burden sharing is necessary in order
to achieve this allocation of tasks.
A third strand determines the optimal allocation of regulatory power. Mikkonen (2006)
shows that ambiguity between liquidity provision by a central bank and by a national regulator
can be welfare-improving. Similarly, we derive the optimal allocation of regulatory power
between a national and a multinational regulator, but, in contrast to Mikkonen (2006), we
also account for a home country regulator. The models of Repullo (2000) and Kahn & Santos
(2005) are close to ours. Repullo (2000) nds that in case of a small liqudity shock, the
regulation should be allocated to the central bank, whereas in the case of high solvency shocks
the deposit insurance should provide liquidity assistance. Kahn & Santos (2005) argue that it
depends on the liquidity shock level whether centralizing the power of a lender of last resort
and a deposit insurance is desirable. While the decentralization of the power is benecial
in case of high liquidity shocks, it might be undesirable in case of low liquidity shocks. In
contrast to Repullo (2000) and Kahn & Santos (2005), we do not restrict our attention to
the regulatorsincentives, but account for the subsidiary banks maximization problem. As we
do in our model, Niepmann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) nd that the implementation of a
multinational regulator can be welfare-improving if he also has scal power. Similarly to our
ndings, Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2009) show that ex ante burden sharing of bank bailouts
can be welfare-e¢ cient, especially when burden is shared between countries which are directly
a¤ected by the failure of an institution. By contrast to Niepmann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013)
and Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2009), we also model a potentially bailed out banks risk
incentives depending on who rescues and justify the optimal allocation of tasks and burden
sharing arrangement from a moral-hazard point of view.
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5.3 The model
5.3.1 Players and action sets
Consider the following risk-neutral players: a regulator which can be either multinational or
national, a multinational bank which has invested in a host country through a subsidiary bank,
and depositors. We neglect any principal-agent-problems between the parent bank and its
subsidiary. Furthermore, the parent bank is the unique owner of the subsidiary bank whose
prot is transferred to the home country. Therefore, the prot of the subsidiary bank does not
a¤ect the welfare of the host country, but increases the welfare of the home country.
Depositors
Depositors are fully insured. The deposit demand function is assumed to be totally elastic,
o¤ering the opportunity for the subsidiary bank to fund itself innitely by o¤ering at least the
risk-free interest rate. We normalize the risk-free interest rate and the insurance premium,
paid by the subsdiary bank, to zero.
Multinational bank and its subsidiary
The multinational bank has invested both in a foreign country through a subsidiary bank and
in the home country through the parent bank. We abstract from an exchange rate risk and
exclude any conict of interest between the subsidiary and the parent bank. The investment
in the home country is riskless, can be liquidated without any costs and is nanced through
equity capital. This ensures that the parent bank does not become insolvent and always has
funds available to support the subsidiary bank if necessary. The assumption will particularly
play a role in Section 5.6.
By contrast, the foreign investment through the subsidiary is risky. Its liquidation causes
liquidation costs, which are supposed to be one, and it is solely nanced by secured deposits.
We assume that the liability of the subsidiary bank is one, which is equal to the payo¤ to
the depositors, as the deposit rate is zero. The investment generates a payo¤ (henceforth we
often write "return") of R 2 (1; 2) with probability q 2 [0; 1] and 0 with probability 1   q.
Hence, the return function eR of the subsidiary bank is given by:
eR =
8>>>><>>>>:
R with probability q
0 with probability 1  q
.
Due to the assumption that the investment is totally nanced by deposits, the subsidiary bank
is insolvent if the project fails. The parent bank (or the subsidiary bank) can inuence q by
monitoring the foreign investment. The monitoring e¤ort is equal to the probability of success
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q and its cost is given by c(q) = 1
2
q2, where  > 0 measures the ine¢ ciency of the bank.
After choosing the monitoring e¤ort, which is the banks private information, the subsidiary
bank experiences a solvency shock  2 [0; 1] with probability 1   , where  2 [0; 1]. All
players can observe , but it cannot be veried by a third party. We assume that only the risky
investment can be a¤ected by the solvency shock, and if the shock appears, the subsidiary
bank has to write-o¤  of the initial project value. As the subsidiary bank is solely nanced
by debt, it is (then) insolvent and cannot continue to operate unless rescued by a regulator.
In order to guarantee the continuation of the project, the parent bank or the regulator has to
inject . Assume, for instance, that the subsidiary lent to a corporation that has to depreciate
a part of its assets and cannot continue with its initial project unless it receives further funds
from the bank. We argue that an insolvent bank cannot fund itself via the capital market and,
therefore, the subsidiary bank itself cannot raise funds in order to guarantee its continuation.
Capital injection does not increase the initial value, but it solely guarantees the continuation
of the initial project.
The subsidiary bank does not have to repay bailout costs. Following these assumptions,
the subsidiary banks prot function is given by:
 =
8>>>><>>>>:
R := q [R  1]  1
2
q2; if bailed out
L := q [R  1]  1
2
q2; if liquidated
,
where index R stands for "rescued" and index L for "liquidated". Notice that the probability
for a solvency shock does not matter in the prot function of a bank which will be bailed out
in emergency because it will always survive the shock.
Regulators
The incentive to bail the subsidiary bank out varies among regulators. The national regulators
take their domestic welfare into account whereas the multinational regulator accounts for the
aggregate welfare (sum of national welfare). As depositors are located in the host country,
their wealth only inuences the welfare in that country. Shareholders are located in the home
country and therefore, their wealth (subsidiary banks net prot) only a¤ects the welfare in
the home country.
The liquidation of the subsidiary bank or/and the failure of the project causes costs CF
(index "F" stands for failure). These failure costs can, for instance, be interpreted as systemic
(contagion) costs. The liquidation value of the insolvent subsidiary bank is supposed to be
zero. Hence, if the subsidiary bank is liquidated, the payo¤ to the host country is   [1 + CF ]
because depositors lose their initial wealth and the host country regulator has to bear the
failure costs. Liquidation does not a¤ect the welfare in the home country.
In case of a bailout, the welfare loss of the host country regulator is equal to the di¤erence
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Figure 5.1: Payo¤s of the regulators
Liquidation value Continuation value (bailout)
Home 0   + q [R  1]
Host   [1 + CF ]     [1  q] [CF + 1]
Multinational   [1 + CF ]   + q [R  1]  [1  q] [CF + 1]
between capital injection , expected failure costs [1  q]CF , and expected loss of depositors
wealth, i.e. [1  q]. The home country regulator does not care about expected failure costs,
but about the subsidiary banks prot and therefore his welfare equals the di¤erence between
expected net payo¤ of the project, q [R  1], and capital injection .
The multinational regulators payo¤ is the sum of the payo¤s of the host country regulator
and the home country regulator, except for the required capital injection, which is always given
by . Notice that the multinational and the home country regulator take the monitoring costs
of the subsidiary bank into consideration, but these costs do not inuence their decision since
these costs a¤ect the payo¤ in both scenarios (bailout and liquidation).
Regulators, be they national or multinational, only intervene if the shock occurs. Then
they decide to rescue the subsidiary bank if the liquidation value is lower than the continuation
value. Figure 5.1 summarizes the payo¤s of the home, the host and the multinational regulator
under the assumption that only one of the regulators is in charge.
5.3.2 Sequence of events
The time horizon extends over two periods. We neglect any time preference. The timing
of the game is as illustrated in Figure 5.2. First, the subsidiary bank chooses its monitoring
e¤ort. Second, a solvency shock appears with probability 1   . If the subsidiary bank is hit
by the solvency shock, it can ask for a bailout, i.e. capital injection , and the regulator has
to decide whether to bail the subsidiary out or to liquidiate it. In the case of being bailed out,
the subsidiary generates the payo¤ R with probability q and with probability 1  q it fails. If
the subsidiary bank is liquidated, depositors are paid by the regulator and the subsidiary banks
project cannot be terminated. Third, the subsidiary bank realizes payo¤s, unless it has been
liquidated.
5.3.3 Equilibrium concept
We concentrate on subgame perfect equilibria. Therefore, we apply backward induction be-
ginning with the regulatorsdecision at the second stage of the game. Taking their decision
into account, we determine the banks optimal decision at the rst stage of the game.
121
Chapter 5. Who Should Rescue Subsidiaries of Multinational Banks?
Figure 5.2: Sequence of events
0=T 1=T 2=T
Subsidiary
bank chooses
monitoring
effort
Subsidiary bank is hit
by a solvency shock
with probability
Then regulator decides
whether he liquidates
or bails the subsidiary
bank out
Payoffs are
realized if
subsidiary
was not
liquidated
l-1
5.4 Optimal allocation of resolution power between
national regulators and a multinational regulator
We initially assume that the parent bank cannot a¤ord a bailout or is not willing to rescue its
subsidiary, which means that the subsidiary bank can only be rescued by either the national
(host or home country regulator) or the multinational regulator. We will consider a potential
bailout by the parent bank in Section 5.6. The game is solved by backward induction beginning
with the second stage where the regulators decide whether to bail the subsidiary bank out or
to liquidate it.
5.4.1 Bailout decisions of the regulators
The host country regulator bails the subsidiary bank out if the continuation value exceeds the
liquidation value, i.e. if (the index "H" stands for "host" country regulator)
q  
CF + 1
=: qH ,
where qH  1 by   1. The threshold level qH increases in  and decreases in CF . Intuitively,
a higher , i.e. the more capital is needed to ensure the continuation of the project, has to
be compensated by a higher probability of project success in order to induce the regulator
to rescue. An increase of failure costs CF decreases the liquidation value and therefore the
host country regulator accepts a lower monitoring e¤ort. The host country regulator faces the
following trade-o¤: Liquidating the subsidiary bank avoids capital injection , but it disclaims
the part of the assets that were not hit by the solvency shock, i.e. 1   , and causes failure
costs with probability one instead of probability 1   q. Hence, if he liquidates the subsidiary
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bank, welfare loss is CF + 1 with certainty, whereas in case of a bailout, welfare loss is  < 1
with certainty and CF + 1 with probability 1  q.
The home country regulator rescues the subsidiary bank if (the index "NH" stands for
"native" country, i.e. "home" country regulator)
q  
R  1 =: q
NH .
An increase of  raises the required monitoring e¤ort qNH , whereas an increase of R decreases
qNH . Intuitively, an increase of R raises the payo¤ of the project and, therefore, the benets
from a bailout. The home country regulator faces the following trade-o¤: Liquidating the
subsidiary bank avoids capital injection , but it disclaims the payo¤ R of the project.
The multinational regulator bails the subsidiary bank out if (the index "M" stands for
"multinational" regulator)
q  
R + CF
=: qM .
The threshold qM increases in  and decreases in R and CF . As the host country regulator, the
multinational regulator also accounts for the failure costs. However, the multinational regulator
also takes the payo¤ R into consideration. He faces the following trade-o¤. Liquidating the
subsidiary bank avoids the capital injection , but it disclaims the payo¤ of the project and
the part of the assets that were not hit by the solvency shock, i.e. 1  .
We immediately see that qNH > qH > qM . Figure 5.3 illustrates the regulatorsbailout
decision, depending on the subsidiary banks monitoring e¤ort and the solvency shock if we
assume that only one regulator exists. A higher solvency shock requires a higher monitoring
e¤ort, thus a higher probability of success for the project. The reason is that a higher shock
level, , increases the bailout costs which have to be outweighed by an increase of the expected
project payo¤, qR, or/and by a decrease of expected failure costs, [1  q]CF . The marginal
increase of qH is higher than qM because the host country regulator does not benet from
an increase of expected project payo¤, qR. However, it is lower than the marginal increase of
qNH , as he has to take failure costs into account.
Before we determine the subsidiary banks optimal monitoring e¤ort at the rst stage of
the game, we calculate the rst-best monitoring e¤ort from an aggregate welfare point of
view.
5.4.2 Welfare-optimal monitoring e¤ort
The e¤ort level, which a welfare-maximizing subsidiary bank chooses if only the multinational
regulator exists, is dened as the rst-best monitoring e¤ort. As a welfare-maximizing bank
takes the welfare of the host and the home country into account, it may be rational to consider
a multinational regulator instead of a national regulator when determining the welfare-optimal
monitoring e¤ort.
We denote W as the objective function of the welfare-maximizing subsidiary bank. It is
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Figure 5.3: Bailout decisions of the regulators if only one regulator is in charge
q
u1
M, H and NH
rescue
M and H
rescue
M, H and NH liquidate
1 NHq
Mq
M rescues
Hq
partially dened, depending on whether it is rescued or liquidated in the case of a solvency
shock, and given by:
W =
(
WR; q  qM
WL; q < qM
,
where index R stands for "rescued" and index L for "liquidated". WR is similar to the
multinational regulators payo¤ determining the bailout decision, but di¤erentiates from this
in two points. Firstly, we have to take the monitoring costs c(q) into account. Secondly, the
expected capital loss amounts to   [1  ]  instead of  . The failure costs and the loss
of depositorswealth, CF + 1, reduce aggregate welfare if the shock appears and the project
fails, i.e. with probability [1  ] [1  q], and if the shock does not appear, but the project
nevertheless fails, i.e. with probability [1  q]. As a result, WR is given by:
WR =   [1  ]  + q [R  1]  c(q)  [1  q] [CF + 1]  [1  ] [1  q] [CF + 1] ,
which is equivalent to:
WR =  1  [1  ]  + qR  c(q)  [1  q]CF , (5.1)
where
q =
1

[R + CF ] = argmax
q
WR. (5.2)
WL di¤ers in three points from (5.1). Firstly, the subsidiary bank only generates R if
the solvency shock does not occur, i.e. with probability . Secondly, the costs of failure and
the loss of depositorswealth decrease welfare if the shock appears, independently of whether
the project would have been successful, i.e. with probability 1   and if the shock does not
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appear, but project fails, i.e. with probability  [1  q]. Thirdly, the regulator does not have
to inject . Consequently, WL is given by:
WL = q [R  1]  c(q)  [1  ] [CF + 1]   [1  q] [CF + 1] ,
which is equivalent to:
WL =  1 + qR  c(q)  [1  q]CF , (5.3)
where eq = 

[R + CF ] = argmax
q
WL. (5.4)
Proposition 17 The aggregate welfare optimizing subsidiary banks monitoring e¤ort depends
on the shock level  and the e¢ ciency level  in such a way that
 if   R + CF , the welfare-optimizing subsidiary bank chooses
qW =
(
q;   1
2
1

[R + CF ]
2 [1 + ] =: RHeq;  > RH ,
 if  [R + CF ]   < R + CF , it chooses
qW =
8<: 1;   [R+CF ] 
1
2
2

[R+CF ]
2  1
2

[1 ] =: 
RI
eq;  > RI ,
 if  <  [R + CF ], it chooses
qW = 1.
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix.
The intuition is as follows. In the case of  <  [R + CF ], monitoring is relatively in-
expensive due to high e¢ ciency. Therefore the maximum monitoring e¤ort, qW = 1, is
welfare-optimal. If monitoring e¢ ciency is  [R + CF ]   < R+CF , the optimal e¤ort level
depends on the solvency shock level. In case of a su¢ ciently low solvency shock, rescuing
is better than liquidating, as rescue costs are still su¢ ciently small. If this is the case, then
the welfare maximizing subsidiary bank chooses q = 1. By contrast, if the solvency shock
is su¢ ciently large, rescuing is too costly and it is more benecial for the subsidiary bank to
gamble, i.e. to choose eq. In case of su¢ ciently low monitoring e¢ ciency, i.e.   R + CF ,
both e¤ort levels q and eq are lower than one, and the optimal e¤ort level depends again on
whether rescuing is rather costly, i.e.  > RH , or not, i.e.   RH .
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5.4.3 Monitoring e¤ort of the subsidiary bank
Again, the subsidiary banks objective function is partially dened. Denoting  = R as the
banks prot if q  qRE (index "RE" stands for "regulator", i.e. for H, NH and M), where
qRE is the threshold (Section 5.4.1) of the regulator in charge, and  = L as the subsidiary
banks prot if q < qRE, we obtain the following objective function:
 =
(
R; q  qRE
L; q < qRE
.
Notice that R and L have already been dened in Section 5.3.1.
Consider R. Remember that in this case, we do not have to consider the probability for
a solvency shock. The subsidiary banks expected net payo¤ is given by q [R  1]   1
2
q2.
Hence, the optimal monitoring e¤ort of the subsidiary bank is given by (index "B" stands for
"subsidiary bank"):
qB :=
1

[R  1] = argmax
q
R. (5.5)
An increase in the project return R increases qB because the opportunity costs of gambling
increase. This means a lower probability of project success. Comparing (5.2) and (5.5), we
see that qB < q, which results because of two facts. Firstly, the subsidiary bank does not
account for systemic costs of its failure, CF . Secondly, it takes advantage of limited liability
and passes part of the risk to depositors.
Consider L. In this case, we have to take the probability of a solvency shock into account.
This means that the subsidiary banks expected net payo¤ decreases to q [R  1]   1
2
q2.
We obtain the following optimal monitoring e¤ort for the subsidiary bank (the "tilde" stands
for the case in which the subsidiary bank is liquidated in case of a solvency shock):
eqB := 

[R  1] = argmax
q
L: (5.6)
An increase in the probability that the shock does not occur increases eqB. Intuitively, an
increase of  increases expected prot which, in turn, raises incentives to engage in higher
monitoring.
As R
 
qB

> L
 eqB, the subsidiary bank chooses qB if it is not constrained, i.e. if
qB  qRE. By contrast, if qB < qRE, the banks optimal e¤ort level depends on whether
R
 
qRE
  L  eqB.
Proposition 18 The subsidiary banks optimal monitoring e¤ort depends on the solvency
shock in such a way that
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 if the host country regulator controls, it chooses
q =
8>><>>:
qB;  < 1

[R  1] [CF + 1] =: bH
qH ; bH    1

[R  1] [1 + CF ]
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
=: eHeqB;  > eH ,
 if the multinational regulator controls, it chooses
q =
8>><>>:
qB;  < 1

[R  1] [CF +R] =: bM
qM ; bM    1

[R  1] [R + CF ]
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
=: eMeqB;  > eM ,
 if the home country regulator controls, it chooses
q =
8>><>>:
qB;  < 1

[R  1]2 =: bNH
qNH ; bNH    1

[R  1]2
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
=: eNHeqB;  > eNH .
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix!
The intuition is the following. We have to di¤erentiate between three cases, independently
of who is in charge. If the solvency shock is su¢ ciently low, the regulators threshold level is
not binding and the subsidiary bank can choose qB  qRE without taking the risk of being
liquidated. qB, however, is not optimal if qB < qRE because L
 
qB

< L
 eqB. Then the
subsidiary bank decides between choosing the threshold qRE, which is necessary in order to
be bailed out in case of a shock, and gambling, i.e. eqB. In case of intermediate shocks, the
subsidiary bank follows the regulators requirement and chooses qRE because qRE is not too
high (remember that qRE increases in ). By contrast, if the solvency shock is su¢ ciently
high, qRE is too costly and therefore, the subsidiary bank prefers to gamble. The thresholdsb and e are decreasing in . Intuitively, the higher the ine¢ ciency of the subsidiary bank,
the less it is willing to accept a monitoring e¤ort qRE > qB because of the higher monitoring
costs. Finally, an increase of  decreases e because the expected payo¤ in the gambling case
increases, which raises incentives to choose eqB.
5.4.4 Welfare-optimal allocation of bailout responsibility
To begin with, we examine whether the regulators can be too strict, which means that the
subsidiary bank follows the regulators requirement although it is not benecial from a welfare
point of view.
Lemma 19 Consider the range for , where the subsidiary bank chooses the regulators thresh-
olds q = qRE. We have
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 W (qM)  W (eqB) if
bM    minMR :=  [R + CF ] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]] ; eM

,
 W (qH)  W (eqB) if bH    eH ,
 W (qNH)  W (eqB) if bNH    eNH .
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix!
First of all, if the subsidiary bank chooses qRE instead of eqB, qRE is benecial from a
banks point of view. However, expected bailout costs inuence the aggregate welfare, too.
If the shock is su¢ ciently low, expected bailout costs are low and rescuing the subsidiary
bank, which has chosen qH or qNH , is more benecial than liquidating the bank which choseeqB. Therefore, the presence of the national regulators is good from a welfare point of view if
solvency shocks are such that these regulators can induce the bank to choose their required
threshold level qH and qNH respectively.
By contrast, if the multinational regulator can induce the subsidiary bank to choose qM ,
the shock level is relatively high. In combination with a relatively low qM , the existence of the
multinational regulator is only benecial if the shock level is not too high, i.e. MR  .
Being aware that the existence of the regulators is (national case), or at least can be
(multinational case), welfare e¢ cient, we now ask who should be in charge.
Lemma 20 Assume that each regulator can be in charge. Then
 the multinational regulator causes higher welfare than the host country regulator,W  qM >
W
 
qH

, if
 >
2

[R + CF ]
2 [CF + 1]
[R + CF ] + [CF + 1]
=: MH ,
 the host country regulator causes higher welfare than the home country regulator,
W
 
qH

> W
 
qNH

, if
 >
2

[R  1] [CF + 1] =: HNH ,
where
MH > HNH .
 Moreover, we have WR  qB > WL  eqB if
 <
1

[R  1] [1 + ]

[R + CF ]  1
2
[R  1]

=: C .
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Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix!
Lemma 20 argues that if the subsidiary bank accepts all thresholds, i.e. qM , qH and qNH ,
the multinational regulator should rescue in case of  > MH , the host country regulator in
case of MH >  > HNH and the home country regulator in case of  < HNH . Moreover,
we know that rescuing the subsidiary bank, which chooses qB  qRE, is benecial unless
  C . Intuitively, qB leads to a higher probability of project success, but it also causes
bailout costs. If these bailout costs are su¢ ciently large, i.e.  > C , it is not e¢ cient to have
a regulator who enables the subsidiary bank to choose qB without risking to be liquidated.
Taking Lemma 20, Proposition 18 and Lemma 19 into account, we can derive the optimal
allocation of tasks.
Proposition 21 The optimal allocation of tasks depends on the solvency shock in such a way
that
 the home country regulator should be in charge if
bNH    eNH ,
 the host country regulator should be in charge if
eNH <   eH ,
 the multinational regulator should be in charge if
eH    C _ bM    min  eM ; MR  ; bM > eH ^ eH < C < bMbM    min  eM ; MR  ; bM  eH ^ C < eHeH    min  eM ; MR  ; bM < eH _ C > bM ,
where
MR :=


[R + CF ] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]] .
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. If the solvency shock is lower than bNH , none of the
regulators can induce the subsidiary bank to choose a higher monitoring e¤ort than qB because
the thresholds qM , qH and qNH are non-binding, i.e. lower than qB. Then it does not matter
who is in charge. In case of su¢ ciently low solvency shocks, bNH    eNH , the home
country regulator should be in charge, as he can induce the subsidiary bank to choose the
highest possible monitoring e¤ort which is desirable since bailout costs are relatively small.
If solvency shocks are beyond eNH , the home country regulators threshold qNH is too
strict and, therefore, he should pass the bailout decision to the host country regulator. The
host country regulator should bail out in the case of eNH <   eH , i.e. as long as he
can induce the subsidiary bank to choose qH instead of eqB. In this range, bailout costs are
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still su¢ ciently small, so that rescuing is more benecial than inducing the subsidiary bank to
choose eqB.
If the shock level exeeds eH , the host country regulator cannot induce the subsidiary bank
to choose qH . Whether the multinational regulator should be in charge, depends on whether
he can induce the subsidiary bank to choose qM or not. If bM > eH , there is a range where
the subsidiary bank chooses qB if the multinational regulator is in charge and eqB if he is not
in charge. In the case of  > C , eqB is more benecial from a welfare point of view than qB.1
In this case, the multinational regulator should not be in charge. Otherwise, the existence of
the multinational regulator is welfare-benecial even if he cannot induce the subsidiary bank to
choose qM . If  > MR and the subsidiary bank still chooses q
M , i.e. MR < eM , the existence
of the multinational regulator decreases welfare because  is relatively large and  relatively
low, so that expected bailout costs are relatively high. Then liquidating the subsidiary bank
which chose eqB is better from a welfare point of view than rescuing a bank that chose qM .
The existence of a multinational regulator can also be welfare-e¢ cient in case of interme-
diate solvency shocks when the host country regulator is not able to bail the subsidiary bank
out. In this case, a convex combination of qM and qNH can replace qH . Then the home
country and the multinational regulator should apply "constructive ambiguity". That is, the
multinational regulator should be in charge with probability ! and the home country regulator
with probability 1   ! in such a way that !qM + [1  !] qNH is equal to qH . By contrast
to the previous case, the subsidiary does not know with certainty whether the home country
or the multinational regulator is in charge. This policy is equivalent to the optimal bailout
probability found by Freixas (1999). Our ndings show that constructive ambiguitymight
also be desirable on an institutional level.
5.5 Implementation of the optimal allocation
We switch over from the normative analysis (who should bail out) to the positive analysis
(who bails out). Assuming that regulators move successively, each regulator, except the last
mover, has three actions available: rescue, liquidate and pass the decision to the successor
(henceforth often "pass"). In the previous section, the latter action led to the same payo¤ for
the players as "liquidate". We assume the following sequence:
H ! NH !M .
With respect to the bailout costs, it might be useful to di¤erentiate between two cases: In
the rst case, national regulators do not bear the bailout costs if the multinational regulator
rescues. Then bailout costs are borne by the regulator who rescues. Assume, for instance, that
both the host and the home country are small countries and their contribution to the funding
1The range eH    C can hold if failure costs CF are close to zero and the project payo¤ R is
close to 2. See Step 7 of the proof of Proposition 21 in the appendix!
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of multinational institutions such as a multinational bailout authority is small. In the second
case, national regulators bear the multinational regulators rescue costs (capital injection ).
5.5.1 Without sharing of costs for bailout
Figure 5.4 illustrates a subgame, where R stands for the action "rescue", L for the action
"liquidate" and P for the action "pass to the successor". If the host country regulator rescues,
he receives     [1  q] [CF + 1], the home country regulator generates q [R  1] and the
multinational regulators payo¤ amounts to q [R  1]   [1  q] [CF + 1]. Liquidation by the
host country regulator leads to the payo¤s   [CF + 1] for the host and the multinational
regulator and zero for the home country regulator. Liquidation payo¤s are independent of who
liquidates.
If the host country regulator passes the decision to the home country regulator who, in turn,
rescues, the host country regulator receives   [1  q] [CF + 1], the home country regulator
generates   + q [R  1] and the multinational regulators payo¤ amounts to q [R  1]  
[1  q] [CF + 1].
If the home country regulator passes the decision to the multinational regulator who
rescues, the host country regulator receives   [1  q] [CF + 1], the home country regulator
generates q [R  1] and the multinational regulators payo¤ amounts to   + q [R  1]  
[1  q] [CF + 1].
Figure 5.4: Game tree of the regulatorsgame without sharing of bailout costs
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Proposition 22 In a subgame perfect equilibrium
 the multinational regulator rescues the subsidiary bank if q  qM and liquidates it if
q < qM ,
131
Chapter 5. Who Should Rescue Subsidiaries of Multinational Banks?
 the home country regulator passes the decision to the multinational regulator if q  qM
and is indi¤erent between "liquidating" and "passing" if q < qM ,
 the host country regulator passes the decision to the home country regulator if q  qM
and is indi¤erent between "liquidating" and "passing" if q < qM ,
 the subsidiary bank chooses
q =
8><>:
qB;  < bM
qM ; bM    eMeqB;  > eM .
Proof. The rationale is provided below.
In Section 5.4.1, we already determined the multinational regulators decision at the last
stage of the game. If q  qM , he rescues, whereas in the case of q < qM , he liquidates.
Proceeding with the second stage of the subgame, the home country regulator does not
have an incentive to intervene if q  qNH > qM because q [R  1] >   + q [R  1].
Similarly, passing the decision to the multinational regulator is more benecial than liquidating
if qNH > q  qM because q [R  1] > 0. If q < qM , he is indi¤erent between liquidating and
passing the decision to the multinational regulator since his payo¤ is always zero.
Similarly, the host country regulator passes the decision to the home country regulator if
q  qM . Indeed, in the case of q  qH > qM , passing the decision to the home country
regulator (who passes the decision to the multinational regulator who, in turn, rescues) is
more benecial than rescuing because   [1  q] [CF + 1] >     [1  q] [CF + 1]. This also
holds if qH > q  qM because   [CF + 1] <   [1  q] [CF + 1]. In the case of q < qM ,
the host country regulator is indi¤erent between "liquidate" and "pass" because his payo¤ is
  [CF + 1], independent of whether the home country or the multinational regulator liquidates.
Foreseeing the regulatorsdecisions, the subsidiary bank chooses the same monitoring e¤ort
as it would have chosen if only the multinational regulator existed. As a result, the regulators
cannot induce the subsidiary bank to choose the higher thresholds qH and qNH because neither
the host nor the home country regulator has an incentive to rescue or to liquidate.
The sequence is not crucial for the result. Independently of who rescues, the subsidiary
bank knows ex ante that qM is su¢ cient in order to be bailed out in an emergency. Consider,
for instance, the sequence, where the multinational regulator moves rst. Of course, the
multinational regulator does not rescue the subsidiary bank if he expects one of the national
regulators to rescue. However, if they have an incentive to liquidate the subsidiary bank, the
multinational regulator intervenes and rescues unless q < qM .
5.5.2 With sharing of costs for bailout
Now we argue that national regulators share the multinational regulators bailout costs . The
part of the host country regulators contribution to the funding of these bailouts is denoted
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with  and the home country regulators part is denoted with 1   . Considering the same
sequence as in the previous section, the payo¤s are the same until the last stage of the game
where the multinational regulator has to decide whether to rescue or to liquidate. If the
multinational regulator bails out, the host country regulators payo¤ decreases by  and the
home country regulators payo¤ by [1  ] .
To implement the optimal allocation of tasks, we argue that the order has to be changed
in such a way that the home country regulator moves rst and then the host country regulator
decides whether to rescue or to liquidate. If the home country regulator does not intervene,
the host country regulator decides whether to pass the decision to the multinational regulator,
to rescue or to liquidate the subsidiary bank. Finally, the multinational regulator moves and
liquidates or rescues the subsidiary bank. Figure 5.5 illustrates the new subgame of the game.
Figure 5.5: Game tree of the regulatorsgame with sharing of bailout costs
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Beginning with the last stage of the game, we know that the multinational regulator rescues
if q  qM and liquidates if q < qM . The host country regulator passes the decision to the
multinational regulator if q  qH . He is indi¤erent between "liquidate" and "pass" if q < qM .
If the host country regulator has to pay  of the multinational regulators bailout costs and
qH > q  qM , he prefers to pass the decision to the multinational regulator in the case of
q  
[CF+1]
and to liquidate in the case of q < 
[CF+1]
. This arises from the fact that in
the latter case the payo¤ generated from liquidating the subsidiary bank, i.e.   [CF + 1], is
higher than the payo¤ generated from passing the decision to the multinational regulator, i.e.
    [1  q] [CF + 1]. Setting  = 1, the critical threshold [CF+1] equals qH and the host
country regulator never passes the decision to the multinational regulator, but liquidates in
the case of q < qH .
The home country regulator passes the decision to the host country regulator who, in turn,
passes the decision to the multinational regulator if q  qNH . Similar to the host country
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regulator, the home country regulator is indi¤erent between "pass" and "liquidate" if q < qM .
The critical values are qNH > q  
[CF+1]
, where the host country regulator passes the burden
to the multinational regulator who, in turn, rescues or liquidates the subsidiary bank. In this
case, the home country regulator liquidates the subsidiary bank if [1  ] 
[R 1] > q. By setting
 = 0, the home country regulator does not pass the decision to the host country regulator
if q < qNH because the host country regulator would pass the decision to the multinational
regulator who, in turn, would bail the subsidiary bank out. However, this is not benecial for
the home country regulator in the case of [1  0] 
[R 1] = q
NH > q.
Proposition 23 In order to generate the welfare e¢ cient solution
 the home country regulator should be forced to pay the multinational regulators bailout
costs if bNH    eNH ,
 the host country regulator should be forced to pay the multinational regulators bailout
costs if bH    eH ,
 "third parties" should bear the costs if  > eH .
Proof. The rationale is provided below.
Foreseeing the outcome of the regulatorsgame, the subsidiary bank chooses qNH if bNH 
  eNH and qH if bH    eH . This optimal burden sharing can only be implemented if
the home country regulator moves rst. Assume, by contrast, that the host country regulator
moves rst and knows that the home country regulator has to pay the whole bailout costs of
the multinational regulator. Then the host country regulator does not pass the decision to the
home country regulator unless q < qH . Indeed, in the case of qNH > q  qH , the host country
regulator rescues because his payo¤ is higher than if the home country regulator liquidates.
Foreseeing the host country regulators decision, the subsidiary bank does not choose q > qH
in order to guarantee a bailout if necessary. Hence, qNH is not feasible.
If the multinational regulator moves rst, or at least not at the end, he always rescues the
subsidiary bank if he expects the national regulators to liquidate and q  qM . This is, for
instance, the case when qM < q < qH . Then the national regulators do not have an incentive
to rescue the subsidiary bank which induces the multinational regulator, in turn, to bail out the
bank. Foreseeing the regulatorsincentives, the subsidiary bank never chooses a monitoring
e¤ort q > qM in order to be rescued. Therefore, we obtain the same result as in the previous
section where national regulators do not nance the multinational regulators capital injection.
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5.6 Allocation of bailout responsibility between a par-
ent bank and a regulator
5.6.1 Bailout incentives of the parent bank
We start with the simple case where the subsidiary bank can only ask its parent bank to bail
it out.
Lemma 24 The subsidiary bank chooses
 qB and is rescued by its parent bank if
  1
2
[R  1]2 =: BB,
 eqB and is liquidated by its parent bank if
 > BB:
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
If the solvency shock is relatively low,   BB, the parent bank rescues its subsidiary
because bailout costs are su¢ ciently low. From Section 5.4.3, we already know that the
subsidiary banks optimal e¤ort level is then qB. By contrast, if the solvency shock is su¢ ciently
high, bailout costs are relatively high and the subsidiary bank gambles, i.e. chooses eqB.
Now we allow for a bailout by the parent bank and a bailout by either the national (host
or home) or the multinational regulator. The game structure is the same as in Section 5.4,
except for the fact that the parent bank decides whether to rescue its subsidiary bank before
the regulator in charge moves.
Proposition 25 The parent bank never rescues if any of the regulators is in charge.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix!
Comparing rescuing the subsidiary bank and relying on the safety net, the parent bank
chooses the rst one if the solvency shock is su¢ ciently large. This results from the fact that
an increasing solvency shock raises the required threshold level qRE. However, an increasing
solvency shock raises bailout costs, too. If the solvency shock is too high for accepting the
safety net, a bailout is also too expensive for the parent bank. Consequently, the parent bank
never rescues if any of the regulators is in charge.
By ensuring that the parent bank publicly commits itself to recapitalize, thus to rescue
its subsidiary, the regulators cannot prevent the parent bank from relying on the safety net.2
2In this paper we do not address the question of how the regulator can induce the parent bank to
restore its subsidiary.
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However, the safety net also has a positive e¤ect, since the subsidiary bank chooses a higher
monitoring e¤ort which increases the probability of project success. From an aggregate welfare
point of view, it does not matter who pays the bill of a bailout. Therefore, the existence of a
safety net is welfare-increasing, since it induces the subsidiary bank to increase its monitoring
e¤ort, at least for intermediate solvency shocks.
5.6.2 Cooperation between regulator and parent bank
Now we assume that the parent bank does not rescue its subsidiary voluntarily because the
solvency shock is too large,  > BB. Then the regulators have three options:
 Firstly, they can force the parent bank to rescue its subsidiary. Then the subsidiary bank
chooses qB.
 Secondly, the regulators can o¤er a safety net without requiring any repayments. Then
we are in the same case as in Section 5.4.1.
 Thirdly, the regulators can o¤er a safety net and force the parent bank to pay a part of
the bailout bill.
We follow the third option and assume that the parent bank has to inject . On the one
hand,  reduces the capital injection which the host country regulator needs to ensure the
continuation of the subsidiary bank. This decreases threshold level qH . On the other hand,
the parent bank has to pay  if the subsidiary bank demands a bailout. We consider  as
a lump-sum charge and ask whether a contribution by the parent bank to the bailout of its
subsidiary can increase the range where the subsidiary bank chooses the required monitoring
e¤ort qH .3 If the home regulator or the multinational regulator is in charge, an increase of 
does not decrease the thresholds qM and qNH .
Proposition 26 We have to di¤erentiate between the regulators.
 Assume that the host country regulator is in charge. Then an increase of  (at  = 0)
can increase eH if
 > 1  2 [R  1]
2
[CF + 1]
2 + [R  1]2 =: 
H :
 An increase of  always decreases eM and eNH .
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix!
Cooperation between a regulator and the parent bank can increase the range where the
subsidiary bank chooses its required monitoring e¤ort level qH if  is su¢ ciently large. The
reason is that, on the one hand, a small contribution to the restoration decreases the parent
3As we restrict our attention on a marginal e¤ect of  at point  = 0, it does not matter whether we
consider  as a lump-sum "tax" or as a levy depending on .
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banks payo¤, but, on the other hand, it decreases the required monitoring e¤ort. If the
solvency shock only occurs with a su¢ ciently small probability, i.e.  is su¢ ciently high, the
expected loss due to its own contribution to the recovery is relatively small and therefore it is
benecial for the parent bank to partly contribute to the rescue of the subsidiary bank.
A contribution of the parent bank does not change the thresholds qM and qNH because it
does not change welfare in the home country. Therefore, a bailout by either the multinational
or the home country regulator increases costs for the parent bank without decreasing the
required thresholds. Obviously, this leads to a decrease of the range (of ), where the subsidiary
bank accepts qM and qNH , respectively, in order to be rescued.
5.7 Conclusion
We asked whether the implementation of a multinational regulator, dealing with bailouts and
resolutions of a subsidiary bank, is desirable and how these bailout costs should be nanced.
Moreover, we analysed the benet of burden sharing among regulators and between regulators
and parent banks.
To address these issues, we developed an incomplete-contract model, where a subsidiary
bank rst decides about its monitoring e¤ort. Thereafter, the subsidiary bank is hit by a sol-
vency shock with an exogenously determined probability. Then it cannot continue to operate
unless it is bailed out. We di¤erentiate between host, home and multinational regulators. We
assumed that the regulators bail out the subsidiary bank if the rescue costs are lower than
the liquidation costs. This holds if the banks monitoring e¤ort exceeds a certain monitoring
threshold which is di¤erent among host, home and multinational regulators, since the na-
tional regulators maximize domestic welfare, whereas the multinational regulator maximizes
aggregate welfare.
Our results suggest that in the case of su¢ ciently low solvency shocks it does not matter
who bails out, since the required monitoring e¤ort levels are not binding. In the case of very
low shocks, the home country regulator should rescue the subsidiary, whereas in the case
of low shocks, the host country regulator should be in charge. The multinational regulator
should rescue or liquidate subsidiary banks that are hit by intermediate shocks. The allocation
of resolution power does not matter if solvency shocks are su¢ ciently high, as neither the
national nor the multinational regulator can induce the subsidiary bank to choose a monitoring
e¤ort above the gambling e¤ort level.
The implementation of such an allocation of tasks requires burden sharing of bank bailouts
in such a way that the home country regulator should be forced to bear the multinational
regulators bailout costs if the solvency shock is very low. In the case of low shocks, the
host country regulator should bear the multinational regulators bailout costs. In the case of
intermediate shocks, the national regulatorscontribution should be as small as possible.
Finally, we argue that a regulator might decrease welfare if he forces the parent bank to
bail out its subsidiary. We rather suggest that the host country regulator and the parent
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bank should cooperate in rescuing the subsidiary bank, which can increase the range where
the subsidiary bank chooses a higher monitoring e¤ort if the probability of a solvency shock
is su¢ ciently low. This e¤ect does not exist if the home or the multinational regulator is in
charge.
Our results are based upon a number of assumptions, and it may be worthwhile to check
how critical they are. Firstly, we assumed that costs of failure do not di¤er between the
host and the multinational regulator. This assumption is not critical to our main nding that
burden sharing is necessary to implement the optimal allocation of resolution power, but solely
changes the relative size of regulatorsthresholds. Secondly, we analysed the incentives using
a specic cost function. However, we allow for the variation of monitoring e¢ ciency. Thirdly,
we assumed that the subsidiary bank does not have to repay capital that was injected. If the
subsidiary bank has to repay the capital injection, regulators thresholds decrease.
The model can be expanded in several ways. Firstly, we do not internalize the subsidiary
banks decision to invest abroad. Secondly, we only account for a single subsidiary bank.
Mikkonen (2006) shows that the relative threshold level of the multinational regulator can
change and be lower than the national regulators threshold level when taking more than one
subsidiary of a multinational regulator into account. Then the optimal allocation of resolution
power depends on the number of banks. Thirdly, the subidiary bank is only nanced by secured
deposits. Beck et al. (2011), for example, analyse the distortions assets, deposits and equity
introduce in the regulatory process of cross-border banking. Finally, the set-up can be used
to model bargaining solutions between the regulators and/or between the regulators and the
bank.
Nevertheless, our paper provides some insights into the risk incentives of multinational
banks and shows why the implementation of a multinational regulator and burden sharing
among national regulators might be welfare-improving. This chapters illustrates that coop-
eration and nancing agreements should not necessarily lead to a joint resolution or bailout
of insolvent multinational banks, but may imply an allocation of responsibilities depending on
the type of the crisis. The same holds true for the nancing arrangements.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 17
In order to determine the optimal monitoring e¤ort for a welfare-maximizing bank, we proceed
in three major steps and, in each major step we proceed in three minor steps. First, we
di¤erentiate between three di¤erent values of monitoring e¢ ciency:
1.   R + CF
2.  [R + CF ]   < R + CF
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3.  <  [R + CF ],
which we dene as the three major steps. Then in each major step we di¤erentiate between
three minor steps:
 qM < eq < q
 eq < qM < q
 eq < q < qM .
Step 1
In this case, e¢ ciency costs lead to the fact that q  1.
 First, assume that qM < eq < q. As W = WR for q  qM , eq cannot be optimal
because WR (q) > WR (eq). It can be shown that WR (q) > WL  qM holds for all
 2 [0; 1]. Hence, there cannot be a monitoring e¤ort which leads to a higher e¤ort level
under liquidation than under bailout. Notice that we are in the range where eq > qM
or, equivalently:
 <


[R + CF ]
2 .
 Second, assume eq < qM < q. In this case, the welfare-maximizing subsidiary bank
either chooses eq or q We have WR (q) > WL (eq) if
 <
1
2
1

[R + CF ]
2 [1 + ] .
However, we are in the range where q > qM > eq or, equivalently:


[R + CF ]
2 <  <
1

[R + CF ]
2 .
Therefore, we have WR (q) > WL (eq) if 

[R + CF ]
2 <  < 1
2
1

[R + CF ]
2 [1 + ],
which always holds since  < 1.
 Third, assume that eq < q < qM . We have to check whether WR  qM > WL (eq). It
is easy to check that this inequation can never be fullled and we always haveWL (eq) >
WR
 
qM

. To conclude, in the case of   CF + R we have to di¤erentiate between
two cases:
qW =
(
q;   1
2
1

[R + CF ]
2 [1 + ]eq;  > 1
2
1

[R + CF ]
2 [1 + ]
.
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Step 2
In this case, we have eq < 1 < q. Now the subsidiary bank cannot choose q.
 First, assume that qM < eq < 1. As the prot is increasing in q for q < q, we have
WR(1) > WR(eq). However, we have to check whether WR(1) < WL  qM holds. It
is easy to check that WR(1) > WL
 
qM

always holds.
 Second, assume that eq < qM < 1. Then we have to check whetherWR (1) > WL (eq),
which holds if
 <
[R + CF ]  12 
2

[R + CF ]
2   1
2

[1  ] .
 The third case eq < 1 < qM is impossible, since q 2 [0; 1]. To conclude, the welfare-
optimizing subsidiary bank chooses:
qW =
8<: 1;  
[R+CF ]  12 
2

[R+CF ]
2  1
2

[1 ]eq;  > [R+CF ]  12 2 [R+CF ]2  12
[1 ]
.
Step 3
In this case, we have 1 < eq < q. Therefore, we only have to consider the case where
qM < eq = 1. The subsidiary bank either chooses qM , which leads to the liquidation, or
q = 1. From Case 2 we already know that WR(1) > WL
 
qM

always holds and therefore the
welfare-optimizing subsidiary bank chooses always q = 1, i.e.
qW = 1.
Proof of Proposition 18
Assume that the host country regulator is in charge. In the binding case, the bank chooses its
rst-best monitoring e¤ort eqB if

 eqB >   qH
or equivalently if
1
2
2

[R  1]2 > qH [R  1]  1
2


qH

2.
Solving the inequation, we obtain:
qH <
1

[R  1]

1 
q
1  2 =: qH  or 1 [R  1]

1 +
q
1  2 =: qH+ < qH .
In the case of qH < 1

[R  1]
h
1 
q
1  2i, the threshold level is not binding. To see
this, remember that qH is binding only if eqB < qH . This is equivalent to 

[R  1] < qH .
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We have 

[R  1]  1

[R  1]
h
1 
q
1  2i because 0    1. Therefore only one
solution to the inequation remains and the subsidiary bank chooses eqB if
qH > qH+ ,
which is equivalent to
 >
1

[R  1]

1 +
q
1  2 [CF + 1] =: eH .
Notice that the threshold for 
 
qB

> 
 
qH

can be achieved in the same way or by setting
 = 1.
Assume that the multinational regulator has the resolution power. Then the subsidiary
bank chooses eqB if

 eqB >   qM
or, equivalently, if (eM  = 1 [R  1] h1 q1  2i [CF +R] can be neglected, since
 > bM)
 >
1

[R  1]

1 +
q
1  2 [CF +R] =: eM .
Notice that the threshold for 
 
qB

> 
 
qM

can be achieved in the same way.
Assume that the national regulator of the home country controls and the parent bank
cannot rescue its subsidiary. Then the subsidiary bank gambles if

 eqB >   qNH
or equivalently if
1
2
2

[R  1]2 > qNH [R  1]  1
2


qNH
2
.
Solving the inequation we have:
 <
1

[R  1]2

1 
q
1  2 := eNH  or 1 [R  1]2

1 +
q
1  2 =: eNH < .
However, we can neglect the second condition  < eNH  as the required monitoring level is not
binding. Therefore, the subsidiary bank chooses qNH if the home country regulator controls
and eNH < . Notice that   qB >   qNH can be obtained in the same way.
Proof of Lemma 19
 We have WR  qM > WL  eqB if


[R + CF ] [R  1] <  < 

[R + CF ] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]] .
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Notice that 

[R + CF ] [R  1] < bM (remember that bM is dened in Proposition 18)
and, therefore, it remains:
 <


[R + CF ] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]] =: MR ,
which can either be higher or lower than eM .
 We have WR  qH > WL  eqB if
 >
1

[CF + 1]
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]] 
q
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]]

and
 <
1

[CF + 1]
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]] +
q
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]]

.
However, it can be shown that:
1

[CF + 1]
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]] 
q
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]]

<
1

[R  1] [CF + 1] = bH ,
and, therefore, it remains
 <
1

[CF + 1]
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]] +
q
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]]

.
Consider
1

[R  1] [1 + CF ]
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
= eH
<
1

[CF + 1]
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]] +
q
[R  1 +  [CF + 1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]]

.
If [R  1]
p
1  2 <  [CF + 1], this inequation is always true. If [R  1]
p
1  2 >
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 [CF + 1], this holds if
[R  1]2 1  2  2 [CF + 1] [R  1]p1  2 + 2 [CF + 1]2
< [R  1 +  [CF + 1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]] ,
which is always true. Hence, we have the result that WR
 
qH

> WL
 eqB as long asbH    eH .
 We have WR  qNH > WL  eqB if
 >
1

[R  1]
CF + 1 +  [R  1] 
q
[[R + CF ]  [1  ] [R  1]]2   2 [R  1] [R + 2CF + 1]

and
 <
1

[R  1]
CF + 1 +  [R  1] +
q
[[R + CF ]  [1  ] [R  1]]2   2 [R  1] [R + 2CF + 1]

.
We have 1 < bNH if
[CF + 1]
2   2 [R  1] [CF + 1] + 2 [R  1] [R + CF ]
< [R + CF ]
2 + 2 [R  1]2   22 [R  1] [R + CF ] + 2 [R  1]2 .
Let us consider the following function f :
f() = 2 [R  1]2   22 [R  1] [R + CF ] + 2 [R  1]2 .
The rst-order derivative with respect to  is given by:
@f
@
= 2 [R  1]2   4 [R  1] [R + CF ] + 2 [R  1]2 .
The second-order derivative is given by:
@2f
@2
= 2 [R  1]2   4 [R  1] [R + CF ] < 0.
We have a maximum at point
 =
R  1
2 [R + CF ]  [R  1] .
Therefore, if the inequation holds for  = 0 and  = 1, it holds for all  2 [0; 1]. For
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 = 0 we have:
[CF + 1]
2   2 [R  1] [CF + 1] + 2 [R  1] [R + CF ] < [R + CF ]2
and rearranging the inequation leads to:
CF + 1 < R + CF .
For  = 1 we have:
[CF + 1]
2   2 [R  1] [CF + 1] + 2 [R  1] [R + CF ]
 [R + CF ]2 + [R  1]2   2 [R  1] [CF + 1] ,
which is equivalent to:
[CF + 1]
2  [CF + 1]2 .
Hence, the inequation is fullled if it is not strict. As a result, for the solution of the
inequation, it remains:
 <
1

[R  1]
CF + 1 +  [R  1] +
q
[[R + CF ]  [1  ] [R  1]]2   2 [R  1] [R + 2CF + 1]

.
It remains to check whether eNH < 2 which holds if
[R  1]
h
1  +
p
1  2
i
  [CF + 1]
<
q
[[R + CF ]  [1  ] [R  1]]2   2 [R  1] [2 [R + CF ]  [R  1]].
If the left side is less than zero, we do not have any problem and the inequation is
fullled. By contrast, if the left side is greater than zero, we obtain:
[R  1]
h
1  +
p
1  2
i2
< 2 [CF + 1]
h
1  2 +
p
1  2
i
.
We know that h
1  +
p
1  2
i2
< 2
h
1  2 +
p
1  2
i
,
and since [CF + 1] > [R  1], the inequation is fullled. Hence, we have always
WR
 
qNH

> WL
 eqB if bNH < eNH .
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Proof of Lemma 20
 We have WR  qM > WR  qH if
qM [R + CF ]  c(qM) > qH [R + CF ]  c(qH)
or, equivalently, if
1
2
2

[R + CF ]
2   [CF + 1]2

+  [R + CF ]
2 [CF + 1] [[CF + 1]  [R + CF ]] > 0.
The inequation is fullled if
 < 0
or
 > 2
[R + CF ]
2 [CF + 1] [R  1]


[R + CF ]
2   [CF + 1]2
 =: MH ,
where MH is equal to:
2

[R + CF ]
2 [CF + 1]
[R + CF ] + [CF + 1]
.
As a result, the multinational regulator leads to a higher welfare if
 > MH .
 We have WR  qM > WR  qNH if
qM [R + CF ]  c(qM) > qNH [R + CF ]  c(qNH)
or, equivalently, if
  [R  1] [R + CF ]2 [CF + 1] + 1
2
2

[R + CF ]
2   [R  1]2 > 0.
The inequation is fullled if
 < 0
or
 >
2 [R  1] [CF + 1] [R + CF ]2


[R + CF ]
2   [R  1]2 =: MNH .
As a result, the multinational regulator leads to a higher welfare if
 > MNH .
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 We have WR  qH > WR  qNH if
qH [R + CF ]  c(qH) > qNH [R + CF ]  c(qNH)
or, equivalently, if
1
2
2

[CF + 1]
2   [R  1]2+  [R + CF ] [R  1] [CF + 1] [[R  1]  [CF + 1]] > 0.
The inequation is fullled if
 < 0
or
 >
2 [R + CF ] [R  1] [CF + 1] [[CF + 1]  [R  1]]


[CF + 1]
2   [R  1]2 =: HNH ,
where HNH is equal to:
2 [R  1] [CF + 1]

.
As a result, the host country regulator leads to a higher welfare if  > HNH .
 Comparing these thresholds, we have MH > MNH > HNH .
Proof of Proposition 21
We proceed in seven steps:
Step 1
It can be shown that HNH > eNH . Consequently, the home country regulator should rescue
in the case of bNH    eNH .
Step 2
We know that MH > eH and, therefore, the host country regulator should rescue in the case
of eNH    eH as long as eNH > bH .
Step 3
The subsidiary bank chooses the multinational regulators threshold qM in the case of bM 
  eM . However, he should only rescue in the case of eH    min  MR ; eM as long aseH > bM .
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Step 4
It remains to be examined whether "as long as" is necessary in Steps 2 and 3. Therefore we
check whether WR
 
qB

> WL
 eqB. This holds if
1

[R  1] [1 + ]

[R + CF ]  1
2
[R  1]

>  =: C .
We know that C > bH and therefore, the "as long as" in step two can be deleted. However,
we know that C > bM if
 >
1
2
[R  1]
[R + CF ]  12 [R  1]
.
Therefore, we cannot exclude C < bM . Moreover, we cannot exclude C < eH . We have to
prove whether eqB leads to a bailout, too, i.e. eqB > qM ,


[R  1] [R + CF ] >  =: L.
Notice that if C < bM , we denitely have L < eH , which is easy to show. Consequently, if
there is a range where eH < C <  < bM , we can argue that WL  eqB > WR  qB because
L < eH and the subsidiary bank is indeed liquidated in the case of choosing eqB.
Step 5
We know that WR
 
qNH

> WR
 
qB

as long as
qNH [R + CF ]  c(qNH) > qB [R + CF ]  c(qB)
or, equivalently,
22   2 [R + CF ] [R  1] + 2 [R  1]3 [R + CF ]  [R  1]4 < 0.
The solution of the inequation is given by:
1

[R  1]2    1

[R  1] [[R + CF ] + [CF + 1]] .
We have 2 > eNH if
1

[R  1] [[R + CF ] + [CF + 1]] > 1

[R  1]2
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
or, equivalently,
[R + CF ] + [CF + 1] > [R  1]
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
.
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We see that the right side decreases in . Assuming  = 0, we have:
[R + CF ] + [CF + 1] > 2 [R  1]
or, equivalently,
2CF + 1 > R  2,
which is always fullled, as the right side is negative.
Step 6
We know that WR
 
qH

> WR
 
qB

as long as
qH [R + CF ]  c(qH) > qB [R + CF ]  c(qB)
or, equivalently,
22   2 [R + CF ] [CF + 1] + 2 [R  1] [R + CF ] [CF + 1]2   [R  1]2 [CF + 1]2 < 0.
The solution of the inequation is given by:
[CF + 1] [R  1]

   [CF + 1] [[R + CF ] + [CF + 1]]

,
where 2  eH (same proof as in Step 5).
Step 7
We cannot show that the di¤erentiation between C < bM and C  bM is not necessary. IfeH < bM , we have C > bM . The rst inequation holds if
1

[R  1] [1 + CF ]
h
1 +
p
1  2
i
<
1

[R  1] [CF +R]
or, equivalently, if
 >
s
1  [R  1]
2
[1 + CF ]
2 .
The second inequation holds if
1

[R  1] [CF +R] < 1

[R  1] [1 + ]

[R + CF ]  1
2
[R  1]

or, equivalently, if
 >
1
2
[R  1]
[R + CF ]  12 [R  1]
.
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We show that the following inequation can hold:s
1  [R  1]
2
[1 + CF ]
2 <
1
2
[R  1]
[R + CF ]  12 [R  1]
.
Set CF = 0 which leads to:
1  [R  1]2 < [R  1]
2
[R + 1]2
.
Rearranging the inequation, we obtain:
4R < [R + 1]2 [R  1]2 ,
which is true for R = 2. Consequently, there is a possible range if failure costs CF are very
low and return R is very high.
Proof of Lemma 24
Assume that the parent bank rescues. Then the subsidiary bank chooses qB and the parent
banks net prot amounts to   [1  ]+ 1
2
[R  1]2. In the case of a liquidation, the parent
bank only receives the net payo¤ of its subsidiary if the shock does not appear. Hence, the
expected net prot amounts to 
2
[R  1]2. Obviously, rescuing its subsidiary is more benecial
than liquidating if
  [1  ] + 1
2
[R  1]2  
2
[R  1]2
or, equivalently, if
  1
2
[R  1]2 =: BB.
Proof of Proposition 25
Assume that the host country regulator has power of resolution. Notice that the parent bank
is the unique owner of the subsidiary bank, which means that it can force its subsidiary to
choose a certain threshold level. Accordingly, restoring the subsidiary bank is only benecial if
  BB and the net expected prot from rescuing is higher than the net expected prot of
forcing the subsidiary bank to follow the regulators required threshold level qH . This holds if
  [1  ] +   qB    qH
or, equivalently, if
  [1  ] + 1
2
[R  1]2  
CF + 1
[R  1]  1
2



CF + 1

2.
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Solving the inequation, we obtain:
  H  _ H+  ,
with
H  =
1

[CF + 1]

[1  ] [CF + 1] + [R  1] 
q
[1  ] [1  ] [CF + 1]2 + 2 [CF + 1] [R  1] ,
which is irrelevant because H  < bH and
H+ =
1

[CF + 1]

[1  ] [CF + 1] + [R  1] +
q
[1  ] [1  ] [CF + 1]2 + 2 [CF + 1] [R  1] .
Now it remains to check whether the parent bank ever rescues if the host country regulator is
in charge. It is easy to show that:
BB <
1

[CF +R] [[1  ] [CF +R] + [R  1]]
for all  < 1 and therefore BB < H+ . Hence, the parent bank never rescues if the host
country regulator is in charge.
Assume that the multinational regulator has the power of resolution. Then the parent
bank rescues its subsidiary bank if   BB and
  [1  ] +   qB    qM
or equivalently
  [1  ] + 1
2
[R  1]2  
CF +R
[R  1]  1
2



CF +R

2.
The solution of the inequation is:
  M  _ M+  ,
with
M  =
1

[CF +R]

[1  ] [CF +R] + [R  1] 
q
[1  ] [1  ] [CF +R]2 + 2 [CF +R] [R  1] ,
which is irrelevant since M  < bM and
M+ =
1

[CF +R]

[1  ] [CF +R] + [R  1] +
q
[1  ] [1  ] [CF +R]2 + 2 [CF +R] [R  1] .
However, since BB < M+ (it is easy to show), the parent bank never rescues if the multina-
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tional regulator is in charge.
Assume that the home country regulator has the power of resolution. Then the parent
bank bails out its subsidiary if   BB and
  [1  ] +   qB    qNH
or, equivalently,
  [1  ] + 1
2
[R  1]2  
R  1 [R  1] 
1
2



R  1

2.
Solving the inequation we obtain:
  1

[R  1]2

[2  ] 
q
[2  ]2   1

_ 1

[R  1]2

[2  ] +
q
[2  ]2   1

 .
Notice that the threshold is not binding if
  1

[R  1]2 .
Since
1

[R  1]2

[2  ] 
q
[2  ]2   1

<
1

[R  1]2 ,
the left side is irrelevant. From Lemma 24, we already know that the parent bank only rescues
its subsidiary bank if
 <
1
2
[R  1]2 .
Hence, the parent bank rescues if
1

[R  1]2

[2  ] +
q
[2  ]2   1

   BB.
However, since
1

[R  1]2

[2  ] +
q
[2  ]2   1

>
1
2
[R  1]2
for  2 [0; 1], the parent bank never restores its subsidiary bank if the home country regulator
controls.
Proof of Proposition 26
If the parent bank has to inject ; the relevant threshold level is:
   
CF + 1
=: eqH .
Assume that the host country regulator controls. Then the subsidiary bank chooses eqB
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(notice that we are considering the case where the parent bank does not rescue) if
E +
1
2
2 [R  1]2 > E + [1  ] [E   ] + eqH [R  1]  1
2

heqHi2
or, equivalently, if
1
2

heqHi2   eqH [R  1] + 1
2
2 [R  1]2 +  [1  ] > 0.
Solving the inequation leads to:
eqH < 1

[R  1]
"
1 
s
1  2   2 [1  ] 
[R  1]2
#
=: eqH 
_
eqH > 1

[R  1]
"
1 +
s
1  2   2 [1  ] 
[R  1]2
#
=: eqH+ .
We do not have to analyse the left side, as eqH ;=0 = eqH  is not binding. For the right side, eqH+ ,
we have:
 >  +
1

[R  1] [CF + 1]
"
1 +
s
1  2   2 [1  ] 
[R  1]2
#
=: eH+ .
It remains to check whether an increase in  can increase the threshold level eH+ . Di¤erentiatingeH+ with respect to , we obtain:
@eH+
@
= 1  1

[R  1] [CF + 1]
2 [1 ]
[R 1]2
2
q
1  2   2 [1 ]
[R 1]2
= 1  1

[CF + 1]
 [1  ]
[R  1]
q
1  2   2 [1 ]
[R 1]2
.
An increase of  leads to an increase of eH+ at  = 0 if
[CF + 1]
2   [R  1]2
[CF + 1]
2 + [R  1]2 < .
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Chapter 6
What Makes Banking Crisis
Resolution So Di¢ cult? Lessons
From Japan and the Nordic
Countries
6.1 Introduction
During the recent nancial crisis, authorities intervened massively in the banking sector. They
provided liquidity assistance as well as equity capital for distressed nancial institutions, often
in order to reduce the social costs of bank failures. In many cases, such nancial assistance
resulted in rising public budget decits, which indicated a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the
banking industry and maintaining sound public nances. In some European countries, such
as Ireland and Spain, bank bailouts even forced governments to ask for nancial assistance
from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), showing that a banking
crisis can often only be solved at the expense of an increasing risk of a sovereign debt crisis
(Acharya, Drechsler & Schnabl (2011)).
While it is important, the scal burden is not the only dimension of a crisis resolution.
When reacting to a banking crisis, regulators must also take into account the impact of
their actions on social costs in terms of GDP loss and the consequences of their actions for
future risk-taking behaviour of banks. Unfortunately, the relationship between scal burden,
GDP growth, and bank risk-taking incentives is not clear-cut. The appliance of a cheap
crisis resolution tool, such as granting guarantees, might not always be e¢ cient from a risk
(moral hazard) point of view. Therefore, policy-makers have to choose between the e¤ects of
resolution packages. This may not always be easy. In addition to conicting goals, regulators
may also face di¢ culties in implementing their preferred bailout policies. Such di¢ culties may
result from transaction costs and coordination problems among authorities, such as sub-optimal
allocation of responsibilities, and commitment problems.
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Against this background, the aim of this paper is to identify which specic di¢ culties
authorities face when choosing and implementing crisis resolution packages.1 We review the
literature on the e¤ects of crisis resolution measures and analyse resolution paths in past
crises. We ask three interrelated questions: Which trade-o¤s and obstacles do policy makers
face when resolving a banking crisis? How did these di¢ culties shape the course of past
banking resolutions, and what were the impacts of these instruments on moral hazard and
scal costs? What lessons can be learnt from these experiences for future crisis resolutions?
We use the case-study method which allows us to cover contextual conditions. This
approach is appropriate whenever the phenomenon studied and its context are not always
distinguishable and when circumstances are highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study (Yin
(2003)). This is, in particular, the case during a nancial crisis when policy decisions which
are made reect potential conicts of interest between di¤erent regulatory agencies or mirror
potential opposition of groups with di¤erent vested interests against single rescue packages.
As the present crisis is still persisting and repercussions from the ongoing sovereign debt crisis
on bank failures are still possible, we do not choose the current crisis resolution as the main
subject matter for our present study; rather, we consider completed crisis resolution episodes
which, however, should also not date back too far in the past. We thus take the 1990s as our
preferred period of observation.
We chose Japan and the Nordic countries as the subject matters for the following rea-
sons: Firstly, both regions have su¤ered from the most serious nancial and economic crisis
experienced by advanced market economies since WWII. Secondly, economic crises in both
regions came after a period of nancial liberalization and happened within similar institutional
contexts with great a¢ nities to current circumstances; this allows us to transform some of the
lessons learnt from past episodes to the current crisis. Finally, policy reactions are evaluated
di¤erently in the literature. While Japan is typically regarded as an example of a failed banking
crisis resolution (Allen & Gale (1999); Kanaya & Woo (2000); Fujii & Kawai (2010); Hoshi &
Kashyap (2010)), crisis resolution in the Nordic countries is generally considered as successful,
in particular in Norway and (less) in Sweden and Finland (Ingves, Lind, Shirakawa, Caruana
& Martínez (2009); Jonung (2009)).
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6:2 reviews the literature on the e¤ects of banking
crisis resolutions on banksrisk-taking, on direct scal/social costs, and on the policy trade-
o¤s for politicians; moreover, it discloses restrictions which policy-makers face when resolving
banking crises. Section 6:3 turns to the two regions under consideration and asks why particular
instruments were taken and examines how political conicts shaped crises resolution processes.
Section 6:4 reassesses the crisis resolution packages applied during the recent nancial crisis
in light of the experience made in Japan and the Nordic countries during the 1990s. Section
1Since our main interest is in crisis reaction mechanisms (after the breakout of the crisis), we do
not discuss consequences for future crisis prevention; on this, see White (2008), Freixas (2010), Allen &
Carletti (2010); Cukierman (2011); Vollmer & Wiese (2013). Political measures for crisis prevention have
already been incorporated into the EU framework for bank recovery and resolution. See the proposal for
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).
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6:5 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Financial assistance, policy trade-o¤s and crisis
resolution obstacles
6.2.1 Taxonomy
As shown in Table 6.1, nancial assistance to troubled banks involves liquidity assistance by
a lender of last resort (LLR) or/and solvency assistance measures ("bank bail-outs") by an
owner of last resort (OLR). Liquidity assistance may be provided either by the central bank
(CB) or by a deposit insurer (DI). It usually means the provision of liquidity to a single nancial
institution ("emergency liquidity assistance"; ELA) or to the nancial market as a whole in
the form of monetary easing or credit easing.2 ELA could be provided at market interest rates
or above market rates. Solvency assistance is usually provided by the Ministry of Finance
(MoF) or, in exceptional cases, also by the CB. It includes instruments that either apply o¤
the balance sheets (like guarantees to unsecured depositors or bank guarantees) or alter the
banksbalance sheets. On-balance sheet instruments comprise a recapitalization through the
liability side of the balance sheet (issuance of new equity or debt conversion into equity) or
through the asset side of the banks balance sheet (purchases of non-performing loans or "toxic
assets" which are transferred to a bad bankor cash injection). Transfer of assets and/or
liabilities to a "bridge bank" may touch both sides of a troubled banks balance sheet.
The need for liquidity assistance results from the fact that banks are possibly subject to
a bank-run. Normally, interbank markets shield individual banks against idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks because they allow banks to outweigh their individiual liquidity decits and surpluses
(Bhattacharya & Gale (2011), Allen & Gale (2000)). During nancial crises, however, inter-
bank markets may fail and stop working smoothly because market participants perceive in-
creases in counterparty risks or liquidity risks (Freixas, Parigi & Rochet (2000), Eisenschmidt
& Tapking (2009), Heider, Hoerova & Holthausen (2010), Acharya & Skeie (2011), Vollmer
& Wiese (2014)). Moreover, strategic actions of surplus banks may also result in a failure
of interbank markets because banks with a liquidity surplus can benet from low prices of
assets which are re-saled by illiquid banks and thus avoid liquidity injection to illiquid banks
(Acharya, Gromb & Yorulmazer (2012)).
In contrast to the case for liquidity assistance, the case for public bank bailouts is less
clear-cut. Solvency payments are not necessary in a setup of Modigliani & Miller (1958),
and under the assumption that debt contracts can be renegotiated at any time because debt
can be transformed into equity at no cost and the probability of default almost becomes zero
(Landier & Ueda (2009); Dewatripont & Freixas (2011); Philippon & Schnabl (2013)). With
2Under monetary easing, the CB increases the size of its balance sheet and provides liquidity to the
markets above the benchmark allotment. Under credit easing, the CB alters the structure of its balance
sheet towards riskier/longer-term assets.
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Table 6.1: Forms of public nancial assistance to troubled banks
Liquidity assistance
to single banks (ELA) to the market
at market
interest
rate
at penalty rates monetary easing
credit
easing
Solvency assistance ("bank bailout")
o¤-balance sheet
through the
liability side
through the asset side
guarantees
to unsecured
depositors
bank
guarantees
new
equity
debt
conversion
into equity
asset
transfer to a
bad bank
cash
injection
asset and liability transfer to a bridge bank
informational asymmetries, however, the independence of the bank value from the structure
of the liability side of the banks balance sheet does not hold anymore; debt renegotiations
may also be impossible due to the dispersion and the large number of creditors (Gilson, John
& Lang (1990); Landier & Ueda (2009)). In consequence, a bank might become subject to
an insolvency shock, i.e. to the risk that capital bu¤ers are insu¢ cient to cover losses.
Private bailouts may form an alternative to the provision of public assistance to failed
banks, but may be feasible only when the number of insolvent institutions is not too large
(Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007)). Under private bailouts, costs are borne by private owners of
acquiring banks rather than by tax payers. Moreover, private bailouts may increase the value
of acquiring banks, which may, in general, induce banks to behave more prudently (Perotti &
Suarez (2002)). The drawback, however, is that bank acquisitions may reduce competition
on markets for banking services. The e¤ect of reduced competitiveness on risk-taking is
ambiguous because it may reduce funding costs, but also increase loan rates (Boyd & De
Nicoló (2005)). High loan rates increase the banksmargin and thus reduce their risk-taking,
but they also inuence bank customersrisk-taking and thus their probability of repayment
(Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2010)).
6.2.2 Liquidity provisions
Liquidity assistance to single banks reduces banksincentives to hold liquidity because such
liquidity support increases the resale value of assets (Acharya, Shin & Yorulmazer (2011)).
Concerning the provision of liquidity at or above market rates, Bagehot (1873) argued that
the Bank of England should lend against collateral any amount to an illiquid, but solvent
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institution only at a penalty rate.3 In that case, however, a bank may increase its risk-taking
because penalty rates decrease the banks margin and thus may create incentives to gamble
(Repullo (2005)). The inuence of penalty rates on banksrisk-taking may also depend on
whether the shocks hitting the banks are caused by the banks themselves. When the bank
managerse¤ort reduces the likelihood of large and intermediate shocks (that cause solvency
and illiquidity problems as well) penalty rates increase banksincentives to remain liquid. By
contrast, if the bank managerse¤ort only reduces the likelihood of large shocks, penalty rates
have a negative e¤ect on the bankse¤ort to remain liquid (Castiglionesi & Wagner (2012)).
Liquidity assistance to single banks may not only a¤ect banksrisk-taking behaviour but also
cause higher scal costs, in particular if the liquidity support to nancial institutions lasts a
longer period of time and thus becomes similar to solvency support (Honohan & Klingebiel
(2003)).
The impact of monetary and credit easing on risk-taking depends on the capital structure
and leverage of banks. With a xed capital structure, monetary easing increases risk-taking if
banks are highly capitalized; if their capitalization is small, banks reduce their risk-taking. The
reason for this is that monetary easing has two di¤erent e¤ects on the risk-taking of banks.
Firstly, monetary easing reduces the interest rate which, in turn, diminishes the banksreturn
on loans. This revenue e¤ect decreases the banksincentives to monitor their borrowers,
i.e. increases risk-taking. Secondly, monetary easing reduces the banksfunding costs which
prevents them from increasing their risk ("cost e¤ect"). In the case of a xed capital structure,
low capitalized banks lower their risk-taking if monetary easing is applied because the "cost
e¤ect" dominates the "revenue e¤ect". If the capital structure is not xed, monetary easing
increases banksrisk-taking. As monetary easing reduces a banks benet of a high capital
base, i.e. lower debt costs, banks lower their capital base. Banks with high leverage, however,
have lower incentives to survive, as they risk losing less (Laeven, DellAriccia & Marquez
(2010)).4
6.2.3 Bank bailouts
In the Modigliani-Miller setup, in particular under symmetric information, and under the as-
sumption that debt renegotiation is impossible, both on-balance sheet and o¤-balance sheet
interventions can increase a banks stability. In either case, however, the regulator has to
transfer assets to shareholders in order to make them willing to accept these measures. The
required compensation is higher in the case of subsidized asset sales than in the case of asset
guarantees and recapitalizations because debt recovery is higher, which in turn increases the
3For a review of the early literature on liquidity provision and bank risk-taking, see also Freixas,
Giannini, Hoggarth & Soussa (2000).
4For empirical evidence concerning the impact of short-term interest rates on banksrisk-taking in-
centives, see Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro & Saurina Salas (2009), Ioannidou, Ongena & Peydro (2009),
Altunbas, Gambacorta & Marqués-Ibáñez (2010) and De Nicolò, DellAriccia, Laeven & Valencia (2010).
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debt value more (Landier & Ueda (2009)).5 Philippon & Schnabl (2013) show that under sym-
metric information a share in a banks assets, the purchase of equity shares and the issuance
of debt guarantees lead to the same costs for the government.6
In the case of asymmetric information, i.e. outside the framework of Modigliani-Miller, o¤-
balance sheet interventions, such as blanket guarantees for the survival of banks, can have a
risk-reducing e¤ect, too, because a higher bailout probability increases a banks charter value,
which induces it to behave more prudently.7 This "value e¤ect" outweighs the "moral-hazard-
e¤ect" if the regulator can credibly commit himself to a policy which promises a bailout only
in times of macroeconomic distortions and a liquidation otherwise (Cordella & Yeyati (2003)).
Due to the fact that the occurence of these conditions is uncertain, such a bailout policy can
be considered as "constructive ambiguity".
Apart from guarantees for banks and their shareholders, a regulator may also guarantee
the payo¤ of unsecured depositors with two e¤ects on banksrisk-taking. Both result from
the fact that the guarantees for unsecured depositors decrease the risk premium banks have
to pay to their depositors. This, on the one hand, increases the banksnet prot and raises
the banks incentives to behave prudently ("margin e¤ect"). On the other hand, a lower
risk premium induces banks to increase their deposit volume. A higher deposit volume raises
deposit rates which, in turn, causes higher risk-taking ("volume e¤ect"). Whether the "margin
e¤ect" outweighs the "volume e¤ect" depends on the elasticity of deposit demand. If this
elasticity is large, a small increase in deposit rates sharply increases the deposit volume. Then
banks receive the deposits cheaply and the margin e¤ect dominates the volume e¤ect,
i.e. banks decrease their risk-taking. By contrast, if the elasticity of deposit demand is low,
banks have to o¤er "very" high deposit rates in order to increase their deposit volume. Then
the "volume e¤ect" dominates and banks increase their risk-taking.
Moreover, bank bailouts do not only a¤ect the risk-taking of the protected bank, but also
that of its competitors. Since bailout guarantees induce the secured bank to expand, aggregate
deposit rates increase. This, however, lowers the margins of the competitor banks and thus
induces them to increase the competitor banks risk level (Hakenes & Schnabel (2010); Gropp,
Hakenes & Schnabel (2011)). Even though the protection of banksdepositors and creditors
may decrease the risk-taking of the protected bank, it tends to increase scal costs of banking
crises (Honohan & Klingebiel (2003)). However, debt guarantees are in general less costly
than the injection of free cash because the government only pays out the insurance if the bank
defaults while under free cash injection, the government always pays out cash. Moreover, all
banks participate in the free cash injection, i.e. also healthy banks which do not all participate
5This arises from the fact that interventions, which reduce the probability of default, increase the
recovery value of debt. Since the bank value remains constant in the Modigliani-Miller setup, a higher
debt recovery involves a lower value for shareholders. Thus, they do not have incentives to agree with
these kinds of interventions unless they are compensated by a regulator, for example.
6Purchases of shares in a banks assets and purchases of equity shares di¤ers in such a way that the
latter provides a share in the banks assets and investment opportunities.
7In this framework, all depositors are secured by a deposit insurance. A bank bailout enables the bank
(the shareholders) to generate a charter value.
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in the debt guarantee program (Philippon & Schnabl (2013)).
Proceeding with on-balance sheet interventions, Berger, Bouwman, Kick & Schaeck (2012)
nd empirical evidence from the German banking sector that capital injections reduce the risk-
taking of the protected bank and its competitor bank in the short-run and in the long-run.
Di¤erentiating between common equity injection and preferred equity injection, Wilson & Wu
(2010) show that the former is at least as e¢ cient as the latter with regard to preventing
banks from gambling. However, capital injection through the purchase of preferred stocks
or the issuance of subordinated debt in exchange of warrants may limit the participation
by banks that do not require recapitalization. This is a key driver for the "fact" that the
purchase of equity shares leads to lower costs to the government than debt guarantees and
the purchase of shares of a banks assets. In the latter case, the costs to the government
are the highest (Philippon & Schnabl (2013)). Duchin & Sosyura (2013) provide empirical
evidence for the U.S. banks during the recent crisis that public recapitalization by the issuance
of preferred shares increased banksrisk-taking. Di¤erentiating between small and large banks,
Black & Hazelwood (2013) nd that the provision of capital for the U.S. banks during this
time increased the risk-taking of large banks, but decreased loan risk-taking of small banks.8
Recapitalizations, however, in particular repeated recapitalizations rather increase scal costs
of banking crises (Honohan & Klingebiel (2003)).
Debt conversion into equity may be an alternative to restructure the liability side of the
bank. Such contingent capital, however, raises incentives to take higher risks, especially in the
case of low equity capital (Pennacchi (2010)). Apart from contingent capital, banks can be
forced to issue subordinated debt. The impact of subordinated debt of banksrisk-taking is
ambiguous. Niu (2008) argues that it may reduce banksrisk-taking, while Pennacchi (2010)
shows that moral hazard may increase and even be higher than in the case of contingent
capital. However, in both cases, the burden of these debt transformations is not borne by
tax payers but by the banksformer debt holders and capital owners. Apart from forcing the
bank to convert debt into equity, the regulator can force a bank to issue equity if a pre-dened
solvency trigger level has been reached. This may encourage banks to remain solvent (Hart &
Zingales (2011)).
Besides recapitalization through the liability side, restructuring can also take place in the
form of cash injection or asset sales to the government (or private investors). The impact of
cash injections on banksrisk-taking may depend on whether the cash provision is unconditional
or not. Granting unconditional support, i.e. lump-sum transfers, does not increase banksrisk-
taking; however, it can be quite expensive for the government and tax-payers cannot participate
in future upside gains. By contrast, if these interventions are conditional on, e.g. the start of a
new business line, banks can externalise risks and this increases their risk appetite (Dietrich &
Hauck (2012)). As an alternative to cash injections, bank assets can be sold, for instance, to
8Duchin & Sosyura (2013) Black & Hazelwood (2013) analyse for the U.S. the relation between capital
injection and risk-taking in the course of the Troubled-Asset-Relief-Program (TARP). Initially, the TARP
was launched to purchase troubled assets in order to stabilize the U.S. nancial system. However, a short
time after, the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), as part of the TARP, was unveiled.
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private sector institutions. If this increases the acquiring banksmarket power, banks have an
incentive to remain solvent ex ante (Perotti & Suarez (2002)). The e¤ectiveness of asset sales
to prevent banks from risk-taking may even be higher than the issuance of preferred shares,
but lower than the issuance of common equity shares (Wilson & Wu (2010)). However, the
purchase of assets can be quite di¢ cult, as it is sometimes hard to evaluate these assets.
Instead of separating "bad assets", the regulator can assist the bank in separating "bad
liabilities" and transfer all of the assets as well as the senior liabilities to a new bridge bank
(Bulow & Klemperer (2009)). Since junior creditors and shareholders of the old bank bear all
of the losses, market discipline is ensured and moral hazard among shareholders is avoided.
The transfer of liabilities still opens the possibility of subsidizing junior debtholders in order to
avoid a run.
6.2.4 Crisis resolution obstacles
Di¤erent countries may choose di¤erent crisis resolution packages for two di¤erent reasons:
di¤erent political preferences with respect to the consequences of the packages (risk-taking;
scal costs; social costs) or di¤erent political and/or institutional restrictions. The chosen
rescue packages reect preferences only if the conditions of the political Coase theorem
(PCT, Acemoglu (2003)) are fullled. The PCT follows the idea of the original Coase theorem,
which states that, as long as property rights are well-dened and there are no transaction costs,
economic agents will conclude contracts with e¢ cient outcomes, regardless of the distribution
of property rights. Acemoglu (2003) extends this idea from the market sphere to the political
sphere and describes the PCT as the idea that political and economic transactions create a
tendency towards policies and institutions that achieve the best outcomes given the various
needs and requirements of societies, irrespective of who, or which social group, has political
power.He confronts this idea with theories of social conict according to which societies
choose di¤erent policies because of decisions made by powerful social groups that are interested
in maximizing their own payo¤s, not social welfare.9
Underlying the political Coase theorem are the assumptions that (i.) the rights to make
political decisions are well-allocated, that (ii.) transaction costs are low, and that (iii.) con-
tracts between political actors are enforceable and not disturbed by a political commitment
problem. If these conditions are not fullled, policies chosen will neither represent voters
preferences nor maximize social welfare, but reect the preferences of politicians or politically
powerful social groups. Among these assumptions, the absence of enforcement problems and
of political commitment problems is of special importance, because contracts that the state
would like to write with others will not be enforceable by denition. Since the state can always
9Acemoglu (2003) applies PCT to policies as well as institutions, i.e. to the choices made within a
given framework and to the choice of the framework itself. Since institutions change only gradually, we
restrict ourselves to the choice of policies. Moreover, Acemoglu (2003) also considers a modied PCT
according to which societies choose di¤erent policies because of di¤erent choices made by leaders taken
under uncertainty.
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use its powers to renege on the contract and cannot commit itself to keep to the terms of
contract, the potential to reach e¢ cient outcomes is undermined.
The di¤erence between preferences and political/institutional restrictions is not always
clear-cut, but time-dependent. A factor which constitutes a restriction to the availability of
a crisis resolution measure in the short-run may form the result of a political preference in
the long-run. A case in point is an exchange rate peg which limits the CBs ability to change
interest rates in reaction to a nancial crisis or forces the domestic authorities to subsidize
foreign bank creditors by declaring blanket guarantees on deposits. However, taking a broader
time-horizon into account, the currency peg is the outcome of political preferences. Henceforth,
we consider political and institutional obstacles in the point of time when resolution decisions
have to be implemented.
In the case of banking crisis resolution, the following constraints may in particular shape
the choice of the resolution package:
 Suboptimal allocations of responsibilities between institutions which may either act as
an LLR or as an OLR, such as the CB, on the one hand, and the deposit insurer (or the
Ministry of Finance), on the other hand: In case of a liquidity shock, the allocation of LLR
responsibilities matters, as both types of institutions may react di¤erently to a banks
liquidity needs because they pursue di¤erent goals. As long as liquidity assistance is not
allocated ex ante between both types of institutions, discretionary and non-coordinated
liquidity assistance may result in the LLR being either too strict or too soft, i.e.
refusing liquidity assistance when it should be provided or providing liquidity assistance
when it should be refused (Repullo (2000); Kahn & Santos (2005); Hauck & Vollmer
(2013)).
 Transaction costs may complicate the assignment of single crisis resolution instruments,
such as bank resolutions and bank nationalizations. Without a complete description
of a banks nancial and non-nancial activities in normal times and in crisis scenarios
(living wills), it may be very di¢ cult for authorities to accurately value the assets of
complex and large banking rms. Consequently, the transfer of assets to a bad bank
or a bridge bank may be impossible and the authorities thus have no other choice but
to support such a bank under nancial pressure. In addition, information costs make it
di¢ cult to di¤erentiate between solvent and insolvent institutions, especially in a short
period of time (Goodhart (1999)). Finally, if a bank defaults, nancial assistance by
the Ministry of Finance or a deposit insurer may be di¢ cult to organize at short notice
because they usually lack funds. In contrast, liquidity provision by the central bank is
relatively easy to get, even if this means that the CB takes over additional risks on its
balance sheet.
 Commitment problems arise for authorities providing liquidity assistance or/and equity
capital as well. In the case of an LLR, providing liquidity only at a penalty rate, i.e. at
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an interest rate higher than the market rate, may be time inconsistent if it aggravates
the banks solvency problem. It may also send signals to the market participants that
the bank is in trouble; fears of stigmatization make banks reluctant to apply for funds
because they fear to be singled out as a weak institution (Dewatripont, Rochet & Tirole
(2010)). Commitment problems also exist in the case of liquidity provision to the market.
If the CB can commit itself ex ante not to lower interest rates ex post, banks are deterred
from investing in risky assets, as they anticipate not to be bailed out by low interest
rates. By contrast, if the CB cannot make such commitments, banks expect to be bailed
out by low interest rates, which induces them to invest in risky assets. Consequently,
many banks will be distressed ex post and the CB nds it optimal to bail them out
by lowering interest rates (Farhi & Tirole (2009)). Finally, commitment problems can
also exist for an authority deciding to resolve an insolvent institution. The authoritys
announcement to close a bank may lose credibility if the bank is too large (too big to
fail), the number of bank failures is large (too many to fail), or if the failing banks
have become too complicated to be resolved (too complicated to fail). In all cases,
the regulator may nd it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks if bailout
costs are smaller than social costs caused by liquidation (Mailath & Mester (1994);
Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007); Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008); DeYoung, Kowalik &
Reidhill (2013)).
Under these conditions, policy makers might be forced to apply inferior crisis resolution
packages which do not perfectly match with voterspreferences. The task of the following
section is to identify the forces that prevent an e¢ cient choice of policies and to reveal those
variables which hinder societies from implementing an e¢ cient banking crisis resolution scheme.
As mentioned in the introduction, we take Japan and the Nordic countries during the 1990s
as two natural experiments.
6.3 Banking crisis resolution in Japan and the Nordic
countries
6.3.1 Japan
Before the breakout of the crisis, nancial markets in Japan were heavily regulated by the
MoF and closely surveyed by the Bank of Japan (BoJ).10 Due to interest rate caps, portfolio
regulations, and capital controls, competition in the banking sector was limited and security
markets were underdeveloped (Takeda & Turner (1992); Ueda (1994)). Financial deregulation
in Japan started during the 1970s due to international pressures and to growing public sector
10For thorough surveys of banking regulations and the political reactions to the nancial crisis in Japan,
see Nakaso (2001); Fukao (2000); Fukao (2003); Bebenroth, Dietrich & Vollmer (2009); Hoshi & Kashyap
(2000) Hoshi & Kashyap (2010). The appendix provides an overview of the main interventions.
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budget decits after the second oil shock. Financial sector reforms were accompanied by
monetary easing by the BoJ, which decreased interest rates to avoid an appreciation of the
Yen against the Dollar (Yoshino (1996); Nakaso (2001); Takeda & Turner (1992)). Banks
reacted to nancial deregulation and monetary easing by lending an increasing fraction of their
assets to small- and medium-sized rms and to the real estate sector as well, which increased
banksrisk level (Hoshi & Kashyap (2000)). In consequence, real estate prices started to rise
until the early 1980s, when the BoJ tightened monetary policy. This caused a decrease in
lending growth and a drop in asset prices and hence in the collateral value of loans (Takeda
& Turner (1992); Fukao (2000); Fukao (2003)).
In 1991, the Japanese banking sector experienced sporadic failures of smaller institutions,
which were initially regarded as rather isolated events. Public intervention became necessary,
however, when two urban deposit-taking institutions, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen, failed
in December 1994. Because of fears of contagion, authorities refused to apply a haircut on
deposits, which was mandatory due to a payo¤ cost limit set by law.11 They, instead,
decided to provide nancial assistance and to cover all accumulated losses. A bad bank
scheme was introduced and assets and liabilities of the two failed institutions were transferred
to Tokyo Kyoudou Bank (TKB), a new bank jointly established and recapitalized by the
BoJ with participation of almost all private nancial institutions.12 The former shareholders
of the failing banks were squeezed out and the management was removed in order to prevent
moral hazard (Nakaso (2001)).
In July 1995, three medium-sized banks, Cosmo Credit Cooperative, Hyogo Bankand
Kizu Credit Cooperative, failed. In the case of Cosmoand "Hyogo" assets and deposits
were transferred to TKB and Midori Bank, respectively, and both banks were dissolved. In the
interim period both banks received liquidity assistance in order to be able to continue their
daily business. In the case of Kizu Credit Cooperative, private institutions refused to provide
nancial support because they feared that a series of nancial contributions would erode their
own nancial soundness. Instead, they urged a reform of the Deposit Insurance Law and a
lifting of the payo¤ cost limit, which was abandoned in 1996. In addition, the risk premium
for the deposit insurance fee was increased and the Tokyo Kyodou Bank was reorganized into
the Resolution and Collection Bank (RCB; later: Resolution and Collection Corporation
RCC). It received the role of a bank of last resort, being able to absorb non-performing
loans or even the whole business of failed institutions (Nakaso (2001)).
In early 1997, the Japanese banking crisis became more severe with the bankruptcy of
the rst major city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and the nancial distress of Nippon
Credit Bank (NCB), one out of three long-term credit banks in Japan (Hoshi & Kashyap
11The payo¤ cost limit was a limit to the amount of nancial assistance the Japanese Deposit Insurance
Company (DIC) could legally o¤er in any single case. It was dened as the insured deposits times the
loss ratio where the loss ratio was the part of liabilities which was not covered by sound assets (Nakaso
(2001)).
12Participation by private institutions was voluntary. According to article 25 of the Bank of Japan
Law, the BoJ was authorized to provide liquidity support and to inject risk capital into distressed banks
as well (Nakaso (2001)).
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(2010)). Both institutions su¤ered from solvency problems and needed capital injections in
excess of the nancial capacity of the DIC. In the case of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the
MoF rst organized a private sector solution and asked large shareholders (mainly insurance
companies) and the Industrial Bank of Japan as well as the Long Term Credit Bank of
Japanfor capital injections. Since this rescue plan turned out to be infeasible, related nancial
institutions and the BoJ injected new equity capital in the form of preferred shares which could
be converted into common shares (Hoshi & Kashyap (2010)). Hokkaido Takushoku Bank
was nally merged with Hokkaido Bankand with Chuo Trust and Banking Company, and
in the interim period the BoJ provided liquidity assistance to outweigh deposit withdrawals.
A private sector solution was also tried. It was to be implemented for NCB, but it soon
turned out that the nancial contributions given by large banks and other related parties were
too small to provide a solid capital basis for NCB. The BoJ had to inject additional funds
(in the form of preferred stocks) into NCB. Although NCB was at rst saved, its asset value
deteriorated quickly and the bank was nationalized in December 1998, after the capital, which
had already been injected, was completely lost (Nakaso (2001)).
In early November 1997, Sanyo Securities, a medium-sized security house, failed and sus-
pended its business. The BoJ did not provide bilateral nancial assistance because Sanyo
did not take deposits or o¤er settlement services to non-banks and was not regarded as being
systemic. However, Sanyo was a borrower on the interbank market and the BoJ under-
estimated the increase in risk sensitivities following from the default on unsecured interbank
markets. Interest rates on unsecured interbank loans increased substantially, and in late No-
vember 1997, the BoJ massively injected liquidity into the markets. At that time, Yamaichi
Securities, one of the largest Japanese security trading companies, failed and the BoJ now
provided individual liquidity support in order to allow Yamaichito continue its business and
to settle all existing contacts. Such an orderly wind-down was executed to avoid a negative
spillover to the banking sector and a breakdown of the interbank market (Nakaso (2001)).
By the end of 1997, more bank failures were announced, among them the failure of Tokyo
City Bank, a regional bank based in Sendai. Although Tokyowas not regarded as systemic,
its failure destroyed depositorstrust mainly in other regional banks, and depositors started
to queue in front of them. To prevent bank runs and contagion, the BoJ declared a blanket
guarantee on all deposits (including interbank deposits) and the government decided to use
public funds to stabilize the nancial system. In February 1998, the Financial Function
Stabilization Actwas passed, which allowed the government not only to pay out depositors
but also to recapitalize banks. A newly created Financial Crisis Management Committee
became responsible for selecting eligible banks. In March 1998, all major banks conjointly
applied for public capital, but asked for only very small amounts, which was mainly provided
in the form of subordinated loans and bonds, and most of the money was left unused (Fukao
(2000); Fukao (2003); Nakaso (2001); Hoshi & Kashyap (2010)).
In mid-1998, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) collapsed. This bank had
provided a variety of nancial services and hence was of systemic importance. The BoJ did not
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provide liquidity as an LLR because it feared that this would have a negative "announcement
e¤ect", cutting o¤LTCBs access to interbank loans. In order to attain an orderly wind-down of
LTCB, the Financial Reconstruction Lawwas passed in October 1998 by the National Diet,
which enabled the temporary nationalization of insolvent deposit nancial institutions. On this
basis, the LTCB was nationalized and later sold to private investors; business operations of the
bank continued and all existing payment obligations were honoured. The bank management
was replaced and existing shareholders had to cover losses (Fukao (2000); Nakaso (2001)).
Furthermore, the newly created Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) took over super-
visory powers from the MoF in June 1998. The FSA became subordinated to the Financial
Reconstruction Commission (as the successor of the former Financial Crisis Management
Committee) which now had the authority to inspect and supervise banks and to use infor-
mation gathered by FSA. The newly enacted Financial Function Early Strengthening Law
allowed the Financial Reconstruction Commission to recapitalize solvent banks which had lost
condence of investors and depositors and were facing di¢ culties in raising capital in the
market on their own (Fukao (2000)). The amount available for bank recapitalizations was
considerably enlarged and was considered to be large enough to leave banks with su¢ ciently
high capital ratios even after non-realized losses had been deduced. The RCC also obtained
the capacity to buy bad loans not only from failed banks, but also from those which were still
solvent (Nakaso (2001)).
In order to restore condence in the nancial system, the government purchased mostly
convertible preferred shares and subordinated debt in 1999. These capital injections were
used by almost all banks. Banks which received public capital had to submit "management
improvement plans" on how to improve protability (Nakaso (2001)). The recapitalization
in 1999 stabilized the nancial markets, though the problem of non-performing loans and
the undercapitalization persisted (Hoshi & Kashyap (2010)). However, as noted by Hoshi &
Kashyap (2010), the nature of non-performing loans has changed since 2000. While during
the 1990s banks herded by collectively lending to the real estate sector, lending to small and
medium-sized enterprises became particularly important after 2000. Banks tended to overstate
the quality of their loan portfolios, which were in large parts non-performing. Instead of writing
o¤ their book values or providing adequate provisions, banks tended to extend their loans to
insolvent borrowers in order to conceal their losses from outsiders. Banks, in fact, pursued
zombie lendingor evergreeningin order to hold down risk premiums for interbank lending
and to retain access to interbank markets. They kept alive enterprises and thus contributed to
the bad growth record of the Japanese economy during the next decade (Peek & Rosengren
(2005); Caballero, Hoshi & Kashyap (2008)).
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6.3.2 Nordic countries
Similar to Japan, nancial markets in the Nordic countries were heavily regulated before the
outbreak of the crisis.13 Bank credit ows were controlled and there was a cap on interest
rates for bank loans (Vale (2004); Englund & Vihriälä (2009)). Banks focused on capturing
market shares mainly by expanding in new geographical areas. In particular, in Norway, the
banks focused on lending into the oil-related business and were severely hit by the drop of
the oil price in 1985, which changed the economic environment. The oil price decline stopped
the boom period, and the Norwegian current account changed from a surplus into a decit,
putting pressure on the Norwegian Krone (Knutsen & Lie (2002); Vale (2004)). Interest rate
increases, following the German reunication, enforced an economic downturn in all three
Nordic countries. In addition, Finland also su¤ered from the collapse of the Soviet Union,
which turned down Finnish trade (Jonung et al. (2008)).
Norway
The Norwegian banking crisis began, one year before the crises in Sweden and Finland, with
the failure of a medium-sized commercial bank in 1988. Until 1990, 13 small and medium-
sized regional banks also failed, but they were too small to worry about systemic risks (Vale
(2004)). Apart from liquidity support by the Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank),
bailouts by mergers and acquisitions of larger solvent banks were su¢ cient to avoid a collapse
of the banking system (Sandal (2004)). Acquisitions were supported by the banking industries
private guarantee funds, the Commercial BanksGuarantee Fund(CBGF) and the Savings
Banks Guarantee Funds (SBGF).14 These funds paid out deposits, but also issued loan
guarantees against other liabilities of the failed bank in order to make a takeover attractive
for an acquiring bank (Vale (2004); Wilse (2004)).
The private sector solution reached its limits at the end of 1990, when the crisis hit the
larger banks and both private guarantee funds were neither able to inject enough capital nor
to assure repayments of deposits in case of bank failure (Sandal (2004)). As private investors
became reluctant to provide nancial assistance (Vale (2004)), two government-sponsored
guarantee funds, the Government Bank Insurance Fund(GBIF) and the Government Bank
Investment Fund(GBF), were established in March 1991 in order to guarantee deposits and
to inject capital into banks.
The GBIF at rst extended loans to the two private guarantee funds (which invested
equity capital into ailing banks); after October 1991, the GBIF directly injected capital into
distressed banks under conditions, such as writing o¤ of shareholder value, replacement of
the management and restrictions on bank activities (Vale (2004); Sandal (2004)). These
13For surveys of the deregulation and crisis period in the Nordic countries, see Englund & Vihriälä
(2009); Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995); Jonung, Kiander & Vartia (2008); Vale (2004). See also the
appendix.
14Although both funds were not state-funded, representatives from the Banking, Insurance and Secu-
rities Commission (BISC)and from the Norges Bank were members of their boards.
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obligations were supposed to induce the banksmanagements to search for alternative solutions
before demanding public support and to avoid creating competitive advantages for rescued
banks (Sandal (2004)).
The GBF ought to aid banks which were still solvent and which were not yet in trouble,
but had di¢ culties in attracting private investors on their own; the GBF could only inject
capital conjointly with private investors (Sandal (2004); Wilse (2004)). An amendment of the
Commercial Banking Act enabled the government to write o¤ shares of old shareholders
against losses in order to make sure that they bore the losses before public interventions
became necessary. The responsibilities allocated to the public funds and the Norges Bank
were clear-cut. Both the GBIF and the GBF acted as OLRs; in addition, the central bank
acted as LLR for individual banks with liquidity problems (Sandal (2004)).
In 1991, two more systemically relevant banks, Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank,
failed, and the crisis in Norway became systemic. In reaction, the public GBIF and the private
CBGF injected capital (in the form of preference shares) into the distressed banks. The
Norwegian government exercised its right to write o¤ the old shares to zero before injecting
fresh capital. Moreover, in 1991 and 1992 the GBIF also provided preference capital for the
largest commercial bank, Den norske Bank, before injecting ordinary share capital in 1993.
Board members and members of the top management were replaced. In 1992, further loans
were granted from GBIF to the SBGF, which in turn injected share capital into two banks,
Sparebanken Rogalandand Sparebanken Midtnorge(Wilse (2004)).
At the end of 1992, Norway de-pegged the krone (against the ECU), enabling the central
bank to reduce interest rates. The peg of the krone against the ECU made the decrease
of interest rates impossible. Consequently, the banking sector recovered quickly due to the
improved performance of the economy; lower interest rates increased the collateral value of
bankscustomers and decreased their default rate (Wilse (2004)). In 1993, Christiania Bank
managed to increase its capital and to attract private investors, but the government remained
a shareholder (through the GBF) until 2000 (Wilse (2004)). Also in 1993, the GBIF converted
its preferred capital shares of Den norske Bankinto ordinary shares, which were partly sold at
the beginning of 1994. The GBIF sold its remaining shares of Den norske Bankin 2001 (but
the government remained the largest shareholder). The remaining shares of Fokus Bankand
Christiania Bankwere sold in 1995. The government-owned banks can be seen as "bridge
banks" between the failed institutions and the privatizations (Vale (2004)). However, as only
the shareholder structure of these banks changed, these were not bridge banks in the strict
sense that liabilities and assets were transferred to another bank.
The quick and extensive policy reactions by Norwegian authorities managed to overcome
the crisis swiftly and enabled the largest banks to keep operating in the international markets
(Allen & Gale (1999)). Commercial and savings banks regained protability in 1993 (Vale
(2004)).
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Sweden
At the end of 1991, two out of six major Swedish banks, Första Sparbanken and Nord-
banken, incurred large loan losses. While in the case of the state-owned bank "Nordbanken"
the government injected new equity, the state provided loan guarantees for "Första Spare-
banken" (Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995); Sandal (2004)). However, at the beginning of 1992,
this support turned out to be insu¢ cient and the government bought all outstanding shares of
"Nordbanken" and transferred the non-performing loans to a bad bank. In order to stabilize
these institutions, both banks were supported by equity capital issued by the state (Drees &
Pazarbasioglu (1995)). The state-ownership may have been one reason for the subsidy passed
to private minority shareholders who received a higher price for their shares than the market
price (Sandal (2004); Englund & Vihriälä (2009)). In 1992, Gota Bank, another major
Swedish bank, revealed solvency problems. The problems were solved in the same way as in
the case of "Nordbanken". The "bad assets" were sold to another bad bank, whereas the
performing assets were left in the "Gota Bank". Moreover, both the bad bank and the healthy
part of "Gota Bank" received further capital from the state (Sandal (2004)).
When macroeconomic distortions became larger in autumn 1992, the crisis was treated
as a systemic crisis. Ad hoc measures were not regarded as suitable interventions to restore
stability of the banking sector (Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995); Sandal (2004)). Moreover,
condence in the Swedish nancial system was low. This caused a large outow of foreign
funds on which the Swedish economy heavily relied. To restore condence, a blanket guarantee
by the government was announced which protected all bank creditors (Ingves & Lind (1996);
Englund (1999)). In order to avoid a conict of interest, rescue operations were assigned
to a newly created Bank Support Authority (BSA), which received an open-ended funding
(Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995); Ingves & Lind (1996); Jonung (2009)). The authority was
established to provide and to coordinate public support for the ailing banks.15
In order to increase the e¢ ciency of support, banks were assigned to one of three categories
(Ingves & Lind (1996). Banks in the rst category institutions with capital (at least slightly)
above the minimum threshold of eight per cent  were encouraged to nd a solution from
the private sector to ensure solvency, and the BSA was to assist by temporarily providing
guarantees. The second category consisted of banks which temporarily breached the capital
requirements, but which might be able to meet these requirements in the long run. The BSA
was prepared to inject capital into these banks or provide loans if private sector solutions were
impossible. Banks from the third category were not able to fulll capital requirements in the
long run. These banks were to be either liquidated or merged or their assets sold to bad
banks.
Apart from "Gota Bank" and "Nordbanken", other banks, such as the largest Swedish
banks, "S-E-Banken", "Swedbanken", "Foreningsbanken" and "Sparbanken Sverige", applied
15Its funding was open-ended to avoid political misgivings about the commitment to support the
banking system (Jonung (2009)).
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for capital support (Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995)). However, a few months later, "Swed-
banken" and "S-E-Banken" did not have to rely further on the support by the BSA, as their
owners injected further capital (Ingves & Lind (1996)). The major part of the capital support
was provided to the rst two banks (Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995); Sandal (2004)). In 1993,
"Gota Bank" was taken over by the state-owned bank "Nordbanken" (Sandal (2004)).16
The central bank, Riksbanken, used a large share of its foreign currency reserves as liquidity
support through currency deposits in the banks. Moreover, banks could borrow Swedish krona
freely without security in Riksbankens normal liquidity system (due to the government blanket
creditor guarantee, Riksbanken faced no credit risk). These measures resolved the immediate
liquidity problems (Sandal (2004)).
The improvement of the banksnancial position went in line with the overall macroeco-
nomic recovery. The depreciation of the Swedish currency, the decrease of interest rates and
the reduction of government decit supported the banks recovery process (Ingves & Lind
(1996)). Public measures were supported throughout all political parties, which contributed
to the credibility of the rescue programme and enabled the government to take actions imme-
diately (Sandal (2004); Jonung (2009)).
Finland
The Finnish banking crisis began in 1991 when Skopbank, a central institution mutually
owned by the Finnish savings banks, could not meet the goals of the restructuring programme
which had already begun at the end of the 1980s when the bank had been put under special
and strict surveillance by the Bank of Finland and the Banking Supervision O¢ ce (Nyberg
& Vihriälä (1994); Englund & Vihriälä (2009)). Skopbank was taken over by the Bank of
Finland, which initially acted as an OLR because of the lack of alternative resources (Sandal
(2004); Honkapohja (2009)); the bank was restructured by the setup of three companies which
managed substantial portions of the assets of the bank. The board members of Skopbank
were, to a large extent, replaced (Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994)).
In 1992, the state-funded Government Guarantee Fund(GGF) was founded. It assumed
the role of an OLR and allowed the central bank to concentrate on the LLR function. The
aim was to ensure the stability of the banking system and to secure claims of domestic and
foreign depositors. In contrast to the Swedish BSA, funds available for GGF were limited and
increases in the allocation of funds had to be approved by the Finnish Parliament. The GGF
could support nancial institutions directly by issuing guarantees or by injecting capital into
banks or indirectly through the already existing security funds of the various banking groups.
However, distortionary e¤ects on competition had to be avoided (Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994)).
At the beginning of 1992, the GGF o¤ered equity capital (preferred capital certicates) to
all deposit banks, regardless of their solvency, but in relation to their risk-weighted assets. For
16Later, these banks as well as "Merita Bank", "Unidanmark" and "Christiania Bank" formed the
"Nordea banking group", the largest in Scandinavia (Englund & Vihriälä (2009)).
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the rst three years, banks had to pay interest on these certicates slightly above the market
rate. Thereafter, the di¤erential increased. The government had the right to convert these
certicates into ordinary shares once the bank failed to full its interest payments or the its
equity ratio fell below a required threshold. Almost all banks made use of this o¤er (Nyberg
& Vihriälä (1994)).
Furthermore, the GGF supported a merger of 41 distressed banks which formed the Sav-
ings Bank of Finland(SBF) and which received several capital injections until 1996 (Englund
& Vihriälä (2009); Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994)). The merger and a stringent restructuring
programme were the preconditions for the support by the GGF. This was adjudged to be the
unique solution, as several savings banks had come into nancial distress because of their
common responsibility for each others solvency and due to the fact that shares in Skopbank
comprised a large part of their assets (Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994)). The government intervened
further into the banking sector when in 1992 it took over a large part of the "toxic assets" of
a small commercial bank (STS-Bank) which had been acquired by one of the largest banks
Kansallis-Osake-Pankii (KOP).
In early 1993, the government announced a blanket guarantee for all liabilities of Finnish
deposit banks and in mid 1993 the GGF guaranteed for the Tier-2-capital as well as for
interest payments of the two major commercial banks, "KOP" and "Suomen Yhdyspankki"
(SYP) (Englund & Vihriälä (2009)). However, only bank creditors and not bank equity holders
were protected (Sandal (2004)). In addition, non-performing or defaulting loans from several
banks, e.g. "Skopbank", "STS-Bank" and "SBF", were transferred to a newly established
state-owned bank (Asset Management Corporation Arsenal; Englund & Vihriälä (2009);
Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994)).
Similar to the developments in Sweden, the depreciation of the Finnish currency and the
reduction of interest rates in 1993 and 1994 supported the export market and increased share
prices. The banking sector improved in both of these years as well as in the years that followed,
though the non-performing loans were still responsible for the non-protability in 1993, despite
the decrease of interest rates. The situation remained critical, especially in the case of "SBF"
and "Skopbank" (Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994); Drees & Pazarbasioglu (1995)). However, the
reduction of the number of assets through several mergers increased the e¢ ciency of the
Finnish banking sector and contributed to the return of protability in the banking sector in
the mid 1990s. "STS-Bank" was merged with "KOP", which itself became part of the merger
with "SYP" in 1995. The new bank, "Merita Bank", became part of the "Nordea Bank". The
performing parts of the "SBF" were merged with other commercial bank cooperative banks
as well as the state-owned Post-O¢ ce-Bank (Honkapohja (2009)).17
17The appendix provides an overview of similarities and di¤erences in crisis resolution between Japan,
Norway, Sweden and Finland.
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6.3.3 Determinants of crisis resolution paths
As mentioned above, political preferences as well as coordination failures may shape a countrys
crisis resolution package. Political preferences were important in all four countries, but their
e¤ects on the crisis resolution di¤ered in each country. In Japan public opinion initially heavily
opposed injections of tax payersmoney into ailing banks. This became almost a political
taboo(Nakaso (2001)). Such opposition was much weaker in the Nordic countries, especially
in Norway and Sweden, due to a long history of partnership between the public sector and the
private sector (Sandal (2004); Englund & Vihriälä (2009); Jonung (2009); Eckbo (2010)).
Although authorities in the Nordic countries were less reluctant to provide public funds
to the ailing banks, they initially shared with Japan the focus on private sector solution.
These attempts to support private mergers and acquisitions may have resulted from the fact
that the authorities tried to avoid moral hazard among banks, as private solutions tend to
have a stabilizing e¤ect (Perotti & Suarez (2002); Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007); Acharya
& Yorulmazer (2008)). However, private sector solutions became infeasible, either because
the amounts needed were too large or because the acquiring banks did not participate. They
feared getting into di¢ culties themselves.
Once private sector solutions became impossible, two types of public interventions re-
mained: liquidation or provision of nancial support to ailing banks. Authorities in all four
countries chose the latter possibility and provided liquidity as well as solvency assistance. Liq-
uidity support was provided to individual banks and to the market in all four countries. While
the BoJ immediately provided liquidity to the market at low interest rates, the CBs in the
Nordic countries were not able to change their domestic interest rates before de-pegging their
currencies. Whether the decrease of interest rates by the BoJ was an advantage over the
CBs in the Nordic countries remains doubtful because lower interest rates may support the
recovery process, but may also encourage the risk-taking incentives of banks. Due to the peg
of the currencies, the commitment not to lower interest rates and to bail banks out may have
been more credible in the Nordic countries than in Japan and may have prevented banks from
gambling (Farhi & Tirole (2009)). In Japan such a commitment was not feasible.
Apart from liquidity assistance, banks in all four countries received solvency assistance.
This way, authorities accepted moral hazard among creditors because the social costs of sys-
temic crisis were regarded as being larger than the costs of additional risk-taking by the banks.
As a consequence, bank resolutions under ordinary insolvency laws were not applied to prevent
systemic e¤ects, despite the fact that this may have created the least moral hazard, at least in
case of low solvency shocks (because senior management would lose their jobs, shareholders
would lose their equity holdings and creditors including depositors would be subject to a hair-
cut). Rather, an approach outside the legal framework of existing insolvency laws was applied
which fully protected creditors. To reduce moral hazard on the side of bank management and
shareholders, the senior management in all four countries was often replaced and shareholders
capital was used to cover bank losses, but additional public funds were injected into ailing
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banks in order to prevent a haircut on creditorsclaims. Thus, moral hazard was contained
only on the sides of management and shareholders, but not on the side of creditors who were
not required to take responsibility for bank failure (Nakaso (2001); Sandal (2004)).
Political preferences shaped the way ailing banks were targeted. Authorities in all four
countries provided solvency assistance through the liability side of the banksbalance sheets
and injected capital into banks, mostly in the form of preferred shares and subordinated debt.
While the impact of recapitalizations on risk-taking is ambiguous, they allow for participating
preferences in upside gains. Yet, authorities had to recapitalize not only insolvent banks, but
also solvent institutions, as became obvious from the aborted attempt to recapitalize insolvent
Japanese banks in February 1998. It failed because banks with nancial di¢ culties hesitated to
apply for nancial assistance in order not to be singled out as a bank with nancial di¢ culties.
Instead, they tried to hide their non-performing loans (NPLs) on their balance sheet from
supervisors (Hoshi & Kashyap (2010)). Japanese banks had little incentives to remove NPLs
from their balance sheets because the opportunity costs of holding them were low, due to
the loose monetary policy of the Bank of Japan and to extremely low interest rates (Nakaso
(2001)). To prevent such negative incentive e¤ects, regulators had to o¤er nancial assistance
across the board, which made crisis resolution more costly for tax payers, especially in Japan,
where the number of banks was large.
In addition to recapitalizations, authorities in Japan, Sweden and Finland initially also used
a bad bank scheme, but rather in a piecemeal fashion. This was due to the fact that the
transfer of assets from an ailing bank to another institution was connected with several legal
and economic problems, such as the setting of transfer prices and the withdrawal of experts
from the distressed banks (Vale (2004)). Sweden, Finland and Japan also announced a blanket
guarantee for bank creditors (Sandal (2004); Jonung (2009)). However, as mentioned above,
the impact of equity injections and bank guarantees is not clear-cut (Hakenes & Schnabel
(2010)).
Apart from political preferences, it were also transaction costs, misallocations of political
responsibilities and coordination failures within the political sectors which shaped the course
of banking crisis resolution paths, especially in Japan. After the breakout of the crisis, the
Bank of Japan had to act not only as an LLR, but also as an OLR. This was due to the fact
that a public recapitalization fund was not available and the payo¤ cost limitprohibited the
Japanese Deposit Insurance Company (DIC) to provide liquidity assistance to ailing banks.
This contrasted with Norway and Sweden where public funds were quickly established and
allowed authorities to recapitalize ailing banks without taking recourse to the CBs.
In Japan, it took several years to implement major legislative reforms to remove the payo¤
cost limit (in 1996) and to permit recapitalizations of nationalized banks (in 1998). In the
meantime, the Bank of Japan was forced to take considerable risks on their balance sheets and
even, as in case of the bailout of Nippon Credit Bank, to incur painful capital losses. Such
losses helped to protect bank creditors and to prevent systemic e¤ects, but at the same time
undermined public condence in the BoJ and in the stability of the nancial system. The Bank
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of Japan was heavily criticized on these grounds in the Japanese public and in the National
Parliament (Nakaso (2001)).
Suboptimal allocations of responsibilities between regulatory authorities further aggravated
the crisis in Japan when the two securities houses Sanyo and Yamaichi ailed in autumn
1997. Although security houses acted as participants in the interbank markets, their liabilities
to counterparties were not covered by the Deposit Insurance Corporation. The BoJ refused
to provide liquidity support to Sanyo because it was legally impossible to use the deposit
insurance fund to co-insure the BoJ against potential credit losses. The BoJ tried to negotiate
an agreement with the MoF on this matter, but this needed approval from the National
Parliament. Such an agreement was reached only very shortly before the possible failure
of Yamaichi Securities, which eventually received liquidity support from the BoJ (Nakaso
(2001)).
The resolution packages in Japan and the Nordic countries caused di¤erent scal and social
costs. For Japan, gross scal costs are estimated between 14 % and more than 20 % of GDP
and output losses amounted to 45 % of GDP. Public debt increased by 41.7 % of GDP. For
Finland, gross scal costs are estimated between 8.9 % or 12.8 % of GDP. Output loss reached
69.6 % of GDP. Public debt increased by 43.6 % of GDP. These numbers are much higher
than for Norway and Sweden. For Norway, gross scal costs are estimated between 2.0 % and
8.0 % of GDP. Estimated output losses reach 5.1 % of GDP and public debt increased by 19.2
%. For Sweden, gross scal costs amounted between 3.6 % and 4.0 % of GDP and output
losses reached 32.9 % of GDP. Public debt increased by 36.2 % of GDP (all numbers are from
Sandal (2004); Laeven & Valencia (2012); Honohan & Klingebiel (2003)).
6.4 Reassessment of current crisis resolution proce-
dures
Although the crises in Japan and in the Nordic countries were rather local events and took
place in less complex nancial systems, they share some important similarities to the recent
nancial turmoil.18 Before the start of the current crisis, nancial institutions across the
board in the US were heavily exposed to the real estate sector, and real estate price indices
declined signicantly. Provisioning by banks was insu¢ cient and informational asymmetries
about a single banks solvency caused a breakdown of interbank lending and a signicant
rise in interest rates for unsecured interbank loans. Regulators initially accepted failures of
some non-deposit taking institutions, such as Lehman Brothers in the US or Northern Rock
in the UK, but underestimated the consequences for risk sensitivity of lender on interbank
markets. Similar to their predecessors during the 1990s, they avoided haircuts for creditors
18This applies at least to the US and to the subprime crisis in Europe. With respect to the European
sovereign debt crisis since 2010, Europe di¤ers from Japan, which did not su¤er yet from a sovereign debt
crisis.
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due to fear of contagion and systemic crises. As deposit insurance corporations were not
funded, the initial burden of adjustment was mainly with the central banks which acted as
LLR and took considerable risks on their balance sheets. Similar to the Nordic countries and
Japan, the authorities in the recent crisis used asset purchase programmes, issued guarantees
to a large extent and partially transferred assets to bad banks (Laeven & Valencia (2010);
Laeven & Valencia (2012); Claessens, Pazarbasioglu, Laeven, Dobler, Valencia, Nedelescu &
Seal (2011)).
Despite these similarities, there are some important di¤erences in crisis reaction, especially
with respect to the Japanese case. Firstly, authorities both in the US and in Europe were more
willing to inject risk capital into ailing banks than Japanese authorities during the 1990s. While
political opposition against bank bail-outs was considerable in Japan, the US government al-
ready started in October 2008 the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)and the Capital
Purchase Program (CPP)which allowed the US Ministry of Finance to purchase troubled as-
sets from nancial institutions or to provide them with capital. In Europe, in September 2008,
the German government founded the Special Financial Market Stabilization Funds(Sonder-
fonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung, SoFFin; since 2011: Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt),
which was empowered to provide liquidity to eligible nancial institutions (mainly by guaran-
teeing debt issues) or to recapitalize ailing banks (such as Commerzbank AGor Hypo Real
Estate Holding AG). Similar programmes were also introduced in other European countries,
such as in France (Société de prise de participations de lEtat (SPPE)), in Italy (Ministry of
Economy and Finance) or in the UK (Government Recapitalization Scheme; Faeh, Grande,
Ho, King, Levy, Panetta, Signoretti, Taboga & Zaghini (2009); Petrovic & Tutsch (2009)).
Secondly, authorities in the US and in Europe quickly started implementing special bank
resolution schemes into national legislation (see Deutsche Bundesbank (2011); Cihak & Nier
(2012)). Such schemes allow authorities an orderly wind-down of systemically important
nancial institutions (SIFIs). Ordinary bankruptcy codes are usually insu¢ cient to reach that
goal because they usually stipulate a suspension of all payments after failure has been declared.
This provision intends to treat all creditors equally. Such a suspension of payments, however,
could cause considerable damage in the case of failure of a nancial institution which acts
as a clearing house for many counterparties. To prevent this damage, special bank resolution
schemes usually ensure that SIFIs continue their ordinary payment services (Fukao (2000)).
Thirdly, central banks intervened on a more massive and widespread scale than in the past,
at least with respect to liquidity support for interbank markets and particular institutions.
While during the 1990s interest rates in the Nordic countries and in Japan were kept at a high
level or even increased in order to avoid a depreciation of their currencies, interest rates in the
US and Europe were quickly decreased to a low level (Claessens et al. (2011)). In contrast
to Japan and Finland, the central banks did not inject risk capital in the course of the recent
crisis, but only provided liquidity support to nancial institutions.
Finally, the recent nancial crisis di¤ered in the economic and scal costs from the crises
in Japan and the Nordic countries. Laeven & Valencia (2012) determine gross scal costs of
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3.9% of GDP in the Euro area and 4.5% of GDP in the United States. Taking the advanced
economies into account, Laeven & Valencia (2010) calculate direct scal costs of 5.9% for the
years 2007-2009. In comparison with the Nordic countries and Japan, the scal costs in the
recent nancial crisis were rather low. Output losses amounted to 23% of GDP in the Euro
area and 31% of GDP in the US, which is higher than output losses in Norway and similar
to output losses in Sweden, but lower than output losses in Japan and Finland. In the recent
crisis the public debt increased by 19.9% of GDP in the Euro area and by 23.6% in the US.
Both gures are similar to the increase in public debt in Norway, but much lower than the
increase in debt in Sweden, Finland and Japan during the 1990s (Laeven & Valencia (2012)).
Despite these numbers, current crisis resolution packages still su¤ered from major draw-
backs which made appropriate reactions di¢ cult. One major drawback was the inability of
authorities to handle systemically important nancial institutions (SIFIs) which are considered
as being too complex to be resolved in a short period of time. In reaction, legislators became
entitled to demand SIFIs to write living willswhich describe in advance how an ailing bank
could be quickly resolved (Avgoulaeas, Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2012); Huertas (2012)).
In contrast to bankruptcy procedures for normal industrial companies, where a liquidator of-
ten commands creditor protection, it is impossible for a banking company to execute such a
suspension of payments because it could mean illiquidity for other nancial or non-nancial
companies. Therefore bankruptcy procedures for banks have to be executed very quickly and
the ailing bank has to maintain vital payments to other banks. Living wills help to distinguish
vital from non-vital payments and thus help to remove pressures from regulators to bail-out
an ailing bank because they do not know what services are vital for the functioning of the
banking system.
6.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to nd out which di¢ culties authorities face when they have to
solve a banking crisis. Our survey of the theoretical and empirical banking literature has shown
that there is no best-practicebanking crisis resolution package which dominates all others in
terms of social and scal costs and e¤ects of risk-taking. Instead, authorities face important
trade-o¤s, because instruments with only small adverse incentives for banksrisk-taking are
often costly to implement. Moreover, even the impact of single resolution instruments on
moral hazard is often not clear-cut. Since no superior policy package exists, policy reactions
are country-specic and depend on policy makers preferences. The implementation of a
preferred crisis resolution package, however, is often subject to coordination failures within the
political sector, which create additional costs for society. These coordination failures result
from suboptimal allocations of regulatory responsibilities between single authorities and from
commitment problems which force regulators to choose an inferior crisis resolution package.
Our case study has shown that policy makers in all countries considered here avoided
haircuts for creditors and thus allowed for some additional moral hazard, because they feared
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the social costs of a systemic nancial crisis. While this package made some form of bank
recapitalization necessary, authorities in Japan lacked public support and the necessary legal
instruments to provide solvency assistance to ailing banks. In addition, badly-dened political
responsibilities for bank crisis resolution and commitment problems made the implementation
of the chosen resolution package di¢ cult and costly in terms of scal outlays and output loss.
This contrasted with two of the Nordic countries, where political resentments against public
bailouts were less signicant, banks were quickly recapitalized and coordination failures were
less relevant. The resolution of the recent nancial crisis revealed some similarites, but also
di¤erences to the crises in Japan and the Nordic countries in the 1990s. At the beginning,
one attempted to solve the crisis by private solutions and to avoid moral hazard by liquidating
ailing institutions. However, when this approach failed, authorities massively injected capital
into insolvent banks and provided guarantees. Moreover, measures were often taken ad hoc.
Although many lessons learnt were incorporated into the new regulatory framework - such as
a list of available resolution tools, which lowers transaction costs - further e¤orts are necessary
to resolve future crises e¢ ciently. Firstly, coordination failures may still exist. In the Eurozone,
for instance, the European Central Banks policy is not restricted to liquidity provision. As we
have seen in Japan and Finland, a clear cut between liquidity provision and solvency assistance
may be more appropriate. Otherwise, if the central bank injects equity into ailing banks,
its incentives may change and therefore, evoke commitment problems. Secondly, political
processes of long duration should be avoided. If the political parties have to become aware
of their preferences within a crisis, the decision-making process may last too long, which may
aggrevate the crisis situation. Therefore, political parties should be aware of their preferences
ex ante. Thirdly, each resolution authority should develop a list of potential obstacles for
e¢ cient resolutions and try to eliminate them in advance. Finally, further research is necessary
in order to have a clear picture of how single resolution instruments a¤ect scal costs and
moral hazard.
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Appendix
Table 6.2: Important crisis resolution measures in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Japan
Norway Sweden Finland Japan
1988
Guarantee (CBGF) (all
claims) for a regional
commercial bank
Liquidity support and
subsidized loan (CB) 2
regional savings
1989
Small commercial bank
set under public admin-
istration
1990
Equity guarantee
(CBGF) for Fokus Bank
1991
Preference capital
(GBIF/CBGF) for
Christiania Bank and
Fokus Bank
Equity (government)
for Nordbanken
Take-over of Skopbank
by Bank of Finland
Resolution of Toho
Sogo Bank announced
Primary capital certi-
cates (GBIF/SBGF) for
2 savings banks
Loan guarantee (gov-
ernment) for Första
Sparbanken
Preference capital
(GBIF) Den norske
Share capital (GBIF) for
Fokus Bank and Chris-
tiania Bank
1992
Preferred capital
(GBIF) for Den norske
Bank
Loan provision and
loan guarantee (gov)
for Första Sparebanken
(guarantee transformed
into subsidized loan)
Preferred capital certi-
cates (convertible into
voting shares) for de-
posit banks (accepted
by all banks)
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Preferred capital and
subordinated loan
(GBIF) for Christiania
Bank
Nationalization of
Nordbanken which is
split into "Good" and
"Bad" bank (Securum)
GGF acquires Skopbank
from Bank of Finland
and injects preferred
capital certicates and
share capital
Share capital (GBIF) for
Fokus Bank
Equity capital injection
(gov) for Nordbanken
and Securum
Half of the savings
banks are merged into
Savings Bank of Finland
Primary capital certi-
cates (GBIF and SBGF)
for 4 regional banks
Government assumes
all commitments of
Gota Group and trans-
fers non-performing
loans to Securum
GGF provides subordi-
nated loans, preferred
capital certicates and
share capital for Savings
Bank of Finland
Parent company of
Gota Group declared
bankrupt
1993
Bank Support Agency
provides a convertible
guarantee for Fören-
ingsbanken
STS transferred into
bad bank and perform-
ing assets sold to KOP
GGF provides preferred
capital certicates for
Skopbank, STS-Bank
and the Savings Bank
of Finland
GGF injects share capi-
tal into Savings Bank of
Finland
1994
Announcement of the
resolution of Tokyo Ky-
owa and Anzen
1995
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GBIF sells its shares of
Fokus Bank and Chris-
tiania Bank (GBF re-
mained shareholder of
Christiania Bank until
2000 and is still share-
holder of Den norske
Bank)
Establishment of TKB
(capital injection by pri-
vate investors and BoJ)
Cosmo Credit Cooper-
ative (business trans-
ferred to TKB in 1996)
and Kizu Credit Coop-
erative suspend opera-
tions
Announcement of the
resolution of Hyogo
Bank (business trans-
ferred to Midori Bank
in 1996)
1996
Announcement of the
resolution of Taiheiyou
Bank
Hanwa Bank ordered to
suspend operations
Tokyo Kyodou Bank
reorganized into Res-
olution and Collection
Bank
1997
Announcement of the
resolution of Kyoto
Kyoei Bank, Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank and
Tokyo City Bank
BoJ declares all de-
posits to be secured
1998
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Issuance of preferred
capital and subor-
dinated loans to 21
banks
LTC and NCB placed
under Special Public
Administration (nation-
alized)
1999
Kokumin Bank, Kou-
fuku Bank, Tokyo Sowa
Bank, Namihaya Bank
and Niigate Chuo Bank
placed under manage-
ment of FRA (liquidity
support by BoJ and bad
loans transferred to the
RCC)
Issuance of preferred
shares and subordinated
debt until 2002 (32
banks)
2003
Issuance of subordi-
nated debt (1 bank)
and issuance of com-
mon and preferred
shares (1 bank)
2006
Issuance of preferred
shares until 2009 (5
banks)
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Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation was to analyse the e¤ects of selected intervention measures during
nancial crises on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. In the theoretical part, we focused on
the impact of bank bailouts and a bank levy on banksrisk behaviour. An overview of potential
regulatory instruments and their impact on bank behaviour was provided in the chapter, where
a case-study was presented.
A main result is that the relation between bank bailouts and risk behaviour depends on the
banksmacroeconomic environment, the regulators ability to evaluate how the bank in distress
is a¤ected by the macroeconomic situation and on the interconnectedness of banks. These
factors should be taken into account when empirical studies are launched. A best practice
policy, however, is still a major task in economic research. The literature still does not provide
clear predictions about the e¤ects of rescue measures.
An adequate allocation of responsibilities plays a key role, not only in the success of
banking crisis resolution, but also in the relationship between bailouts and risk-taking. The
nancial crises in Japan and the Nordic countries in the 1990s have shown that the absence
of institutions whose key responsibility is to intervene in case of emergency may extend the
crisis and raise costs. Since regulators have their own incentives when deciding about whether
to rescue or liquidate, it can be a di¢ cult task to allocate these responsibilities properly. In
the European Monetary Union, the regulation for bank recovery and resolution has recently
been adopted. However, agreements about burden sharing have not been signed yet, at
least, on a global level. As long as this challenge has not been accepted and solved, the
supervisory framework will be fragile. Since host, home and multinational authorities have
di¤erent incentives to rescue or/and to liquidate nancial institutions, it remains unclear who
rescues or liquidates when. This ambiguity can be benecial from a risk point of view in
some circumstances, but the avoidance of moral hazard is not the unique aim of a prudent
regulation.
Fiscal costs and output losses are important factors, too. Whether such an ambiguity
saves costs remains doubtful. The cost issue also plays its role when deciding about the
proper bailout instruments. Especially small countries might be unable to bear the whole
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scal costs of rescue measures. The determination of how costly selected instruments are and
how e¤ective they are with regard to a solution of the crisis and to the prevention of distortive
incentives among banks then becomes an even more important and urgent task, especially if
assistance from other countries or international institutions is required.
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Referat
This thesis is concerned with the relation between bank regulation and the risk-taking behaviour
of banks. Two major instruments of regulatory intervention are considered: bank levy and bank
bailouts. The major objective of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following questions:
Do bank levies increase the risk-taking of banks in a competitive environment? When do bank
bailouts decrease banks risk-taking? Does the international coordination of bank bailouts
a¤ect the relation between bailouts and the risk-taking behaviour of banks? Who should
rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks? How could an e¢ cient bailout policy be designed
and implemented?
The bank levy and cooperation between national regulators play an important role in
the recently adopted Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). This directive is a
cornerstone of bank regulation in Europe. Although the conversion of debt into equity (bail-
in) in emergencies is the key component of the current regulation, bailouts, or at least the
assistance to struggling banks, should not be excluded. As the ordinary resolution tools, for
instance, bail-in, have not yet been tested in a real crisis, and due to the fact that it will take
time to prepare global institutions for such a tool, it may be useful to have an adequately
designed "tool of last resort" available, such as an adequate bailout policy, in order to avoid
the disruption of critical economic functions.
We show that a bank levy may decrease banksrisk-taking behaviour. Bank bailouts can
also decrease the risk-taking of banks. This depends on the regulators ability to condition his
bailout policy in accordance with the macroeconomic environment, which has an impact on
the banksprobability of success, or on his ability to condition the bailout policy on the banks
systemic relevance. Coordination of bailouts through a multinational regulator can improve
welfare. The desirability of internationally coordinated bailouts depends on the dimension
of the crisis. If the crisis is severe, it may be more e¢ cient to delegate bank bailouts to a
multinational regulator. However, such a delegation is not always feasible. Therefore, a pre-
dened burden sharing of bank bailouts is necessary in order to achieve an e¢ cient resolution
of banks in distress.
